Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

34. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State¹

London, July 6, 1979, 1616Z

13184. Subject: HMG Expresses Concern About Future of Belize.

1. (C-Entire text) Following conclusion of tripartite consultations on the Caribbean, Ambassador Habib was called aside by Nicholas Ridley, FCO Minister of State and UK Chief of the Delegation.² Ridley expressed HMG’s growing concern regarding the evolution of events in Belize. Evidence of Cuban involvement with the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and the prospect of violence spreading from Nicaragua to other parts of Central America were especially alarming. Added to this, the prospect Price might be defeated in upcoming elections in Belize increased HMG’s concern.³ Ridley was concerned over the implications of these events for HMG’s plans for early independence for Belize. He noted that HMG’s underlying concern remained as it had been: the problem of resolving the territorial dispute between Belize and Guatemala. This was essential if stability in the area was to be maintained following the UK withdrawal. Ridley emphasized that HMG was determined to get out of Belize, and might consider granting independence without waiting for resolution of the dispute, leaving behind for the time being whatever forces were necessary to assure security. In any event, HMG would not act until at least after upcoming elections in Belize. He said he knew that US was also concerned about the future of the area and wondered if the USG could use its “special influence” with Guatemalan President Lucas to improve prospects for a settlement between Belize and Guatemala.

2. Ambassador Habib responded that the USG shared HMG’s concern for an orderly transition in the area. Ambassador Habib noted, however, that past USG efforts at mediation in the dispute had been unsuccessful. Whatever was acceptable to one side was almost by definition unacceptable to the other. Yet some form of settlement was essential prior to the granting of independence to Belize and withdrawal of UK forces. Otherwise the withdrawal of a UK presence would almost inevitably lead to violence.

3. Ridley agreed with this assessment but reiterated the HMG was determined to get out of Belize. He stressed, however, that HMG would not act precipitously. He requested that USG take another look at the dispute with a view towards offering suggestions which might move the problem off dead center. Ridley added that HMG would very much appreciate the USG’s current assessment of the situation and any suggestions it might be prepared to offer confidentially. He concluded by stressing that he would keep Ambassador Habib advised of HMG’s plans.⁴

Brewster

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790308–1140. Confidential; Exdis.
2. Tripartite consultations among U.S., UK, and Canadian delegations on the Eastern Caribbean were held in London July 5–6. (Telegram 13237 from London, July 6; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790308–0295)
3. Belize held Parliamentary elections on November 20. Price’s People’s United Party won a two-thirds majority. (“Earthquake Hits Colombia,” Washington Post, November 24, 1979, p. B9) In telegram 1238 from Belize City, November 23, the Consulate reported the official results and commented “one must bow to George Price as a skilled, effective and clever political man.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790544–0728)
4. In telegram 186779 to London, July 19, the Department addressed Ridley’s request for the current USG view on the Belize negotiations. According to the telegram, Habib considered it “unlikely that the Guatemalans would seriously negotiate on Belize until after the Belizean general elections.” Furthermore, the territorial question remained “crucial” and senior Guatemalan Army officers would “react militarily if the UK were to grant Belize independence without a settlement with Guatemala.” Finally, the United States had “little real leverage with the current Guatemalan Government” and “little ‛special influence’ to use.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790329–0815)