Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

89. Alert Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

[memorandum number not declassified]

Washington, December 19, 1979

USSR-AFGHANISTAN²

The Soviets [2 lines not declassified] are building up other forces [1 line not declassified] near the Soviet-Afghan border. This indicates the USSR has significantly changed the nature of its military commitment in Afghanistan [1½ lines not declassified].

The buildup [2 lines not declassified] suggests that further augmentation there is likely soon, and that preparations for a much more substantial reinforcement may also be under way.³ ([classification marking and codeword not declassified]).

[1 paragraph (8 lines) not declassified]

Concurrent with the upgrading of Soviet forces at Bagram the Soviets began building up forces near the Afghan border. [1 paragraph (16½ lines) and 1 footnote in the original not declassified]

The pace of Soviet deployments in recent weeks does not suggest that the Soviets are responding to what they perceive as a time-urgent contingency, but rather that they are reacting to the continuing deterioration of the security situation in Afghanistan. The deployments and buildups may reflect the recommendations of the August-October 1979 mission of Soviet General Pavlovskiy to Kabul implemented in the light of an updated assessment of the situation. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])

At a minimum the Soviets have now established a capability to defend Bagram as an airhead. They could hold other key points, engage insurgents in selected provinces, or free Afghan Army units for operations elsewhere if they introduced forces of the size now being built up near the border. To conduct extensive anti-insurgent operations on a countrywide scale would require mobilization and commitment of much larger numbers of regular ground forces drawn from other military districts in a potentially open-ended operation. ([classification marking not declassified])

Collection Summary

Overall US intelligence collection capability against Soviet involvement in Afghanistan is considered only fair. [6 lines not declassified] But competition for scarce collection resources, particularly for coverage of neighboring Iran, has placed some constraints on overall capabilities. [5 lines, classification marking, and codeword not declassified]

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council Files, Job 81B00080R, Box 14, [memorandum number not declassified] Alert Memo USSR-Afghanistan (19 Dec 79). Top Secret; [codeword and handling restriction not declassified]. Attached but not printed is a distribution list indicating the memorandum was sent to the President and Vice President, the Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the President’s Assistant and Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Directors of INR, [text not declassified], NSA, and the Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury.
2. The Alert Memorandum is an interagency publication issued by the Director of Central Intelligence on behalf of the Intelligence Community. Its purpose is to ensure that senior policymakers are aware of the serious implications for US interests of impending potential developments. It is not a prediction that these developments will occur. This memorandum has been coordinated at the working level by CIA, [less than 1 line not declassified] NSA, State/INR, Army, Navy, and Air Force. ([classification marking not declassified]) [Footnote is in the original.]
3. [less than 1 line not declassified] believes it is important to add that these latest actions serve to underline the depth of the Soviet commitment to ensure the preservation of a pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan. ([classification marking not declassified]) [Footnote is in the original.]