38. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate in Belize City and the Embassies in Guatemala and the United Kingdom1
24113. Subject: FCO Minister Ridley’s Meetings With Secretary Vance, Under Secretary Newsom and Assistant Secretary Bowdler on Belize.
1. (S-Entire text)
2. Summary. FCO Minister Ridley held a series of meetings in Department January 18 to discuss plans and problems connected with Belizean independence.2 In the first session, with Assistant Secretary Bowdler, Ridley discussed his recent meetings with Belizean Premier Price and the possible bases for further talks with Guatemala. With Under Secretary Newsom, Ridley emphasized the urgent need for the UK to grant independence and to be prepared, if necessary, to do so even in the absence of a settlement with Guatemala. Mr. Newsom made clear that we are on the side of independence; the issue is how to influence Guatemala and assure Belizean security. With the Assistant Secretary, Ridley sketched outline of plans for discussions with Guatemala, need for adequate security for border, and urgency of UK need to grant independence. Secretary Vance, noting the convergence of US and UK views, stated US willingness to help in finding a negotiated settlement so that independence could follow. In the UK timetable, discussions between the UK and Guatemala, with Price of course included, could begin in March. End summary.
3. Ambassador Bowdler opened the first meeting with an appreciation of the situation in Central America. He pointed out that Castro, after many years of extreme caution, last year abandoned this caution when he saw the opposition to Somoza gaining ground. Castro sees a new opportunity for effective revolution in El Salvador and is beginning to provide greater assistance to the extreme Left in that country. Wherever there is evidence of a real vacuum in the region, it appears that Castro will be increasingly willing to take advantage of such targets of opportunity. Minister Ridley agreed with this assessment.
4. Ridley then turned to Belize. He described Price as having grown up as a revolutionary who has sought Belize independence all his life. [Page 107] If Price is frustrated in seeking independence, the hotheads in his party may become uncontrollable and seek help from Cuba. Of course, Price has resisted.
5. Ridley said that he believed that Price had hardened his position on concessions to Guatemala because of his landslide victory.3 He said that Price sees Guatemala as isolated by the UN vote and afraid of Communist activity and penetration, not just from Belize but from the south.4 The UK must go forward with independence but wishes to begin new negotiations with Guatemala. He said in confidence that Price had accepted the British insistence on such negotiations, that Price will offer maritime rights in the Caribbean, that Price will suggest that the UK build the road according to the 1859 treaty,5 and that Price is willing to “tidy up the boundary but without substantial territorial concessions.” Belize will then guarantee no Cuban infiltration through its territory.
6. Ridley said that if Guatemala’s chief interest is in security, the parties should be able to get together on this point. He indicated that the UK would not make an abrupt pullout of its troops prior to some sort of agreeable security arrangement. If, however, the main issue for Guatemala is the political problem of territory, there may not be much hope for an agreement now. Guatemala’s threat of war has been an effective veto on independence in the past. But the UK and Belize must be willing to move ahead toward Belizean independence in the face of this threat if necessary.
7. Ambassador Bowdler said that any solution must contain both security and territorial elements. However, given events in Central America and Guatemala’s growing isolation, the political (i.e., territorial) element in the package may have diminished in relation to Guatemala’s perceived security requirements. Guatemala is concerned that a weak Belize would be an open invitation to Cuban activity. It was agreed that it is important for Belize to be brought into close ties with other countries of Central America through economic relations and [Page 108] possibly by Belize joining existing military and economic arrangements in the region.
8. This element of the discussion and a possible role for the OAS was further discussed in a later meeting with Ambassador Bowdler.
9. In the meeting with Under Secretary Newsom, Ridley made clear the UK determination to get out of Belize so it can use its resources elsewhere. Belize, Ridley said, is less of a security threat to Guatemala than is sometimes thought. It looks to Central America, not the Caribbean. Mr. Newsom asked Ridley what timetable he was considering. Ridley said that talks with Guatemala, with Price present of course, might begin in March. This phase could last 3–6 months. If all went well, the subsequent legislative process in Parliament and the drafting of the Constitution could take 6 months also. This would be followed by time for physical preparations for the act of independence. Independence, therefore, is not likely to be closer than 18 months in the future.
