Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

114. Telegram From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State¹

Managua, October 14, 1978, 1206Z

5072. USUN for Shelton. Subject: Nicaragua Mediation No. 31: FAO Turns a Corner.²

1. Summary: Negotiating Group (NG) efforts to bring FAO to more reasonable and realistic negotiating posture paid off afternoon October 13 when FAO plenary decided by unanimous vote to (a) resume discussions with NG beginning 10 am October 14. (b) relegate issue of total lifting of martial law to second place with request that NG keep trying and (c) move ahead with discussions of key issue of Somoza’s departure and democratization on basis of substantially toned down talking points rather than polemical written demands. The past week has been a worthwhile learning experience for both FAO and NG. End summary.

2. For past few days NG has met with Archbishop, private sector and individual opposition leaders to urge that they influence the FAO toward a more reasonable and realistic negotiating posture. As reported previously, these groups and individuals have been most responsive to our appeals. The latest response came at noon today when the private sector (INDE and combined chambers) met with the FAO plenary to inform it in no uncertain terms that the private sector would be watching the negotiations closely and that it expected to be not only informed of developments but also listened to by the FAO negotiators. Private sector sources advise us that they fully intend to follow up on this by scheduling periodic meetings with the FAO as negotiations proceed.

3. Our efforts to influence the FAO in a more positive direction paid off afternoon October 13. In plenary session the FAO decided by unanimous vote to:

A. Resume discussions with the NG at 10 am Saturday October 14.

B. Relegate its only partially satisfied demand for a total lifting of martial law and the state of siege to second place, requesting only that the NG keep trying to obtain further concessions on this point from Somoza.

C. Proceed with discussion of key issues of Somoza’s departure and democratization process to follow on basis of substantially toned down talking points rather than highly polemical memorandum of demands which FAO had previously intended to present to NG.

4. The final version of FAO talking points for next meeting with NG (text sent septel) clearly demonstrates positive evolution in FAO thinking over past few days.³ It begins by deploring, more in sorrow than in anger, the situation to which the Somoza regime has brought the country. Dwelling briefly on extensive corruption, repression, and incapacity of the Somoza government and its inability to guarantee peace or obtain the assistance needed for reconstruction, the document concludes that the situation has reached a climax. This underscores the importance of the negotiations immediately proceeding to discussion of change in the government. The basis for this change is:

A. Immediate formation of a national government following the definitive separation of Somoza from all civil and military positions and his departure from the country, as well as the separation and departure of all family members holding military position.

B. This national government should be pluralistic and representative of all forces that participate in bringing about democratic change.

C. Implementation of a national plan of political action based on the FAO’s sixteen points to create a juridical/political structure for free election of a truly democratic government.

5. When we talked to one of the FAO–PC triumvirate tonight he told us that the FAO almost foundered yesterday when word first circulated about extension of the state of siege. By today reason had gained the upper hand, although he had not anticipated the 15 to 0 vote achieved on the presentation to be made to US tomorrow.

6. Comment: The past week has been a worthwhile learning experience for both the FAO and the NG. We are encouraged by the way in which the moderates have reasserted themselves. The new realism will help them think constructively as they approach the tough issues of spelling out their proposals for the transition. We have learned a great deal about the personalities and inner workings of the FAO. This will assist us in knowing how and when to make our input in their deliberations.

Solaun

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780421–0201. Confidential; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Guatemala City, San Salvador, Tegucigalpa, San José, Panama City, Bogotá, Caracas, Santo Domingo, and USUN.
2. In telegram 5040 from Managua, October 13, Bowdler reported to Vaky that Somoza had delivered a “hardline speech” on October 12 decreeing that the state of siege would be extended until the end of April. Based on his October 13 discussion with Robelo, Bowdler noted that Somoza’s speech had adversely impacted the FAO. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780187–2505)
3. Telegram 5071 from Managua, October 14, contained the Spanish-language text of the talking points. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 38, Nicaragua Cables: 10/14–22/78)