Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

37. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, January 16, 1980, 1813Z

12204. For the Ambassador. Subject: Belize/Guatemala Negotiations. Refs: A. 79 State 328115; B. Belize 036.²

1. (C-Entire text)

2. According to Ref B FCO Minister Ridley is expected to meet with Premier Price in London prior to Minister Ridley’s visit to Washington on/about January 18. Please pass the following message from the Secretary to Lord Carrington in partial response to the questions that he raised in Ref A.

Begin text. Dear Peter:

As we agreed last December, I have consulted with my experts on the question of independence for Belize.

Our conclusion is that Guatemalan acquiesence is critical to prospects for a reasonably lasting solution.

Two judgments are critical to this assessment:

—First, that under present circumstances, Belizean independence in the face of Guatemalan opposition would unleash significant destabilizing forces—in Belize itself, in Guatemala, in Central America, and in the Caribbean. It would invite increased Cuban involvement, and be detrimental to U.S. and, we believe, Western interests generally.

—Second, that any process that excludes Guatemala from some role in the negotiations leading to Belizean independence would rapidly prove unworkable—regardless of what pressures the United States might unilaterally bring to bear on Guatemala.

This assessment does not imply, however, that Guatemalan acquiesence, on basis that might prove acceptable to both Belize and the United Kingdom is necessarily impossible to obtain.

Guatemalan preoccupation with potential expansion of Cuba’s role in Central America through Belize has been heightened by events and trends of the past year. I share some of these concerns. Cuba has become more active in the Caribbean and in Central America. The changes in governments in Grenada and Nicaragua have given the Cubans footholds.³ We are trying to counter these Cuban advances but conservative governments such as Guatemala realize that they are more exposed. In short I do not believe that the Central American and Caribbean areas, already in turmoil with major Western interests threatened, can afford another destabilizing event that creates a potential opportunity, direct or indirect, for Cuba. Thus a negotiated solution is imperative. The very series of events that increases the need for a negotiated solution makes one more possible. I recall that U.S. and UK experts worked together two years ago on the concept of a treaty between Belize and its neighbors that would include both assurances of its security and Belizean assurances that it would not admit foreign, non-Commonwealth, forces of any kind.

We believe our own position as a neutral party could prove an important stabilizing factor. Should you consider it useful, I would be prepared to ask Phil Habib to assess the current positions of the various parties to the dispute by visiting Guatemala and Belize as well as other potentially interested states. I cannot help but feel that developments in Central America over the past year have affected the perceptions of leaders in both countries. It is my hope the changes will facilitate a new attempt at a negotiated settlement in which we would be prepared to participate if you thought it would be helpful.

I understand Minister Nicholas Ridley will soon be coming to Washington. I have asked Bill Bowdler, the new Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, to meet with him and explore these ideas further.⁴

With best wishes, Cy. End text.

Vance

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800027–0740. Confidential; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Belize City, Guatemala City, and USUN. Drafted by Hemenway; cleared by Bowdler, Habib, Newlin, and in S/S–O; approved by Vance.
2. In telegram 328115 to multiple posts, December 20, 1979, the Department described a December 17 bilateral meeting in which Vance and Carrington discussed Belize and Central America. Carrington asked Vance if the United States would change its policy of neutrality in the British-Guatemalan dispute over Belize. Vance indicated that, before he could respond to the question, he needed answers to two additional questions: “Would US support for Belizean independence drive the Guatemalans off the deep end into an ill-advised military action against Belize; and/or would such a move by the US cause the Guatemalan authorities to employ strong arm tactics which would plunge the country into an internal dispute leading to a Nicaraguan scenario.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790586–0732) In telegram 36 from Belize City, January 9, the Consulate reported on Nalle’s discussions with McEntee. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800016–0182)
3. In March 1979 the New Jewel Movement ousted Eric Gairy, Prime Minister of Grenada, and established a People’s Revolutionary Government headed by Prime Minister Maurice Bishop. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXIII, Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean. In Nicaragua, a five-member junta government backed by the Sandinista National Liberation Front assumed power from President Anastasio Somoza Debayle in July 1979. See Chapter 2 of this volume.
4. See Document 38.