The State Department has prepared a decision memorandum (Tab A) setting
out three options from which you can choose the next step in our policy
to Nicaragua.
There are pitfalls to each of the options, and State’s memo describes
them very well. It will not be easy to structure a fair plebiscite in a
nation which has been controlled by the Somoza family for forty years, nor will it be easy to
persuade the opposition that the OAS
and the
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US can assure a free
election with no intimidation or reprisals. However, I think the
alternative (Option 2) would be indefensible domestically (how can we
reject a Head of State’s request for a vote of confidence?); and
internationally, it would strip away from our position the cloak of
legitimacy, leaving us as the Colossus of the North intervening once
again in the internal affairs of a small country.
Therefore, on balance and with some sense of uneasiness, I recommend that
you approve option 1—to explore the feasibility of a plebiscite as a
solution to the Nicaraguan crisis. You will note that Cy does not state
his preference.2
Attachment
Paper Prepared in the Department of
State5
Washington, undated
NICARAGUA—OPTIONS PAPER
Option 1
Explore the feasibility of a plebiscite as a
solution to the Nicaraguan crisis.
1. The Negotiating Group (NG) would
consult the FAO and Somoza to determine their
willingness to accept a plebiscite on the issue of whether Somoza should leave office and a
provisional government be established to take the country to free
elections. Prior to making the approach, the NG would take soundings to determine what conditions
are essential to holding an open and fair plebiscite. Illustrative
conditions which might be discussed are set forth in the attachment.
(The U.S. Mediator would let the
FAO–PC leadership know
privately that if the FAO agrees to
a plebiscite with reasonable conditions, we will strongly endorse
the proposal and try to persuade Somoza to accept it.)
2. If both sides accept the proposal, the NG would bring the parties together immediately to
phrase the question to be put to the voters, fix the date, and
establish the conditions.
3. If both sides reject the proposal, inform the Department and await
instructions.
4. If the FAO accepts the proposal
and Somoza rejects it, the
U.S. Mediator, after
consultation with Washington, would proceed with the strong
demarche.
5. If Somoza accepts the
proposal and the FAO rejects it,
inform the Department and await instructions.
Arguments in Favor:
1. The plebiscite on the issue posed would allow the Nicaraguan
people to decide whether Somoza should resign and new elections be held after
a transition period.
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2. Under the conditions envisaged for a plebiscite the opposition
will be able to mobilize its forces nationwide as it has never been
able to do under the Somoza
dynasty.
3. An opposition victory would give legitimacy to the formulation of
a provisional government which it otherwise would not have.
4. Should Somoza try to
remain in power if the vote goes against him, the task of persuading
him to step down is facilitated and legitimated, and our ability to
explain our actions on the U.S.
domestic front is enhanced.
5. If Somoza is confirmed in
the presidency, the problems of maintaining correct relations with
his Government are eased.
6. A potentially highly useful precedent will have been established
which may help in the resolution of serious internal conflicts in
other countries.
Arguments Against:
1. The technical and financial difficulties of mounting a plebiscite
on short notice are enormous. These are complicated by the lack of
experience of the OAS in the
management of such a project.
2. The conditions in Nicaragua are not conducive to obtaining a free
expression of the will of the people because:
—The country has had no normal political life or free
competition of political forces for almost half a century;
—Somoza, his party and
his Government (which are one in the same) and his National
Guard enjoy a total monopoly of power which cannot be
neutralized within the time available, no matter how many
foreign observers are present;
—Nicaragua, under a state of siege and beset by ongoing violence
and repression, is in no condition to hold a free and democratic
plebiscite.
3. Without carefully weighing all the implications, the FAO may reject the proposal, thereby
leaving Somoza in an
advantageous position vis-a-vis the moderate opposition without a
test of the public will.
4. Should Somoza win the
plebiscite, the process will have confirmed Somoza in power and probably
insured continuation of the Somoza dynasty. The Sandinistas, and some moderates,
will not accept this verdict, and continue the armed struggle.
5. In campaigning actively against Somoza the moderate opposition will expose itself.
Should they lose the plebiscite, Somoza may well take retribution.
Option 2
Reject Plebiscite Idea and Proceed with
Demarche to Somoza and
Supporting Measures if Necessary.
The USG concludes that Somoza’s offer of a plebiscite is
basically a diversionary maneuver and realistically a non-starter.
