Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

432. Telegram From the Embassy in El Salvador to the Department of State¹

San Salvador, May 26, 1980, 2245Z

3677. Subj: Updating our Strategy for El Salvador. Ref A. State 70429² B. San Salvador 2038,³ C. State 132366.⁴

1. (S-Entire text)

2. Summary

A. In recent weeks, El Salvador’s Revolutionary Governing Junta (JRG) has survived another rightwing coup attempt, a threatened split in the armed forces, a pull-out ultimatum by the Christian Democratic Party, a wrenching social change in the form of “land to the tiller” and ultraleft calls for mass violence on May 1, 7, and 20. It has also withstood a foreign propaganda campaign designed to portray it as a militaristic, reactionary regime and to rally international support for the newly-formed Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR), a coalition of non-Communist groups dominated by the Marxist “coordinadora,” the umbrella organization that shelters the three main revolutionary blocs and their terrorist action arms. Meanwhile, a new coalition of private enterprise groups willing to back the JRG has passed through complex negotiations and, given the failure of the ultraright to pull off its coup, may soon emerge as a positive force on the moderate right.

B. Despite a wave of crises—the Archbishop’s assassination, his violence-plagued funeral, the D’Aubuisson coup attempt, Col. Majano’s arrest of the plotters, the showdown vote in the armed forces, D’Aubuisson’s release, the PDC’s swallowed ultimatum—the JRG is still in office and the strategy outlined in the two reftels has thus far succeeded in attaining that overriding goal, the survival of a moderate, reformist civil-military coalition government. Other key goals seem close to attainment: the reforms are being implemented that will restructure this society from top to bottom and, as a consequence, the far left is losing its appeal and declining in its ability to muster mass support.

C. But we seem as far as ever from reducing the violence from the ultraright. On the contrary, brutal murders of anyone suspected of liberal views, even Christian Democrats, produce a harvest of mutilated bodies by the roadside every morning. Security forces excesses against peasant villages have not declined either and in fact seem to be on the increase. Far left violence has declined in the cities but is on the rise in the countryside where all-out efforts are being made to sabotage the land reform and intimidate the peasantry into refusing to plant this yeae’s crops. The national economy is already in serious straits and the failure to plant on a large scale could produce economic collapse. Serious new problems require us to update the strategy of several months ago and new political opportunities that derive from the JRG’s sheer survival make it possible to consider electoral plans that might reduce the violence and divert revolutionary pressures into more conventional political channels. This cable assesses the gains to date, proposes modifications in our strategy and suggests short-term tactical moves aimed at advancing our overall interests in El Salvador. Most importantly, this message points out that the chief threat to this government comes not from the extreme left or extreme right but from within the military and particularly from the military High Command. The issue we must confront is who governs: a JRG committed to break with the past, human rights, and a valid process towards democracy; or the military High Command whose leaders are implicated in attempted coups against the JRG, who tolerate or encourage torture and murder on a grand scale, and who want to maintain military control over this country, with a fig leaf if necessary, preferably without it. This attitude is opposed by at least 40 percent of the officer corps of the military. The risks of a split are obvious and there is a real danger that this present division could politically damage Junta leader Col. Jaime Abdul Gutierrez. This state of affairs has obvious implications for when and under what conditions we grant military assistance. End summary.

3. From the outset of revolutionary activitiy in 1977 until approximately three months ago, the extreme leftists logged victory after victory, gain after gain, until in the eyes of people of El Salvador and the rest of the world their triumph appeared inevitable. The far left’s unimpeded advance depended on great measure on the widespread perception that the future of El Salvador offered only two choices: a revolution brought about by the Marxist popular organizations (BPR, FAPU, LP–28) and their terrorist underground elements (FPL, FARN, ERP) in alliance with the Church, the universities and key leftist actors on the international scene or the imposition by force of a repressive and unjust government run by the traditional alliance of top military officers and the very rich. The position of the United States was either misunderstood or subject to misinterpretation. The Church and the intellectual community convinced themselves that their influence with the left was sufficient to moderate the revolution enough to make it acceptable to the United States. The forces of the right were just as certain that when the choice came the United States would support its traditional allies—the military and the rich.

4. Although the revolution of Oct 15, 1979, was supposed to change radically this political equation by providing a third force, the first civilian-military junta failed (Jan 1980). This failure can be attributed to two interdependent causes: (1) high level military opposition to radical reform and (2) United States’ support of the reform program and for the civilians in the Junta was half-hearted, intermittent, and indecisive.

