Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

110. Telegram From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State¹

Managua, October 5, 1978, 0015Z

4858. Guatemala for Ambassador Bowdler. For Asst Secy Vaky from Ambassador Solaun. Subject: Mediation: A Difficult Road.

Summary: Now that Somoza and the opposition have agreed in principal to accept mediation, it is important to bear in mind the difficulties ahead in achieving an enduring, peaceful, democratic solution. The obstacles to be encountered from both GON and opposition will require special resourcefulness on the part of the mediation team if there is to be any any hope for a mediated solution. End summary.

1. The Somoza quandary

A. In their last meeting² Somoza told Amb Jorden that he views his early departure from power as unconstitutional. The Emb views this argument as nonsensical, but has not directly told him so. Emb believes that Somoza will continue to insist on a 1981 formula for resolving the political crisis. He may be expected to accept institutional reform provisions, but will adamantly insist on “sticking to the constitution” and accepting political change through free elections over which he presides. It will be hard for the US to resist constitutional/free election arguments. (The constitutional issue is dealt with in para 3).

B. As is typical of a centralized, paternalistic, authoritarian regime, Somoza has successfully suppressed military and political leaders who demonstrated any potential for creation of independent bases. Neither the GN nor the Liberal Party (PLN) has a strong institutional identity or capability of action independent from Somoza. It would be extremely difficult for them to exert pressure on Somoza to depart. Somoza, however, has the capacity to exercise a debilitating influence on these institutions, which could lead to instability. The fact that Major Somoza Portecarrero has control over the most important combat proven unit of the GN demonstrates the problem of Somoza domination of these institutions. The quandary is that, in order for these institutions to become revitalized, it is essential for Somoza to relinquish at least some of the total control he now exercises over them. However, Somoza justifies his continued domination on the grounds that no one but he is strong enough to hold these institutions together and in line. Here the Emb also does not accept Somoza’s argument.

2. The opposition dilemma

A. The opposition wants Somoza to leave immediately and excludes any solution allowing him to continue in the presidency and GN until 1981. But any intermediate solution (i.e., one not involving Somoza’s immediate departure) lends itself to instability because the longer Somoza is to remain in power, the lesser the probability the FAO would accept it, and it certainly is not likely to be acceptable to the more radical elements of that FAO which would rather support the use of continued violence. This is the key issue which could lead the FAO to split apart.

B. The FAO structure is inherently unstable—united principally by anti-Somoza sentiment—and includes a range of ideologies from very conservative to extremely radical. The popular support and legitimacy of moderate traditionalist groups (especially the four conservative party factions and the dissident MLC liberals) has been seriously eroded due to their having collaborated with the Somozas in the past. These groups lack significant organization and rank and file support. They are more like “coffee klatches” made up of relatives and close friends and led by and composed of part time politicos. The strongest group in the opposition, in terms of organization and capacity to act in the short run (not to be confused with nor imply a long run ability to capture votes in any free electoral process) is the FSLN—which is not directly represented in FAO. The Group of Twelve (G–12) representatives have refused to be specific about the extent to which they speak for the FSLN. The lack of clearly established FSLN representation through the G–12 in the FAO is likely to continue to be a problem.³ The popular belief of FSLN support for the G–12 will give that group major weight while, at the same time, the FSLN does not run the risk of having its militant image tarnished by open participation in political negotiations. Meanwhile, everyone, including the mediators will have to worry whether any political agreement will forestall (or weaken) further FSLN activities. (Note: At this moment, Embassy has intelligence indicating plans for new FSLN attacks during the first week of October. This has been confirmed by an FAO leader who has informed Amb of a plan to coordinate attacks with the ongoing mediation effort, possibly with the purpose of establishing a provisional government or some type of territorial stronghold prior to a ceasefire.)