With only
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six days of the
deadline established at Caracas remaining,6 and with indications that Somoza may be wavering, we decide
to press for his voluntary departure to permit a national
reconciliation and a negotiated, peaceful solution to the crisis
facing Nicaragua. To accomplish this we take the following
steps:
1. Urge the FAO, via the negotiating
group, to enter into direct talks with the PLN on the FAO premise
that Somoza should leave
plus the FAO 16 points. This is to
insure that the talks continue.
2. Authorize Ambassador Bowdler to privately convey an emphatic message to
Somoza saying:
—We have regretfully concluded that, under the circumstances, the
plebiscite does not afford a realistic basis for reaching a
solution to the present crisis.
—The central problem continues to be his control of the
government.
—No peaceful solution to this problem is possible unless he and
his family leave the country.
—If he is prepared to do this, we will assist him in negotiating
with a broader group than the FAO, if he prefers, and in achieving the method of
departure he finds most acceptable.
—If he refuses to follow this advice, he must understand that the
USG can no longer lend
military or economic assistance to Nicaragua.
3. Send General McAuliffe (or
another selected General) to Nicaragua to reinforce this message and
to underscore the seriousness of our concern.
4. If our demarches fail to persuade Somoza, we would, subsequent to your review, proceed
promptly with:
—Suspension of all economic and military assistance, including
what is in the pipeline.
—Withdrawal of the MilGroup.
—Withdrawal of Ambassador Solaun for consultations.
—An approach to Israel to suspend its flow of military supplies
to Somoza, as well as to
any other countries that may be suppliers.
Arguments in Favor:
1. We avoid the risk of Somoza using the plebiscite proposal to envelop the
U.S. in a morass of negotiations
to delay and discredit the mediation.
2. We avoid a waste of precious time on the unpromising plebiscite
idea, taking our best shot before a return of violence and armed
confrontations deprive us of the opportunity.
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3. We fulfill the commitment to use all our influence to persuade
Somoza to leave, which
is implied by our mediation and IMF
initiative and is clearly expected of us by the opposition and
others. In doing so we preserve our prestige and credibility for use
in future situations.
Arguments Against:
1. We risk Somoza not leaving
as a result of our pressures or a radical government replacing him
if he does.
2. Openly pressuring a constitutional President to resign will set a
bad precedent and be criticized at home and abroad.
3. The case against the plebiscite is not definitive: It should at
least be explored. We will be particularly vulnerable to domestic
criticism if we ignore the plebiscite possibility and move instead
immediately to seek his resignation.
4. If we take these measures now and fail, we will have lost a great
deal of our ability to influence future developments.
Option 3
Discontinue mediation efforts and return
either to business as usual or distance ourselves from the Somoza regime.
1. Each of the foregoing options carries political costs and high
risk and uncertainties. If we were unwilling to incur the costs and
risks of either, the only alternative would be to accept the current
impasse and conclude our mediation effort. We could justifiably say
that we tried to find a solution but could not bring the two sides
together, and therefore had no choice but to terminate the
negotiation process. This would in turn heighten the tensions and
the probability of continued violence and repression. We would stand
accused by those who trusted the mediation effort that we aroused
expectation and did not follow through hard enough.
2. In these circumstances we would have to decide what our future
relationship to Somoza
should be. We could return to business as usual, continuing our ties
and support. Given our human rights policy, and our efforts in
Nicaragua to date, such a course would identify us with dictatorship
and repression. It would also put our human rights policy and our
credibility in doubt for large parts of Nicaragua and Latin
America.
3. We could, on the other hand, distance ourselves from his regime.
This would require the withdrawal of all our military and economic
ties, including the withdrawal of our military mission and the
cutting of the AID pipeline.
Disassociation would not be credible if our AID and military missions remain and pipeline
disbursements are continued. The difficulty with disassociation is
that we in effect walk away from an explosive situation, and lose
any leverage to influence events.
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Such an act might in fact stimulate violence
and encourage extremism by appearing to isolate Somoza. Moreover, we have been
deeply involved and the opposition elements have exposed themselves
trusting in our efforts; we therefore give up only at the price of
alienating them and perhaps endangering them. It can be argued, on
the other hand, that since we cannot influence events anyway without
unacceptable intervention, distancing ourselves would put us in a
position to readjust to circumstances later as they occur and keep
us in the least disadvantageous position.