5. The Christian Democrats then joined the military in the second attempt to put together a viable coalition. The second junta was widely regarded as a temporary expedient thrown together hastily by the United States to avoid a complete failure of the Oct 15 revolution. It was not given much chance to succeed. Then it began to appear to the oligarchy that the United States might be serious about backing the Junta and its reform program. The word was passed to the still dominant rightwingers in the military to avert this nightmare by staging a coup. The United States made know publicly as well as privately its total opposition to the coup, and it was postponed until a more favorable occasion. Meanwhile, groundwork was laid by cashiered military officers, led by ex-Mayor d’Aubuisson, in Miami, Washington, and Guatemala to combine political support abroad with rightwing terrorism here to demoralize and destroy Junta II. Before the assassinations and bombings could have their full impact, however, in rapid succession came the government decrees carrying out a sweeping program of export control boards, agrarian reform, and bank nationalizations.

6. The far right, by this time desperate, killed the most important political and moral leader of El Salvador, Archbishop Romero,⁵ with the hope of provoking a violent, spontaneous mass uprising which could be brutally suppressed by the security forces with thousands killed among the far left and the moderates in a campaign to wipe out all rival political leadership and leave the military in firm control.

This, they reasoned, was necessary to save the country from anarchy. It would also end in repeal of the reforms. No mass uprising occurred, in part because the reforms had defused popular discontent and in part because people were sick of violence from psychopaths on the left and the right. The leftwing terrorists discredited themselves by turning the Archbishop’s funeral into a bloody circus while the government intelligently kept its troops in the barracks.

7. Having weathered these blows successfully, the government started to take on some semblance of coherence and form. The international press began to recognize the bare possibility that a government capable of giving land to hundreds of thousands of peasants might have the potential to stay in power. The Church, although saddened by the assassination of the Archbishop, foreswore blind rage and began rethinking its position of outright support for the radical Marxists, started taking a more positive view of the reforms introduced by the government and voiced a more even-handed condemnation of the violence from the left as well as from the right.

8. By this point the rich and powerful were thoroughly frightened and increasingly desperate. They collected over a million dollars to sponsor ex-Mayor Roberto d’Aubuisson’s second try at putting together a coalition of key officers in the armed forces to overthrow the government and roll back the reforms. Twenty million dollars more were promised to participants if the coup was successful. This time success seemed certain because several members of the military High Command, who had been passing participants the last time around, took an active part and encouraged D’Aubuisson as he circulated through the military camps recruiting officers and men to his case.

9. The coup plotters chose Junta member Colonel Adolfo Majano as their chief target. PDC member Morales Ehrlich, Bete Noir of the oligarchy, was also on their ouster list.⁶ Majano warned the other military members of the Junta, Col. Abdul Gutierrez, of the danger but he was ignored. We again made clear our rejection of any coup or any disguised coup to be achieved by putting in a “reformed” Junta. The coup did not succeed because of our opposition and the opposition of the PDC, but neither had it failed. The plotters continued to meet.

10. Stung by this second attempt against him by his military colleagues, Majano rallied the younger, more progressive officers around him and demanded that the coup plotters be punished. Learning of a meeting at a farm near San Salvador of those involved in the coup, he sent a group of officers loyal to him to arrest the plotters. Twenty-three people, led by ex-Mayor d’Aubuisson, were captured, together with substantial evidence which, if followed up, would implicate not only important civilians but also active duty officers including at a minimum, Vice Minister of Defense Nicolas Carranza, also implicated in the earlier rightist coup attempt in February.⁷

11. The Christian Democrats, tired of providing a civilian figleaf for the military, threatened to resign en masse if D’Aubuisson and the other plotters were not punished. They also demanded that at least one or two members of the military ruling clique be shifted out of the High Command. This played into the hands of the rightwing military officers and even with D’Aubuisson in jail, the coup attempt kept going.