10. Ridley said that Premier Price had been in touch with Torrijos and Mexico and with other countries in the Caribbean to seek some sort of security guarantee. According to Price, Torrijos had offered 1,000 von to defend Belize independence, and was urging him to declare it, even unilaterally. Other countries apparently have offered only psychological support.
11. Price asked somewhat rhetorically what role the US and Canada might play with respect to guaranteeing Belize security. He did not seek an answer then but suggested that an answer would be helpful as negotiations proceed. In response to a question by Mr. Newsom, Ridley said the UK would be willing to keep some troops in Belize for an unspecified but limited time after independence.
12. With respect to the role of the OAS, Ambassador Bowdler pointed out that if Belize were a member, it could be protected by the Rio Treaty and other OAS automatic guarantees.6 The problem is that the OAS charter does not permit the nomination of a new member where there is an outstanding territorial dispute with an extra continental power.
13. Mr. Newsom made it clear that the US was basically on the side of independence but did not want any additional problems in this disturbed region right now. We therefore welcome the UK offer to provide Belize with security even after independence. The issue for [Page 109] the US is to see how we can influence Guatemala and what kind of a security guarantee, if any, we are prepared to offer to Belize.
14. Mr. Newsom repeated the offer contained in Secretary Vance’s letter to Lord Carrington that Phil Habib might go to Belize, Guatemala and elsewhere, to sound out the views of interested parties.7 Ridley agreed that Mr. Habib’s help could well be useful.
15. In the last meeting of the day, Ridley told the Secretary that he was delighted with the consultations with Assistant Secretary Bowdler. The UK planned to grant Belize independence, Ridley said, reporting the timetable he had mentioned to Mr. Newsom. Thus, it would be at least a year to 18 months before Belize became independent. Ambassador Bowdler noted that it would be destabilizing if there was no solution to the border dispute before independence. The UK wanted to find formulas to resolve this dispute and various possibilities, such as using the OAS or CACM, needed closer examination. Ambassador Bowdler would sound out the Guatemalans shortly and a role by Mr. Habib would be welcomed but that role had yet to be developed.8
16. Ridley said that Premier Price was prepared to help in providing adequate security of the border but he would not “cede” territory to Guatemala. The main preoccupation of all parties was security. Guatemala, however, preferred to retain the status quo because British troops now help secure the border. The British, however, found the cost no longer tenable. Ridley added that the UK was prepared to work with the two parties to find a solution but negotiations could not be prolonged forever. It would be helpful for the US to encourage Guatemala to be reasonable. The Secretary responded that the US was prepared to help. Ridley added that should the negotiations fail, Price might turn to unfriendly means for help. Thus, a contingency plan for independence without Guatemalan agreement should be developed, but first soundings need to be taken to determine the chance of success of negotiation. The Secretary was pleased there was a congruence of views on how to proceed, noting that the US wants to resolve this dispute, and thus minimize the chance that Cuba becomes involved.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800049–0417. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Hemenway and Warne; cleared in S/S–O, S–PH, S/S, EUR/NE, in substance in P; approved by Bushnell.↩
- No other records of the conversation have been found.↩
- See footnote 3, Document 34.↩
- In telegram 5483 from USUN, November 22, 1979, the Mission reported that the UN General Assembly held a plenary vote on a resolution regarding Belize November 21. The United States joined seven countries voting against the adoption of the resolution and 134 countries voted in favor. Guatemala did not participate. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790537–0059) The resolution endorsed an “early and secure independence” for Belize and called upon the “parties concerned to refrain from exerting any pressure or the use of threats or force against the Government and people of Belize to prevent the full exercise of their inalienable right to self-determination, independence, and territorial integrity.” (Question of Belize, A/RES/34/38, adopted by the UN General Assembly on November 21, 1979)↩
- See footnote 4, Document 16.↩
- The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, known as the Rio Pact, was signed in 1947 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and promulgated a collective security agreement among members in case of an armed attack by any state.↩
- See Document 37.↩
- In telegram 1344 from Guatemala City, February 27, Ortiz reported that, with the prior concurrence of Bowdler, he had raised the Belize question with Lucas on February 25. Lucas preferred to leave the issue “undisturbed,” and said that “the real problem for him” was that the Guatemalan Constitution stipulated that Belize was Guatemalan territory. Lucas also noted his concern that Belize might become “a focal point for Communist penetration” and that Guatemala needed an outlet to the sea. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800107–1056)↩