111. Telegram From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State1
4935. Subject: Nicaragua Mediation Team No. 7: Mediators’ First Meeting with Somoza.
1. Negotiating Group principals2 met alone for one and half hours with Somoza in his “bunker” on October 6. First hour was largely a monologue in which Somoza sought to demonstrate that: (a) the Liberal Party rule of Nicaragua was not much different from the ruling PRI Party in Mexico, and (b) Nicaraguan history showed how the liberal and conservative parties have alternated in power and sometimes worked together in supporting single candidates.
2. Turning to recent events, he placed responsibility for his present trouble largely on Venezuela and the United States. He described the hostility of Carlos Andres Perez and secret meeting he had with him. He said the Carter administration human rights policy, “as administered by middle level officials”, had given his opposition encouragement to renew efforts to overthrow him. With Venezuela supporting armed action and the United States applying the economic screws the Sandinistas believed they could force his withdrawal and take over the country. He had crushed them with a lamentable loss of life (1,300 killed, 2,000 wounded). Now he was pleased the negotiation group had arrived to “help them climb down from the coconut tree”.
3. Jimenez thanked Somoza for his presentation and explained the group’s mission. He asked Somoza whether news reports quoting him as saying that the negotiating team would have total freedom in talking to any groups it wished were correct. Somoza replied in the affirmative. Obiols carried the point a step further by expressing the assumption that these contacts would be without prejudice to any of the people concerned. Somoza took this without any outward manifestation of arrogance and nodded his assent. Jimenez then asked what might be done to improve the climate for our negotiations, mentioning specifically the lifting of press censorship. Somoza at first took the tack that there was no obstacle to the opposition press printing daily if they so desired, subject to certain restrictions affecting public order. Then he came around to saying that perhaps an understanding could be reached covering publication of anything having to do with efforts to work out [Page 301] a peaceful solution. We left it that we would come back to him after we have talked with the opposition.
4. By way of broaching the state of siege/curfew issue, I asked Somoza when the present period is due to expire. He replied on October 12 but he would have to extend it until the end of the harvest in order to make sure there was no serious disruption of this essential process. He nevertheless showed a willingness to consider “modifications” when Jimenez pushed him for a review of this measure. Somoza volunteered that he had released all detained political leaders with whom we might wish to meet.
5. At the end of the session Somoza asked what he wanted in the way of further meetings. Jimenez explained that we would talk with opposition leaders on Saturday and would appreciate a second session on Sunday.3 Somoza said he planned to be out of town but would come back. We set the appointment for 11:00 am.
6. As we left his office, Somoza by obvious pre-arrangement had a photographer in the antesala and asked that we stop for a picture. We are compensating for this by alerting the wire services that there may be a picture opportunity after we meet with the FAO.
7. Comment: In this opening skirmish Somoza was his usual confident and affable self. He played heavily on the non-interventionist theme (Venezuela support for armed action and United States economic strangulation) for the benefit of my colleagues but did not dwell on the Communist menace as I had expected. He seemed eager to continue the dialogue. While he gave no chips away, we detected more flexibility on censorship, and possibly the state of siege, than what we had anticipated. The second round after we see the opposition will be more revealing. As I commented to my colleagues after the meeting, our task will be to persuade Somoza that he is higher up on the coconut tree.
8. Department please handle lateral distribution to other interested posts.