12. The High Command denounced Col. Majano for violating the chain of command by having D’Aubuisson arrested without the approval of the Junta or the Minister of Defense and organized a series of meetings of all active duty military officers that ended in a vote giving Col. Gutierrez operational control of the armed forces by a 60–40 margin. The High Command found a pretext to release D’Aubuisson because they could not risk an investigation and trial that almost certainly would reveal their involvement in both coup plots against the government.⁸ Perhaps more importantly, they hoped to force the Christian Democrats and Col. Majano out of the government, thereby achieving the objectives of the D’Aubuisson coup and perhaps making at least some of them eligible for a share of the oligarchy’s proffered twenty million dollars. But the Christian Democrats and Majano declined to play their prescribed roles and, with our encouragement, elected to stay in the Junta and fight the rightists from within.⁹

13. These political events took place against a background of appalling violence which can be explained but never defended. Much of it comes from the far right—death squads and paramilitary elements that have close links, if not complete identity, with the security forces. Counter-terror by the armed leftist guerrillas is aimed both at the rightwing paramilitary groups and at innocent peasants who are being threatened with death, and examples made among them, to prevent planting and thereby undermine success of the land reform, the left’s biggest fear.

14. The far left still has guerrilla forces in the countryside but has lost its capacity to muster mass demonstrations in San Salvador. People are afraid. They want an end to the violence. Even sophisticated residents of the capital now see the extreme left as doctrinaire Marxist-Leninist whose total commitment to violence precludes any but a fully Marxist solution to the problems of the country. Giving up on the urban masses for the time being, the forces of the extreme left have shifted their focus to the countryside and are menacing the campesinos to prevent planting, trying to bring about the failure of the agrarian reform and a breakdown of the rural economy.

15. Even worse is the killing by the government’s security forces and their rightwing allies, the para-military thugs who threaten and kill with greater barbarism than the far left. To them, this government is a transitory phenomenon. The real power is the military and anyone who shows any sign of independence is tortured and killed. Their reign of terror is also preventing the campesinos from planting and helps create the impression that the reforms are a fake and will end up a failure.

16. There are elements of the military which do not go along with the brutality. They are especially visible in the army. Some of these are effectively carrying the fight to the real enemy—the armed, foreign-trained guerrillas—who are suffering more and more casualties in front-on fights with government troops. This type of military action against armed guerrillas, we of course encourage. But the sickening slaughter of unarmed and innocent people goes on. Death squads, reportedly drawn from the national police, execute young men and women nightly, often after hours of torture. No member of the rightwing paramilitary organizations has ever been arrested. The government is impotent. The High Command disclaims responsibility.

17. Here is the worst dilemma U.S. policy faces in El Salvador. We have achieved considerable success on the political front but at a tremendous cost in innocent lives. Ideologically the extreme left is weak and floundering: The reforms have taken away their program; the legitimate violence by military against armed terrorists has killed many of their best militants; random and selective terror has had its effect as well; young people know that mere attendance at a university meeting is enough to mark them for torture and death. Those who look on this mayhem with tolerance, believing that the terror will be worth its cost if it prevents people from taking part in rebel activities, leave out a crucial factor. The target of the rightwing slaughter is not only or principally the extreme left but anyone who is against the oligarchy/military combine, including PDC members and their supporters of the present government. At least twenty Christian Democrat leaders have died at the hands of the paramilitary groups.

18. This government can and must succeed—and is succeeding against the extreme left. A political process is now possible that can gain the support of the Church, the private sector and much of the moderate leadership to the right and left of the government. A constituent assembly and elections can be realized regardless of the destructive activities of the extreme left.

19. The success to date against the left does not necessarily mean that it is permanently weakened. With no real issue at the moment, it is temporarily morbibund. But should the rightwing military succeed in destroying the Junta and establishing a military government with some “independent” civilian participation, go promptly to work to undo the reforms and kill off the political opposition, then the far left will be the beneficiary of an important transfusion of strength, both from younger political leaders of the Christian Democrats and Army officers. Civil war would soon begin and, fairly soon, would mean the end of all international support for the government. Mexico would break relations; the Andean Pact would condemn its repressive, reactionary policies; Europe would condemn the atrocities. The international organizations devoted to human rights and civilized politics would find the United States guilty of political idiocy if we continue to support a fascist, military GOES. In the end, we would lose anyway and the most fanatic of the leftists would come to power. The crucial problem the United States must face is that without some significant changes in the military this government will eventually fail.

