109. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Guatemala and Nicaragua1
252512. Guatemala for Ambassador Bowdler. Subject: Nicaragua Mediation: Negotiating Instructions.
Following are negotiating instructions as approved by the White House:
Begin text. With the Nicaraguans becoming increasingly polarized and caught in a cycle of escalating violence and repression—that produces human suffering and could lead to a radical takeover—the basic objective of our mediation is to seek an enduring, peaceful, democratic solution.
Towards that end, the U.S. mediator should try to accomplish the following:
1. Facilitate the achievement of a national consensus on Nicaragua’s future political evolution. To the greatest extent possible, allow the solution to emerge from the play of the positions taken by the two sides. While the U.S. role in the mediation will be important, perhaps central, it should be carefully calibrated to permit the parties to express their views fully and to reflect the international character of the mediation.
2. Help the opposition groups articulate their interests so that any agreement which might be reached is as broadly reflective of their views as possible—otherwise it will be an unstable settlement. As much as possible, the broad opposition front (FAO) should be treated as the principal representative of the opposition groups.
3. Work out between the government and the opposition groups (a) the nature of a transition that will take the country to free and open elections and (b) the mechanics for effectuating such a transition. Towards those ends, it will be important to encourage the formulation of a timetable for transition arrangements.
[Page 295]4. Seek to preserve the National Guard (GN) as an institution capable of maintaining law and order while insuring acceptable new leadership and the establishment of discipline and restraint.
5. Consider whether other institutions of government (e.g., the judiciary) need to be reformed to facilitate the transition to a peaceful and democratic solution.
6. If necessary to assure such a solution, persuade Somoza and his close relatives to step down in advance of 1981 and not run for office. Consult with Washington on what steps may be desirable and appropriate to achieve this result. Their departure from the country would be preferable but this decision should be a function of the negotiating process. (Should Somoza express a desire to come to the U.S., indicate that entry could be considered.)
7. During the course of the negotiations, indicate, as appropriate, that the USG is prepared (a) to provide humanitarian assistance to Nicaraguans affected by the civil strife inside the country or in Honduras and Costa Rica, and (b) once agreement is reached on a transition, to consider resumption of economic and military assistance. End text.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of the Office of the Deputy Secretary, Warren Christopher, Lot 81D113, Box 21, Human Rights—Nicaragua V. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Santo Domingo. Drafted by Vaky; cleared by Oxman, Pastor, and in S/S–O; approved by Vaky. In a September 30 memorandum to Carter, Christopher recommended that he select INR Director Bowdler to serve as U.S. mediator. Brzezinski added in a handwritten notation: “I concur. He is solid. ZB.” Carter approved the recommendation. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of the Office of the Deputy Secretary, Warren Christopher, Box 9, Memos to Christopher from the White House.)↩