56. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Guatemala1
284221. Military Addees Handle as Specat Exclusive. Subject: Guatemalan Foreign Minister’s Meeting With Deputy Secretary and Other Department Officials. Ref: State 281673.2
1. (S-Entire text)
2. Summary: In a meeting with the Deputy Secretary October 17, Guatemalan Foreign Minister Francisco Castillo had little to add to the information on the UK/GOG talks on Belize we had received two days earlier from British FCO Minister of State Ridley. Castillo confirmed that no settlement had been reached because of the differences on the land issue. However, he said the Guatemalans were determined to find a negotiated solution and that negotiations would continue. Castillo also met jointly with Assistant Secretary Derian (HA) and Deputy Assistant Secretary Bushnell (ARA), with human rights the principal topic of discussion.3 Despite the exhaustive treatment given this issue, there seemed to be no meeting of minds between Castillo and the Department officials. End summary.
3. Belize: The meeting with the Deputy Secretary focused primarily on Belize. The Deputy Secretary opened by noting that Minister Ridley had been very complimentary of the way Castillo had conducted the negotiations. Alluding to the difficult decision the GOG would be facing on Belize, the Deputy Secretary expressed hope that a solution to the dispute could be found. He said the US would be reassessing its own position on Belize for the upcoming vote on the UN resolution, but added that the US would not take a stand that would handicap a negotiated settlement. Comment: We find it remarkable that Castillo did not seize the opportunity at this point or later in the conversation to request that the US abstain again on the resolution this year. We do not know whether this was a simple oversight on his part, or indicates that the GOG has already written us off on this question or reflects a disinterest in our vote. End comment.
4. Castillo confirmed the report we had received earlier from the British that no settlement had been achieved in the October 13–14 New [Page 159] York talks. Territory remained the major sticking point. Without adding specifics, Castillo said his government was insisting that a negotiated settlement contain “an ingredient of territory.” The British had deferred to the Belizeans on this key question. The Belizean position was that Guatemala could have some “territorial sea and perhaps some cays,” but no other land. The GOG would study and expand upon the 16-point proposal presented by the British in New York. However, Castillo did not believe it would be possible to achieve a consensus resolution on Belize at the UN this year because a number of points remained to be resolved. (Comment: In his conversation with us October 15, FCO Minister of State Ridley gave no indication that the Belizeans were willing to cede sovereignty over any cays, although he said Premier Price had proposed leasing some cays to the GOG as part of a settlement. End comment.)
5. Castillo characterized the Belize dispute as a great waste of his government’s time. He was of the opinion that the GOG must accept “an honorable solution” to this dispute. He added that the Belizeans also would eventually realize they would have to come to terms with their much larger neighbor (Guatemala). Castillo lavished praise on comportment of the UK negotiators. “We are turning a huge problem into a beautiful friendship,” he said.
6. Human Rights: The lengthy meeting with Assistant Secretary Derian (HA) and DAS Bushnell (ARA) dwelled exclusively on the question of the human rights situation in Guatemala and its impact on US/GOG relations.
7. The discussion was suspended for the meeting with the Deputy Secretary. While walking in the hall, Derian suggested to Castillo that the matters they were dealing with were serious and important. Castillo agreed. She then suggested that they might reach better understanding if they did not consider it a negotiation which required points and scorekeeping. Castillo had been countering every issue to that point with a statement whether or not it had relevance to the point. After agreeing to suspend the fencing, he abandoned that tactic and addressed the topics more directly.
8. DAS Bushnell outlined the foreign policy dilemma Guatemala posed for the US On the one hand the US wanted to cooperate more closely with the Lucas government to resist the Marxists. But on the other we were prevented from doing so by the high level of illegal political violence in Guatemala, some of which was attributable to the official security forces. In some detail Bushnell explained how US human rights legislation would continue to play a determining and restricting role in US/Guatemalan relations until the GOG began to take steps to deal with the problem of illegal political violence. He noted in passing that this same legislation recently had compelled the [Page 160] US to refuse to allow a shipment of ammunition from South Korea to transit the US enroute to Guatemala.