20. In an extraordinary poll of all military officers whether to recognize Col. Abdul Gutierrez or Col. Majano as the Junta member from whom the military would receive orders, Gutierrez won over Majano but Majano received just under 40 percent of the votes. It is clear that Majano has the majority of the younger, more professional officers of all the services and probably can count on the support of most Army as opposed to security forces officers. The fact is that Majano’s units are mostly here in the city and he controls the communications facilities and the artillery as well. He is far from finished if he plays his cards right. Majano’s defeat was organized in part by those who either tolerated or supported the attempted coup. D’Aubuisson’s release has added another destablizing factor to the situation.¹⁰ The old guard will not rest until Majano and the Christian Democrats are out and the incipient threat from the younger officers is solved by transfers and resignations. Majano and the younger officers recognize this reality and are planning what to do about it.

21. Here is our dilemma. The primary objective of our policy is to save the military as an institution and bring about basic reforms and a valid process towards democracy. But the military is divided and we are supporting those in the military who oppose what we stand for, oppose what the Christian Democrats stand for, and oppose what at least 40 percent of the military officers stand for.

22. We are handicapped in seeing the problem clearly because of our closeness to Junta strongman Colonel Jaime Abdul Gutierrez. Day in and day out he has proved to be a solid, dependable leader who more than any other Junta member is responsible for the successful launching of the reforms. But at the same time, Gutierrez is becoming identified in the minds of the younger officers as closely allied with the rightwing High Command whom the younger officers despise as politically backward, morally primitive and professionally flawed. This has the effect of causing a destructive rivalry between Gutierrez and Col. Majano, when in reality the two men are both progressive, professional military men committed to the same program for El Salvador as in the United States.

23. If we do not confront this problem and come to a logical answer, we run the substantial risk of a split in the Junta and a split in the military with potentially serious consequences. If it comes to a confrontation and the younger officers win out, which is entirely possible, we would lose Gutierrez and his steadying hand, plus a substantial number of valuable, conservative but basically apolitical officers; if the younger officers lose, Majano would leave, the Christian Democrats would leave, and the country would be back to the status quo ante and the left would take on new life.

24. What do we do, first about the rightwing coup plotters in the military who, by no coincidence, are also guilty of winking at rightist repression? The key to success for us is not complicated but it is difficult. We must begin by recognizing that Col. Abdul Gutierrez and Col. Majano are not philosophical enemies but allies. They are in opposition to one another only because the High Command represents the real power and is able to play the two Junta colonels off against each other. So long as the High Command stays together the Junta cannot impose its will on the military establishment. Therefore, we must cause a realignment in the High Command. We have to insist on the transfer of Vice-Minister Carranza to some overseas post right now and call for the abolition of the notorious Treasury police who although they number less than five hundred, are a symbol of all that has been evil in this country and must be changed.

25. These two actions, which call for coordinated initiatives on our part here and in Washington, will make clear that military officers cannot indulge in coup plotting (as Carranza has twice) with impunity and that the future belongs to those who want a professional military establishment free from political alliances with the extreme right. We must make crystal clear once and for all that we see no salvation but rather civil war and defeat on the far right. If something very close to this does not take place, and soon, we will have more plotting and counter-plotting as well as an upsurge in popular revulsion against the JRG and the result will be the failure of this government and defeat for U.S. policy in this small but important country.

26. We must confront this issue and decide how we are to proceed before we can come to an intelligent decision whether to move forward with military assistance in an important way. Trucks and communications equipment are one thing, helicopters and mobile training teams are quite another. Before we commit ourselves to this kind of program with all it implies, we must be clear on who we are supporting and why and where such a decision will take us.

27. Next, on the political warfare front, we should cut all ties, real or perceived, with the ultraright in this country immediately. D’Aubuisson’s visa denial under 212(A)27 should be announced in Washington as soon as possible. He is a dangerous terrorist and perhaps the worst immediate threat to our interests in this country. For similar consideration, I will soon submit a list of those who led the demonstration against the Embassy, who called on the Marines to desert, and who attempted to keep me prisoner in the residence.¹¹ I recommend that the FBI, IRS, and INS give special attention to the gang of rightwing fanatics who have made Miami their headquarters, who are transferring vast sums of money out of this country and who publish lists of U.S. Government officials they accuse of being Communists. These people are dangerous and should be taught that they cannot carry out their plots in our country with immunity.¹²

28. What can we do to divert the political struggle into more conventional political channels, reducing the level of violence and delivering the enfeebled left another political blow? The coming weeks are likely to see even more violence from the extreme left, coupled with efforts by the Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR) to broaden its support and isolate the JRG. Operating on a narrow political base, dependent on consensus within the armed forces, and burdened by economic crisis, administrative incompetence, and security force heavy-handedness, the Junta will continue to be severely tested. The extreme left’s continued fragmentation and inability to generate broad popular support will hopefully provide a measure of relief, nonetheless.

