Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

237. Message From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, June 28, 1979

SUBJECT

• SCC Meeting on Nicaragua

The SCC Meeting, attended by the Vice President, Warren Christopher, Charles Duncan, Frank Carlucci, and a JCS representative, revealed basic divergence of views over future options.

State basically believes that the Sandinistas are likely to gain control and that we should work to increase our credibility with them and seek to broaden the junta and increase the relative strength of the moderate forces in the junta. Similarly, State is reluctant and, in some cases, opposed to undertake any action to try to preserve the National Guard (GN) as a continuing instrument after Somoza’s departure for fear that this would prolong the civil war and ultimately drag the United States in on the Guard’s side.

Defense and I believe that some aspect of the guard must be preserved or the moderate political forces will simply be overrun by the Sandinistas once Somoza leaves, since they will be the only ones with the guns.

I put this dichotomy in stark terms because you and the President should understand that behind the two options lie fundamental differences. At the meeting, we were able to agree on a course of action that reconciles these differences, but we are rapidly approaching the point where we are going to have to fish or cut bait on one or the other of the approaches. This process is further complicated by the fact that Congressman Murphy is in Managua and has participated in the meeting with Pezzullo in which Somoza said he will step down if we will help preserve the guard as an instrument in the fight against a Communist takeover.² Thus, if we choose to emphasize the route preferred by State, we can depend upon Murphy to do his utmost to portray our policy as one of having, in effect, handed over power to the Sandinistas and washed our hands of possible moderate forces.

We agreed on the following immediate course of action:

(1) We will go back to Torrijos and urge him to begin the process of broadening the junta. In effect, we will tell him that whether we can take his advice in supporting the junta will depend on his success in broadening it.

(2) We will instruct Pezzullo to concentrate his discussions on stitching together the moderate elements in Managua. As for supporting the Guard, we will instruct him to use the President’s guidance on the conditions under which that support will be forthcoming.³ He will not get embroiled in a negotiation with Somoza over the future of the Guard.

(3) We will begin discussions with General Paz of Honduras as well as Torrijos and the Venezuelans about how the Guard or some elements of the Guard can be preserved. Torrijos has indicated that some elements of the Guard could be in the new government, and we will press him on how to bring this about. The Venezuelans similarly have expressed concern about the Sandinistas sweeping to power. We will try to get them to focus on this problem. We will also urge Torrijos and the Venezuelans to get the Sandinistas to declare that there will be no reprisals and no revolutionary trials of National Guardsmen. We hope this might help the Guard’s morale.

(4) The sharpest split in the meeting was whether Gutierrez should be asked by us to go back to Central America. I argued that we should urge him to do so, that he should return to Costa Rica or Honduras and begin the process of contacting his former colleagues in the Guard. This would potentially give us an option of the Guard or some faction of it withdrawing its support from Somoza and husbanding its resources to support moderate elements in a successive regime. Alternatively, Gutierrez would be on the scene to respond to a call from our proposed Executive Committee should that work out. Christopher was adamantly opposed to our asking Gutierrez to come back. He argued that this would only taint him and offend the junta who would see this as a plot to prolong both Somocizmo and the civil war. Chris and Vaky both expressed fear that we would end up backing the Guard in a civil war.

We all recognize that the Guard has become the instrument of oppression as the battle has continued, but my view is that if the moderate forces have no military strength of any kind, they will be swept away by the Sandinistas. Congressman Murphy’s presence insures that the Administration will bear the maximum responsibility for a Sandinista takeover if we do nothing to preserve at least some remnant of the Guard. I do not believe Gutierrez’s presence or absence is necessarily crucial. But I think the arguments against his going there and starting to try to operate are not persuasive. Gutierrez has become a symbol of a much larger question which has not yet been reconciled by you, Cy and the President.

The best I could get today is agreement that our different views on Gutierrez be presented to you for consideration by the President. If you can resolve the question of whether Gutierrez should go to Central America, you should. In addition, if it can be done discreetly, we will try to get Gutierrez invited by Paz, or perhaps even Torrijos, for consultations. We are asking Bowdler for his advice on whether Torrijos might respond constructively to such a suggestion.

Above all, we are going to need guidance soon on the general route we wish to take. Even if our proposed Executive Committee idea does not work out, it is clear that we will be involved in at least the timing of Somoza’s departure. We therefore must have some kind of plan on how we use that to either support our position with the junta, preserve the National Guard, strengthen the moderate elements, or whatever. It is an important point of leverage, and we should not waste it since it is about our only asset in this situation.

We also have to look hard at the issue of support (political or military) for the Guard. I have no quarrel with the President’s view that this should be done on the basis of a new and more legitimate government. However, we have a serious timing problem. By the time we have a new, more legitimate government, there may be no Guard to support.

I do not know when these issues will come to a head. By the end of today, I will probably have a further message.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 35, Nicaragua: 6/26–28/79. Secret; Senstive; Flash; Eyes Only; Deliver in a Sealed Envelope. Sent through Gates. Pastor initialed for Aaron.
2. See Document 235.
3. See footnote 8, Document 223.