Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

201. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron) to President Carter¹

Washington, March 14, 1979

SUBJECT

• U.S. Policy to Nicaragua (S)

You may recall that you asked us to “negotiate, firmly” in response to informal messages conveyed by Somoza’s officials to our Embassy in Managua that he would be open to beginning the process of normalizing relations with the U.S.² My staff immediately set to work with Cy’s to evaluate a number of different options for the U.S. to consider as we enter into a new phase in our relations. At Tab A is Cy’s response. We concluded that it is too soon to consider opening up negotiations with Somoza. We have already received reports from within Nicaragua and in neighboring countries that the steps which we have recently taken to adjust our relationship with Nicaragua have enhanced our credibility among the democratic groups in the region. (S)

One indication of the effectiveness of these steps is that Somoza has already put out feelers to renew our relationship along historical lines. Cy and I believe that we should adopt a cool and correct posture at this time. We should be prepared to listen to Somoza and his government if they approach us, but we should make clear that his problem in Nicaragua cannot be solved by the U.S., but only by a successful dialogue between him and his opposition. We do not want to get in the middle of this right now. We should also look for appropriate occasions to signal our interest in Nicaragua in maintaining a democratic option and in sustaining the democratic middle. (S)

Cy has also attached a cable (Tab 1) summarizing this posture. I recommend that you approve this posture.³

Tab A

Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter⁴

Washington, March 6, 1979

SUBJECT

• Nicaragua

You expressed interest in the cable from Embassy Managua (Managua 1003, attached at Tab 2)⁵ detailing GON interest in confidential bilateral negotiations with the USG, and its hope that we would exercise our influence with the opposition in order to negotiate a political solution for 1981, when Somoza’s term as President ends.

We have assessed this report, and our conclusion is that Somoza’s bid is primarily intended to obtain USG underwriting of and support for his present position of remaining in power, and to dissipate opposition pressure. The reforms suggested, while desirable on their merits, do not deal with the basic issues and are unlikely to lead to a permanent solution.

The basic position and perceptions of Somoza and his opposition are so far apart and mutually exclusive that we do not believe we can now fruitfully negotiate or mediate a real solution to the succession issue bilaterally, any more than we could with an international mediation team. Indeed, to reopen negotiations with Somoza now, after he has rejected our mediation proposal, would undermine the opposition and lead Somoza to believe that we are anxious to normalize relations on his terms. In short, the end result of such a tactic would be to discourage and radicalize the moderate opposition and project an image of U.S. identity with Somoza. We also note that the Embassy has reported a continuing level of serious human rights violations, and another wave of arrests has followed the December amnesty.

I believe that politically and tactically, as well as for human rights reasons, we should adopt for the time being a cool but correct posture, while we reassess the internal situation and its possible future opportunities for USG initiatives that could contribute toward the peaceful resolution of the political crisis.

I attach at Tab 1 for your approval a reply to Embassy Managua outlining this basic position and policy for its guidance.⁶

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 56, Nicaragua: 12/78–6/79. Secret. Sent for action. Carter initialed the top of the page.
2. See Document 199.
3. Carter indicated his approval and initialed the top of the page.
4. Secret.
5. Not attached. See footnote 2, Document 199.
6. Not attached. See Document 202.