29. Despite more severe problems, and if requisite external financial and political support can be obtained, it may be possible for the Junta to gather strength: traumatic reform efforts have now reached a plateau, coup planners in the military have been rebuffed for the time being, Junta/Cabinet functionaries may improve as a result of personnel restructuring, and there are promising signs of a possible government-private sector rapproachement.

30. In the coming weeks, we propose to promote three political objectives here: (a) a rapproachement between the JRG, the private sector, and moderate elements not represented in the Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR). This effort might lead to formation of a reform and election-oriented “democratic alliance” (Alianza Democratica) incorporating private sector representatives with PDC members of the government and thereby creating a political alternative to the FDR; (b) new Washington backed pressure on the military High Command to make required institutional changes in the security forces to place them under tighter discipline and control in order to minimize repression; and (c) formation of a committee—as an outcome of the church-sponsored national dialogue or the Alianza Democratica exercise—to work up and negotiate “rules of the game” to govern an election for a constitutent assembly within a reasonable time period.

31. Internationally, the Department could simultaneously undertake strong lobbying with key foreign states pointing to the JRG’s successes to date and prospects for progress in the above three areas to argue against writing off the Junta. It would be particularly helpful if the European governments would reopen their Embassies. This lobbying effort could also lay the groundwork for broadened support, particularly in Europe and Japan, for seeking extensive international financial assistance that will be needed here.

32. I believe thought should now be given to supporting and perhaps stimulating a political timetable that is already under consideration within PDC and those [garble] is to normalize and, hopefully, civilize political activity in El Salvador. The immediate objective would be to link the JRG and all the moderates in the country behind a political movement with real national purpose. There is an obvious U.S. interest in strengthening and broadening the moderate forces of the center here. The various crises of the last three months may be working in our favor. As noted above, the traumatic impact of the Romero assassination, plus attendant and independent violence since have stimulated a widespread call for the end of bloodshed and political mayhem. Various groups including the Church, civic and private organizations, as well as, we estimate, the vast majority of Salvadorans, are looking for ways to replace murder and fear with national conciliation and dialogue.

33. We believe a political plan can now be considered that would incorporate the following elements:

—Announcement of a definite timetable for a return to elected civilian rule, perhaps by mid-1981. (Junta member Morales Ehrlich commented to us recently that 1981 would be about the maximum life span of the JRG.)

—As a first step a national referendum (as PDC leader Alvergue has suggested) under international observation to:

A) Stimulate broad support for the reformist thrust of the government from El Salvador’s “silent majority”;

B) Condemn and isolate the violence;

C) Endorse the political timetable.

(As an alternative, Duarte has suggested municipal elections—especially since the PDC now controls most municipalities—as a first step but other PDC leaders are concerned that local intimidation by the left could produce some undesirable electoral results.)

34. In either case, the next step in the process would be the election of a constituent assembly to incorporate revolutionary change in the country’s basic law and set new directions and responsibilities for an elected government. All political groups would be permitted to participate, including the extreme left and right. (The fact that some elements, especially on the left, would boycott such an assembly and probably try to disrupt it could isolate them even further from the national mainstream.) The election of the assembly would serve as a test of national sentiment and relative political strength (perhaps answering the interesting and much debated question of how much support the PDC still really enjoys); it would also be a forum where moderates or the right and left might be able to hammer out a consensus in the interest of mutual survival.

35. Finally, the assembly would complete its work within the timetable established in the referendum and would turn the government over to a civilian regime either through presidential/legislative elections or by “constitutionalizing” itself and selecting a President from its own membership. This scenario, of course, assumes a number of things:

—That military can be convinced that the transfer of government is the best means to assure the protection of their institution and survival of a nonCommunist state. The military will remain the single most important political force here but might prefer to be somewhat less in the spotlight, serving instead as “guardian” of national reforms. They would obviously have to offer the strongest commitment, in word and deed, to a fair election process.

—That violence can be brought down to “acceptable” levels so that the referendum and constituent assembly processes can be carried out with a fair degree of national participation (the referendum vote would be the initial test of this)

—That a significant degree of international support and endorsement for the plan can be won, especially from some of the other Central Americans and the democratically oriented Andean group, as well as the U.S. and perhaps the OAS. This would blunt momentum of the “international front” of the extremists organizing to overthrow the JRG by means of international opprobrium.

