35. Telegram From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State1
6616. Subj: (U) US Position on Inter-American Bank Loan. Ref: State 256788.2
1. (C-Entire text)
2. Summary. On October 2, President Lucas and I met alone for an hour and a half discussion mostly centered on our human rights concerns. The President considers Guatemala is the target of an unjust orchestrated campaign of defamation. The object of this campaign, he says, is to destabilize Guatemala and halt its progress. He is, however, confident that the truth will prevail. I counseled that Guatemala take the necessary steps to improve its image and assure that objective facts are publicized. End summary.
3. I read the talking points contained in reftel to the President. He listened very carefully. However, he took no notes as I had suggested. Speaking personally I advised him that it was probable that despite our efforts or wishes there would be publicity and consequent speculation in the media over the significance of the U.S. position in the IDB. He said such publicity would have unsettling consequences in Guatemala.
4. The President did not comment directly on our position in the IDB. Instead, he referred again, as he has in the past, to what he terms an orchestrated international campaign of defamation against Guatemala. Much of the impetus for this campaign, he says, comes from the University of San Carlos here in Guatemala. He said for years the university, which is autonomous and which under the Constitution [Page 99] receives a fixed percentage of the national budget, has been under the control of Marxists and frustrated intellectuals who consistently adopt hostile and negative anti-government positions. He says these embittered and often subversive elements are in constant contact with like-minded groups abroad. Between them they organize campaigns of defamation against Guatemala because they want to stop Guatemala’s progress and destabilize the country preparatory to political and subversive actions in accord with their plans for the country. He lamented that foreign groups seldom seem even to attempt to verify objective facts.
5. The President said this situation greatly worries the constructive and patriotic sectors of Guatemala. They advise him that his government must hire a good public relations firm to counter the bad image Guatemala is unjustly being given. They have gone so far, the President said, as to have high-powered public relations firms make bids to handle Guatemala’s account. The cost, he said, would be about a million and a half dollars. He rejected this advice. He will not spend money for such purposes. Rather, he will continue to invest in schools, dispensaries, and in other public works. He is confident that responsible and fair-minded people will perceive the truth about Guatemala. There is a free press and anyone can come and go as they wish. He knows the business community, however, is determined to carry out a publicity campaign to counter the untruths. He will not try to stop them, but believes it will be wasted effort and money.
6. The President says he also has his problems with the media in Guatemala. He initially sharply reduced and will soon cut off entirely the quote subsidies end quote that the Presidency has long paid to a large number of Guatemalan newsmen. They retaliate by printing or otherwise publicizing stories intended to embarrass his administration. The unknowing accept media accounts at face value. This contributes to the image problem his administration has.
7. I raised the Colom Argueta and Fuentes Mohr murders and the lack of any credible efforts to resolve those crimes, all of which shocks public opinion greatly.3 In addition to these murders, the continuing killings of common criminals allegedly by a death squad, and the incident at Panzos4 all caused problems even for Guatemala’s best friends that Marxist professors and disgruntled journalists can take advantage of.
8. The President said he wanted to tell me about Colom Argueta. He was a close personal friend of the President’s. He helped the President [Page 100] greatly in the campaign. The President believes it is time for Guatemala to consider a civilian President next term. The army as an institution must not risk loss of popular support. He believed Colom had a good possibility to be elected as the next President. President Lucas implied he would have supported Colom for the Presidency. He said he saw to it that Colom’s party was officially registered so it could participate in the elections. However, the President said this plan ran across the quote political ambitions of another end quote. The result was that his friend Colom was murdered. There is no proof as to who was responsible. Colom’s rival had also been assassinated. The President said that as is always the case, the government was blamed for both murders. Twelve years ago it had even been blamed for the assassination of the US Ambassador.5
9. The President seemed to speak with feeling. Much was implied rather than clearly stated. He appeared to be telling me that the Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Cancinos, was somehow involved in the Colom assassination. Gen. Cancinos in turn was murdered, we believe by the clandestine Marxist EGP.6 The President added that an attempt was made on Colom even before Lucas was in office, but he was only wounded.
10. The Fuentes Mohr case, the President said, was one he did not know much about. At this point he spoke of his Vice President, Villagran Kramer. He described him as an incorrigible intriguer and posturer. He called Villagran quote that scorpion I carry in my shirt end quote. He went on to speak of his resentment over the slight of the Panamanians (who invited Villagran but not Lucas to the ceremonies of October 1).7 When I asked if an investigation had been made of the Fuentes Mohr murder, he replied there were no significant leads and spoke also of the unsolved murder of prominent businessman Luis Canella. I do not believe he meant to connect the two.
11. The President took great pains to describe the clash at Panzos between Indian peasants and the army. He said it occurred before his term of office and essentially originated when nervous troops not speaking the local Indian dialect panicked and fired upon an angry [Page 101] group of peasants. The peasants had been incited by political agitators. Able military leadership on the spot would have avoided the clash. Nevertheless, Marxist intellectuals greatly magnified the incident alleging that 200 peasants had been killed when only a small fraction of that number died. The President said foreign sectors, as usual, believed the maliciously exaggerated version even though an impartial investigation was made. I suggested a blue ribbon commission which published the results of its investigations had a better chance of being believed than one formed at a lower level.
12. The President asked me to report to my government that his administration was trying to improve its image, but will do so through deeds not publicity campaigns. I replied Guatemala had many friends who would welcome an improvement no matter how it came.
13. As I was leaving, Gen. Lucas said quote I stay calm and I study the situation carefully and then I decide what to do and I stick by the decision end quote.
14. Comment. This discussion of the Colom, Fuentes Mohr and Panzos cases was one I planned to have with the President since my arrival here. I had delayed until I felt a better personal rapport was established. The President was unusually frank in his comments to me. He appeared to be speaking with sincerity and did not show resentment or anger at my observations or towards the U.S. at any point. I had the impression of a somewhat lonely man surrounded by people he does not entirely trust and anxious for understanding and sympathy.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis.↩
- In telegram 256788 to Guatemala City, September 29, the Department discussed the U.S. intention to abstain on Guatemala’s $15 million IDB loan request in the October 4 IDB board meeting and instructed Ortiz to inform Lucas and Bucaro that the United States “had no choice but to take this position given our policies and legislation relating to human rights” and that Guatemala should “make public its commitment to respect human rights and to correct abuses, wherever they occur, through followup investigations and judicial action.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790446–0520) Vance’s evening report to Carter on September 29 reported that the United States had decided to abstain on the “$15 million industry and tourism loan to Guatemala from the IDB on human rights grounds,” which was the “first non-basic human needs loan to come to a vote since 1976.” The report also noted that “since this vote might cause a seriously adverse reaction in Guatemala, we are instructing our Ambassador to inform President Lucas, in advance, of our decision.” Carter wrote in the margin: “Why do it? (discussed with Cy).” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 24, Guatemala: 1/7–12/79)↩
- See footnote 4, Document 32.↩
- See footnote 5, Document 28.↩
- See footnote 6, Document 1.↩
- In telegram 3666 from Guatemala City, June 11, the Embassy reported that unidentified gunmen had assassinated Army Chief of Staff Major General David Cancinos Barrios and noted that Cancinos was “widely considered to have been intellectual author of Colom Argueta’s murder—supposedly to remove him as rival for Presidency in 1982.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790264–0463)↩
- Ceremonies held in Panama City on October 1 marked the implementation of the Panama Canal Treaties. Mondale and numerous Latin American leaders attended. (John M. Goshko, “Panamanians Take Possession of Zone,” Washington Post, October 2, 1979, p. A1) See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, volume XXIX, Panama.↩