9. Castillo after complaining that we did not understand the extent and validity of the GOG’s fear, volunteered with a wry expression, “Look at our new friends, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Uruguay,” then he shrugged. Derian said that it was obvious that those countries would like to have Guatemala follow their course to give it validity.
10. Bushnell pointed out that the US did not demand or expect perfection on the part of the GOG. But the GOG would have to demonstrate it was trying to address its human rights problems. Bushnell also observed that despite suspicions in some Guatemalan circles, the USG was not hostile to the GOG and had no intention of tampering with Guatemala’s constitutional order.
11. Assistant Secretary Derian said that governments which resorted to illegal violence—even to deal with subversion—eventually lost their moral authority, strengthening those very groups which were attempting to subvert them. Derian noted that in discussions with a number of Guatemalans, there seemed to be the idea that the USG did not care what happened to the country or that we were trying to destabilize the government. On the contrary, we believed that suspension of citizen rights was destabilizing. She cautioned the GOG not to be fooled into thinking that Argentina offered a desireable model for dealing with subversion. Any government which clamped down in order to control would meet with great difficulty once it decided to loosen up.
12. Castillo said he was pleased to learn that the US had no hostile intentions toward Guatemala. Events in Nicaragua and El Salvador as well as statements by several ARA officials had given him and others in Guatemala doubts. DAS Bushnell responded that those statements had been distorted by persons who wished to misrepresent the US position.
13. Assistant Secretary Derian noted Castillo had not heard her position previously on Guatemala and that she would tell him what it was: Guatemala is a country with serious human rights problems, two in particular: torture and killings by death squads which seem to operate under some umbrella of government protection. Although, Castillo had earlier evaded the subject of torture, by giving a detailed explanation of the new “farm” prison system, he nodded, seeming to indicate he understood what she was referring to. All other human rights concerns were discussed or named in the subsequent discussion.
14. Castillo said the US had nothing to teach Guatemala about human rights. Guatemalans had been talking and writing about this subject for four centuries. The Lucas government also favored human rights. But unlike the Carter administration, GOG support for human [Page 161] rights was based on principle, not political expediency. Castillo said he was saddened by current US policy toward Guatemala. The GOG was now being forced to identify with such “de facto” governments as Argentina and Chile. The US should understand that his country, Castro’s prime target in Central America, was now locked in a struggle against Cuban-supported subversive forces.
15. Later in the conversation Castillo volunteered that Guatemala’s judicial system left much to be desired. Judges were threatened and bribed to release criminals and subversives, forcing people to take matters into their own hands. The USG should understand that in this sense, Guatemala today is in many ways comparable to the American West a hundred years ago. It was unfair to hold his country to the standard of a European nation. Much of the violence stemmed from the low educational and cultural level of the people. The GOG was trying to redress this legacy of ignorance of many years standing, but the process would take time. The security forces merely reflected the existing cultural levels of the nation. In the meantime, they could not be expected to act as responsibly as their much better educated counterparts in the US and other developed countries.
16. Castillo said it had been a mistake for the US to terminate military training for the Guatemalan Army. A new generation of young Guatemalan officers was growing with hard line attitudes because of a lack of contact with US military counterparts. The US was losing an opportunity to impart human rights values.
17. Castillo stressed his government’s desire for good relations with the US as well as to receive US military training and other assistance. However, if the question of US assistance to Guatemala were a source of contention within the US, and as a consequence contributed to frictions between the two countries, he would prefer to dispense with any US assistance.
18. Bushnell informed Castillo that he would be travelling to Belize at the end of the month for talks on Belize and other Central American issues with Premier Price, and to review the operations of our Consulate General.
19. Comment: In terms of agreement on any future, improved human rights situation, the discussion was inconclusive. In terms of heightened understanding of the US position and concerns in human rights matters, Assistant Secretary Derian believes that it was useful and important. End comment.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800508–0717. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Also sent Immediate to Belize City, USUN, London, and USDOCOSOUTH Quarry Heights. Drafted by Mack; cleared in ARA/CEN, HA, D, and S/S–O; approved by Bushnell.↩
- See Document 55.↩
- No record of Castillo’s meeting with Derian and Bushnell was found.↩