36. We believe that we should begin to consult informally with civilian and military members of the government as well as with moderate forces and institutions (the Church will be particularly important) about how such a blueprint could be designed and then sold to the nation. We believe the time is approaching when some sort of consensus on the broad outlines of El Salvador’s future is beginning to jell. Alternatively, to permit the JRG to drift politically or even think about how to deal with the sort of rightwing Junta we have been threatened with twice in the last three months will only worsen, not end, the violence and complete the radicalization of Salvadoran society.

White

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P890105–1574. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
2. See Document 427.
3. See footnote 2, Document 428.
4. In telegram 132366 to San Salvador, May 20, the Department wrote to White expressing concern over the political situation in El Salvador and the “fundamental lack of consultation” between the military and the civilian components of the government. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880137–1505)
5. See Document 429.
6. In telegram 3087 from San Salvador, May 2, White reported: “rightist officers and enlisted men are seeking to oust Junta members Majano and Morales Ehrlich. Success of this maneuver would probably lead to departure of PDC from government and consequent political isolation of JRG.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 20, El Salvador: 4/80–7/80)
7. In telegram 3269 from San Salvador, May 8, White reported on Majano’s May 7 arrest of “seventeen coup plotters led by the right-wing extremist ex-Major d’Aubuisson.” White also noted that the JRG was facing its “worst crisis yet.” (Ibid.) In telegram 3268 from San Salvador, May 8, White transmitted a “copy of a draft manifesto captured at the time of Major d’Aubuisson’s arrest, evidently to be released to the public at the opening of the rightwing coup that was scheduled to begin May 1.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800228–0899) Muskie’s May 9 memorandum to Carter described the current crisis in El Salvador regarding the coup plotters and commented: “If the JRG weathers this crisis, it will be strengthened and the extreme right weakened. If the military supports the right and the PDC leaves the government, the prospects for moderate, non-violent solutions would be greatly diminished and we would have to reassess our policy of support for the JRG.” (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretary, Subject Files of Edmund S. Muskie, 1963–1981, Lot 83D66, Box 3, 1980 Muskie Breakfast)
8. In telegram 3287 from San Salvador, May 9, White reported on his meeting that day with Gutierrez and Majano about the arrest of the plotters. White informed them that “action would have to be taken against the captured coup plotters or else the JRG’s civilian component would walk out and the outside world would lose all faith in the JRG.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 20, El Salvador: 4/80–7/80)
9. In telegram 3376 from San Salvador, May 13, White reported on his efforts to convince Majano to stay in the Junta. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])
10. In telegram 3410 from San Salvador, May 14, White reported that D’Aubuisson and others arrested for coup-plotting had been released on May 13. White commented that “Majano has been struck a serious blow bringing into question his ability and willingness to continue on in the Junta.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800239–0297) In his May 16 Evening Report to Brzezinski, Pastor noted: “The Christian Democrats (PDC) have apparently decided to remain in the GOES despite the release of the coup plotter D’Aubuisson, on the rationale that their exit would worsen the situation. Napoleon Duarte told Ambassador White that this latest development had left him feeling ‛used, battered and deceived.’ Duarte is convinced now that Vice Minister of Defense Carranza has important links with the extreme right, and exercises the real power of the High Command. Whether Colonel Majano will agree to stay on in the Junta is now very much in doubt. White plans to talk to him today. White communicated our great displeasure with the release of D’Aubuisson through our Milgroup who informed the Defense Minister that we are suspending for the time being a decision on helicopters and MTT’s.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Subject Files, Box 55, Evening Reports: 4/80–8/80)
11. In telegram 3313 from San Salvador, May 12, the Embassy reported on a “crowd of rightist demonstrators” at the Ambassador’s residence who placed loudspeakers to announce that “the U.S. Ambassador was a prisoner and would not be permitted to leave his residence until the government released ex-Major D’Aubuisson, leader of the failed coup.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800234–1214)
12. In his July 2 Evening Report to Brzezinski, Pastor noted that he had alerted the Immigration and Naturalization Service that D’Aubuisson, who had been denied a visa, was holding press conferences in Washington and would be at a meeting in Congress. Pastor’s call prompted D’Aubuisson’s arrest and subsequent deportation. Brzezinski wrote in response: “good.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 21, El Salvador: 6/80–7/80)