C. The FAO political committee (FAO–PC) recently named by the FAO, has no independent decision-making authority to represent the FAO. Rather, its mandate is extremely narrowly-defined. Further, Ramirez is a Marxist: Robelo is a businessman of extraordinary ambition and little political savvy and whose followers participated, in coordination with the FSLN, in the attacks of Managua police stations on September 9; Cordoba Rivas is a political (as distinct from social or economic) radical conservative party (PCN) partisan. Embassy knows that FAO–PC agents outside of Nicaragua have been advocating the immediate establishment of a provisional government headed by the FAO–PC thus creating internal FAO problems. The FAO–PC plays an ambivalent role: on the one hand, prepared to negotiate with the GON; on the other, seeking support for heading a provisional government independent from a mediated solution. On balance, the FAO–PAC appears willing to permit the FSLN to play a large role in any post-Somoza government. Because the FAO–PC’s position within the FAO is tenuous and ultimately it accepts recourse to violent action, it is prone toward radicalism. Recently (witness the flap over the deletion of the Church Amendment to the FY 1978 aid authorization bill), the FAO–PC has demonstrated a willingness to act indepently of FAO instructions and a greater preparedness to threaten to abandon the game whenever events not to its liking occur than the FAO itself. The mediators will have to be alert to the possibility that FAO–PC contacts may not always be reported accurately back to the FAO and that FAO positions may not always be accurately reported to the mediators by the FAO–PC.

3. The constitutional issue:

A. Somoza was elected in December 1974 for a term to expire in May 1981. In that election, which resulted from the liberal-conservative pact of 1971 and which was based on the 1974 constitution, Somoza won in a landslide with only minor reports of fraud. His victory was due to effective liberal party machine politics, ineffective conservative party opposition, and an active electoral abstention campaign on the part of the opposition spear-headed by Pedro Joachin Chamorro.

B. Somoza contends that, in accordance with his electoral mandate and the constitution, he must serve until 1981. He argues correctly that there is presently no constitutional provision for a referendum. The traditional way for affecting major political change in Nicaragua is the convocation of a constituent assembly to come with “total reform” of the constitution. However, the present constitution, specifically precludes that possibility until 10 years from it adoption (i.e., 1984) (Art 336). Therefore, this avenue for an early Somoza departure appears closed.

C. Whether Somoza’s term could be foreshortened by partial amendment (Art 3389 is problematic. There is no precedent for such a change; some PLN leaders consider that the only constitutional solution to remove Somoza before 1981 would be (1) his death, (2) his physical incapacity, or (3) his resignation. However, other reputable lawyers opine that Somoza’s term might be constitutionally shortened.

D. Despite Somoza’s claim he is prohibited by the constitution from resigning, there is no such impediment according to Nicaraguan constitutional lawyers.⁴

E. The dilemma is that with the opposition adamant it cannot live with Somoza until 1981 and this position reinforced by the prospect of further serious violence and deterioration in public order as long as he is in office, the decision as to whether he will resign appears to be totally in Somoza’s hands or in his acceptance of “partial” constitutional reforms (which could not take effect before mid-1979.) To date, Somoza appears more likely prepared to take his sinking ship down with him than to resign and give it a chance to right itself by revitalizing the PLN and the GN.

4. Conclusion: It is difficult to see how an end to the violence is possible—especially if Somoza is unwilling to surrender power. Only through a combination of his early departure and solution permitting the GN and PLN⁵ to remain cohesive forces with a constructive role to play, does a peaceful transition seem presently likely (avoiding the post-Trujillo-type events that transpired in the Dominican Republic). Nicaragua’s political system is not integrated within a constitutional framework, i.e., the constitution and legal system are subservient to politics and not vice versa. The political system has been held together through Somoza’s control of the GN and PLN machinery. Mediation, inevitably, must define new legal “rules of the game” and alow additional actors to meaningfully enter the system. The mediators must play a key role in the crystallization and implementation of these new rules, as well as permitting new actors to develop to the point that a chaotic transition can be avoided. A partial solution which does not lead to Somoza’s raide [rapid?] departure will likely split the opposition. Only the moral weight of the international presence in favor of a partial solution might lend such a solution sufficient legitimacy to restore a semblance of peace but, in this case, the US will have undertaken a very significant commitment to insure that such an agreement is fulfilled.

Solaun

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of the Office of the Deputy Secretary, Warren Christopher, Lot 81D113, Box 21, Human Rights—Nicaragua V. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Guatemala City. Oxman sent the telegram to Christopher under an October 5 note describing the telegram as “a thoughtful, helpful cable. Superb in parts. Worth review,” and added, “p.s. I would take a slightly less pessimistic view than Solaun, however.” (Ibid.)
2. September 29. See Document 108.
3. Oxman bracketed this sentence, underlined the word “problem,” and wrote in the right-hand margin: “It’s also an asset.”
4. Oxman underlined this paragraph and drew a star in the right-hand margin.
5. Oxman circled this abbreviation, drew a line from it to the end of the paragraph, and wrote: “(Liberal Party).”