Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

431. Telegram From the Embassy in El Salvador to the Department of State¹

San Salvador, April 12, 1980, 1830Z

2613. Pass White House. Subj: Efforts to Divide the Military. Ref A. State 94375,² B. San Salvador 2510.³

1. (S-Entire text)

2. Discussions over the last two days with all Junta members except Majano (absent) and Avalos (irrelevant) as well as with Minister of Defense Garcia, Minister of Agriculture Orellana and shadowy political operators have convinced me that the effort to divide the military is neither far advanced nor likely to prosper. What we are seeing is not a move by the extreme left to divide the armed forces but a strategy of right-wing politicians (Ulises Flores in particular) to head off further steps in the reform program by taking advantage of the gullibility of Col. Majano whom Flores et.al. dominate intellectually. Just exactly what this strategy is and to what extent it has influenced Majano I will not be able to ascertain until I have had a chance to speak with him. (I have requested an urgent appointment with Majano as soon as he returns.)⁴ I believe that Colonels Abdul Gutierrez and Guillermo Garcia spoke accurately when they told us on Thursday (Apr 10) that there are certainly some discontented officers who speak frequently and publicly of the need to restructure the armed forces, but that these men do not have great influence. The acting DATT now has a report from one of the principals among the younger officers who says the “time is not yet ripe” and no timetable has been set for a showdown. I am certain that at this point there is no serious confrontation building against senior officers. Certainly we are far from a coup, as ref B noted in comment. I will counsel Majano along the lines suggested in section C of ref A on his return to San Salvador.

3. As the Department is aware, I have met with Gutierrez and Garcia and discussed all of the points outlined in section DD. For reasons I have stated earlier, however, I did not believe that this was the time for me to urge the dismissal of one or more of the top echelon of the security forces. What must be done first is to strengthen the line of command which should run from the Junta, including the civilians, to the Commanders of the Army and the security forces. I urged this on both colonels at our lunch. Specifically, I told Col. Gutierrez that the JRG should occasionally publicize a direct order to the MOD and Col. Garcia responded immediately that he would publicly carry out such an order. There is some evidence that a new line of authority is beginning to take hold. At a dinner at my house Wednesday night⁵ for Christian Democratic leaders, Duarte and Morales Ehrlich were called to the phone repeatedly to take calls from Col. Garcia regarding a problem that had arisen when off-duty National Guard troops were threatening to enter the National University to rescue a kidnapped trooper being held inside by leftist students. I found it encouraging that Col. Garcia was seeking instructions from the civilian members of the Junta and that he took their orders, as did Guard Commander Vides Casanova, to pull the Guard members back immediately.

4. Regarding the totally different question posed in ref A about how to counter the “leftist political initiative in establishment of democratic front,” I intend to discuss this with Duarte, Morales Ehrlich, and Chavez Mena at the earliest opportunity. While they will see an advantage to the JRG in taking the initiative to seek a political compromise, they will also worry about the effect a public rebuff would mean, especially by their former friends and allies who have formed the Frente Democratica in an effort to woo the CRM. Our evidence to date suggests that the Frente is being manipulated by the CRM and that its initiative does not amount to much domestically but is aimed at undermining the JRG abroad as a “fascist throwback” opposed by a broad range of non-Communist liberals and even conservative businessmen.

5. I am certain we are going into a period where urban violence will diminish and rural violence increase. The extreme left is using violence and the threat of violence to prevent the campesinos from planting. We have learned that leftist cadres are being shifted wholesale to the countryside to block the planting by force (which also accounts neatly for the decline in urban violence). Government troops will do everything they can to insure that the planting takes place in conditions of security. This was the thrust of the excellent speech on April 10 by Morales Ehrlich (septel).⁶ Armed clashes and mutual accusations of excesses are almost certain over the next two months as government and ultraleft fight for control of the countryside.

White

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880137–1621. Secret; Immediate; Nodis
2. In telegram 94375 to San Salvador, April 10, the Department instructed White to meet with members of the Junta and discuss the concern that the extreme left was working “to divide the armed forces by wooing Majano and other disaffected officers.” The Department also asked White for his “assessments and any recommendations for additional steps to counter leftist efforts to gain legitimacy, broaden their political support and generate internal dissension and division within the armed forces.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 20, El Salvador: 4/80–7/80)
3. In telegram 2459 from San Salvador, April 8, the Embassy relayed a report that Majano was no longer participating in the JRG and was working to restructure the military government by seeking the resignations of Gutierrez, Garcia, Carranza, and about thirty-five senior officers. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880137–1636) In telegram 2510 from San Salvador, April 9, White reported that he had been unable to contact Majano. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 20, El Salvador: 4/80–7/80)
4. In telegram 2674 from San Salvador, April 15, White reported that he had met with Majano on April 14. White wrote that Majano “is still undecided whether to stay or go but that he will remain where he is for the moment and that he will talk to me before reaching any decision to leave.” White also added that Majano insisted that that several senior military officers must be fired for him to stay and for the reform movement to continue. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880137–1615)
5. April 9.
6. Telegram 2635 from San Salvador, April 14, reported on Morales Ehrlich’s April 10 speech summarizing the reform program on behalf of the JRG. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800191–0663)