113. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1
SUBJECT
- Support for the FSLN: Panama and Costa Rica
Summary
Panama’s General Torrijos supports the Sandinistas because of a mix of personal and political motives that seems unlikely to change. There are few domestic restraints on Torrijos’ involvement in Nicaragua; the types of cautions that might influence policymaking on bilateral Panamanian-US issues are far more feeble in the case of Nicaragua.
[less than 1 line not declassified] Torrijos’ clandestine maneuvers—including funneling arms and money to the Sandinistas and using both regular troops and government-supported civilian volunteers in support of FSLN objectives—[1 line not declassified]
Torrijos shows no signs of substantially moderating his support for the Nicaraguan guerrillas and—under present conditions—clandestine Panamanian assistance to the FSLN and pro-FSLN groups is nearly certain to continue. Some combination of a change in the Nicaraguan domestic situation, a shift in Venezuelan policy, and US pressure would be necessary to deter Torrijos.
Costa Rica, on the other hand, is a powerful asset to the anti-Somoza movement simply by its passive acceptance of a role as the principal guerrilla sanctuary and staging area for operations into Nicaragua.
[less than 1 line not declassified], Costa Rican President Carazo [2 lines not declassified] will probably continue to adhere to Costa Rica’s instinctively anti-Somoza line while another guerrilla offensive is planned and staged in his country.
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 80T00634A: Production Case Files (1978), Box 13, Folder 72: Support for the FSLN: Panama and Costa Rica. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified].↩