202. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nicaragua1
64200. For the Charge from Assistant Secretary Vaky. Subject: GON Desire to Reinvolve the U.S. Ref: Managua 1003.2
1. (S-Entire text)
2. It appears clear that Somoza is currently wedded to remaining in power until 1981 and probably leaving a handpicked successor when his term ends. The reforms described in reftel and Managua 11243 do not deal with most of the basic concerns of the opposition, and hence do not in themselves promise a definitive solution to the succession issue. Rather they appear designed simply to dissipate pressures to enable the Somoza regime to continue with less difficulty.
3. We therefore interpret the GON approach to us, described reftel, as an effort to regain USG support for and underwriting of Somoza’s policy. Thus the end result of the “normalization” requested would be [Page 527] to discourage the opposition and project the image of U.S. identity with the GON.
4. We do not believe that at the moment the USG can bilaterally negotiate or mediate successfully a real solution to the succession issue between Somoza and the opposition. The basic position of both has not changed. Somoza is clearly unwilling to contemplate a process that cuts short his term, and the opposition is unwilling (or unable) to contemplate less. There is no reason to believe that the wide agreement necessary for a real and accurate plebiscite to settle the issue is any more likely now than during the mediation. Indeed, entering into “negotiations” with Somoza now, when he is relatively strong and has just rejected our mediation proposal, would lead him to believe that we are anxious to normalize relations basically on his terms. It would also discourage the moderate opposition and radicalize some of it. Hence we might well contribute to the polarization we wish to avoid, and identify the U.S. with a repressive regime.
5. In short, we do not believe that the opportunity exists for productive new initiatives at the moment. For political as well as human rights reasons, our posture should be cool but correct—and not slip back into business as usual relationships—while we assess the internal correlation of forces and possible new opportunities.
6. Accordingly, you should respond to any queries such as those described reftel, along the following lines:
—Our mediation efforts undertaken pursuant to an international attempt to help the parties find a negotiated solution to the internal crisis, regrettably were not successful.
—We do not believe that we can now fruitfully reengage ourselves bilaterally in internal discussions with the GON and the opposition.
—The basic differences of view and objective of the GON and the opposition are too deep and fundamental to be papered over with partial reforms. Unless there is a basic willingness by the parties concerned to honestly confront the central and pressing issue of the Nicaraguan crisis we do not see how “normalization” negotiations with the USG can reestablish internal equilibrium.
—The USG earnestly hopes that a new national consensus can be established with the opposition and all major elements of society; the means for doing this, however, lie clearly in the hands of Nicaraguans. The GON must decide what it is willing to do and how to do it.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790120–0596. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent for information Priority to Caracas, Guatemala City, Panama City, San José, San Salvador, and Tegucigalpa. Drafted and approved by Vaky; cleared in INR, S/P, ARA/CEN, ARA, NSC, and S/S–O.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 199.↩
- In telegram 1124 from Managua, March 2, the Embassy reported on Somoza’s press conference held that day. The Embassy noted that Somoza had claimed that “the Liberal Party would have participated in the plebiscite had it been arranged.” He promised to “organize a commission of noted jurists to study the reorganization of the judicial branch” of the Nicaraguan Government. He also pledged to “name a technical council to study the elaboration of a new organic law for the National Guard;” “to form a commission of experts under the aegis of the Ministry of Government to organize a national police force;” “to name a commission to elaborate a new electoral law promoting greater democratization of the electoral process;” to provide “new laws designed to eliminate corruption from the government,” as well as, “laws to guarantee the observance of human rights by all governmental authorities;” and “that the radio and TV code would be reformed and would be one of the most liberal in Latin America.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790096–0034)↩