149. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)1
SUBJECT
- My Conversation with a Nicaraguan Opposition Leader
On Wednesday evening,2 I received a call, requesting that I meet with Ramiro Cardenal, who is a leader of the opposition and very close to Alfonso Robelo, the leader of the FAO. Like Robelo, Cardenal is a businessman and studied in the US. Cardenal, in fact, has an MBA from the Harvard Business School. I had met him before, and he is a sound, reasonable, decent man.
Cardenal had spoken with Robelo a few hours before our meeting on Thursday.3 He conveyed from Robelo a great sense of depression and disappointment with the US. He said that the FAO has lost faith in the US, and it is difficult for Robelo and him, both closely identified with us, to defend us anymore. He believes the plebiscite idea is totally illegitimate; it won’t work, and it plays into Somoza’s hand by delaying the dénouement. He is certain the Sandinistas will attack within the next month, making it impossible to hold a plebiscite. Somoza will react with tremendous repression, and the middle will be squeezed out. He said that the US should be prepared for thousands and thousands of refugees, including people like himself.
I explained to him in some detail the reason why the USG considers a plebiscite important. I told him that from the beginning, we tried to combine the opposition’s strong desire for Somoza’s departure with a recognition of the importance of developing a viable and enduring democratic alternative. I said that we were encouraged by the give-and-take of diverse groups within the opposition during the mediation effort. We believe a plebiscite provides a further opportunity for the FAO to demonstrate not only its ability to manage a difficult democratic process, but also to show that it enjoys the tremendous popular support of the Nicaraguan people. I said that we are prepared to work with other nations to see that the plebiscite is free and fair. I asked him [Page 398] what conditions would be required to make it free and fair, and he said that nothing could make it free and fair. But after I pressed him, he basically sketched the illustrative conditions which are in our proposal. However, he asked whether we would accept the departure of Somoza just before the plebiscite as an added condition. I said that such a condition struck me as unfair and unrealistic. How can one claim a plebiscite is free if one demands that the central party to the plebiscite depart? I said that it was analogous to Cuba’s demand that Puerto Rico should be independent before making a decision on political status. The American people do not view it as fair.
Cardenal said that the real problem is that the US still has not made it clear to the FAO that it wants to see Somoza depart. He told me that there is a tremendous risk that the opposition would fragment if it accepts a plebiscite. I told him that I thought the risks would be even greater if the opposition rejects our proposal, and Somoza accepts it. I said that the ideal goal from our perspective would be for both sides to accept a plebiscite. From his perspective, it appeared to me that his optimal goal would be if the FAO accepted it and Somoza rejected it, since that would show the world that the FAO is willing to test the will of the Nicaraguan people, and Somoza isn’t. He asked what would we do if the FAO accepts it, and Somoza rejected it. I told him that only Ambassador Bowdler could convey the answer to that question, but I did say that such a scenario would certainly make easier the kind of steps (withdrawing US support) which Cardenal wanted to see. On the other hand, it would be much more difficult—perhaps impossible—to consider taking those kinds of steps if Somoza accepted the plebiscite, and the FAO rejected it, or even if both sides rejected it. I urged him to take that message back to Robelo: that it is very important for the FAO to accept the proposal as it would legitimize their position in the eyes of the world.
(Comments: After listening to Cardenal, and speaking to Vaky, I am convinced that it is very important for Bowdler to communicate privately to Robelo that if the FAO accepts the proposal, we will go to Somoza and tell him that we will withdraw our support from him if he does not accept the proposal. If we do not do that, I think the chances of obtaining the support of the FAO for the proposal are slim. Furthermore, I think the FAO needs more encouragement from us right now if they are going to be able to stick together. I repeat my strong recommendation from yesterday’s nightly report, that you call Christopher and suggest that we tell Bowdler that the time has come for him to tell the FAO of the importance we attach to the plebiscite proposal.4 If they accept the proposal, and Somoza refuses it, we would withdraw our support from him.
[Page 399]You may want to check with the President first to make sure that he supports this. The last round of memoranda to the President approves this point, but does not address it quite as specifically as the above. I attach it for your information at Tab A.5 Your memorandum of November 15 states that if Somoza refuses, “we can more legitimately apply pressure to facilitate his departure.”
Cardenal informed me that the FAO plans to officially respond to the proposal within 72 hours—meaning by Saturday6 at 4:00 p.m. We should try to get the new instruction down to Bowdler before then.)