Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

88. Briefing Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Mark) to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, December 16, 1979

SUBJECT

• Internal Situation in Afghanistan

Overall Situation and Outlook

The Amin Government (DRA), because of factional feuding and disillusionment within party ranks of both civilian and military personnel, rests on an even smaller and shakier basis than its predecessor, the Taraki-Amin regime. Furthermore, despite its total dependence on the Soviet Union’s military assistance for its existence—which should have implied, but has not brought, extensive subservience, rumors persist of Soviet intentions to replace Amin, perhaps with leaders of the rival Marxist group, the Parchamists, in order to get a more pliant and effective regime.

The country-wide insurgency has confronted the government with a steadily increasing threat throughout this year. Although split geographically, factionalized, and thus unable to mount a major coordinated offensive against a large city, the cumulative effect of the pressures of the many insurgent groupings has caused a steady deterioration of the DRA’s military strength and of its capability to exert its authority.

The Soviets have clearly hoped that an incremental build-up of military advisory personnel and materiel could turn the tide in favor of the government. But they have been unable to compensate for the major military problem, an increasingly acute manpower shortage. Because of casualties, large-scale defections, desertions, and recruitment problems, the army is, by some estimates, down to a force of 50,000 from a norm of 90–100,000.

It has seemed almost inevitable that, because of the critical military manpower shortage, the USSR would eventually be faced with the choice of bringing in its own troops or of retiring from the scene. The present build-up of a Soviet combat force in Afghanistan may indicate that the Soviets have concluded that that point has now been reached. The very serious situation in northeastern Badakhshan, where rebels threaten to gain control over a province on the USSR’s border, may contribute to the making of such a decision at this particular moment. However, given the tens of thousands of Soviet troops who would be necessary to bring about broad pacification of the country as a whole, the present Soviet build-up seems likely to be an attempt to insure the security of the capital region and perhaps to improve the safety of land transport from the Soviet border to Kabul.

There is also, however, the possibility that the newly introduced troops have a limited function for a limited time span. If the Soviets were to attempt to oust Amin and install a Parchamist government, they would have to contend with resistance from the present military leadership and the possibility that a Soviet-backed coup attempt could back-fire and become also directed against Soviet military advisory personnel. Thus preparations for such a move could consist of bringing in sufficient military force to guarantee its successful execution.

The Internal Political Situation

The Amin government is politically very insecure. Not only is it opposed by the population at large, which is conservative and fundamentally Islamic, but its enemies include former leftist collaborators, the Parchamists, and most recently the supporters of former President Taraki.

Amin has arrested and/or removed from key positions many Taraki loyalists but, according to clandestine reports, many remain in the army in important positions. If given another secular and leftist choice, this group might well move against Amin.

The top Parchamist leadership, headed by Babrak Karmal has been in exile (reportedly in Eastern Europe) since the fall of 1978. Recently several thousand Parchamists were, reportedly, arrested throughout Afghanistan and large numbers were executed. This followed rumors that the Soviets were planning to remove Amin and replace him with Parchamists. Earlier there were reports that Taraki had been in touch with the Parchamists and was planning, with Soviet support, to bring them back into the government, ousting Amin in the process. Rumors that the Soviets would like to replace the DRA leadership first surfaced in June 1979 and still persist.

The Soviets are known to believe that Amin’s ruthless and hasty implementation of Marxist “reforms” in Afghanistan was a major mistake, provoking the country-wide insurgency. Most of these reform programs have been halted by the expediency of declaring them “completed.” Since the inauguration of the new Amin government, the emphasis has been on “legality, security and justice” and the drafting of a constitution. In this connection, Amin has tried to shift the blame to Taraki for the large numbers of political arrests and executions in the preceding months. However, Amin is widely regarded to have been the strong man in the Taraki regime and the one responsible for its ruthless policies.

State of the Insurgency and Military Efforts to Contain It

While the insurgency remains uncoordinated and locally led, the number of active rebels has multiplied throughout the year. The rebels’ military capabilities have steadily increased owing to captured equipment and the participation of officers and recruits defecting from the DRA forces. Insurgents now control most of the countryside throughout Afghanistan. They have made travel on the major roads extremely hazardous even in heavily armed convoys and have successfully isolated military outposts.

In October, the government was able by assembling massive armored force and air support under Soviet control and direction to mount a successful campaign against the rebels in Paktia province, on the border with Pakistan. However, the actual and psychological effects of this victory appear to have been negated by the subsequent reappearance of the insurgents as the DRA was forced to withdraw its armor for redeployment.

The DRA had apparently been counting on a winter lull to reorganize its forces and train new recruits. However, the lull has failed to materialize as the insurgents continue to press and government forces have suffered a number of recent set backs, particularly in areas surrounding Kabul and in northeastern Badakhshan province.

There are reports that the rebels intend to step up terrorist activities in urban centers during the winter. The situation in Qandahar indicates this is already in progress in Afghanistan’s second largest city. Reportedly, the government is preparing for an expected rebel attack on the city. There were reports in October that Soviet military personnel had taken over the control of both military and civilian government of Qandahar.

The most serious problem affecting the government’s military capability to contain the insurgency appears to be the manpower shortage and the disaffection among both recruits and officers. Throughout the year, there have been constant reports of defections, occasionally involving complete military units. Troop disloyalty is reportedly rampant in the Badakhshan area.

The extent of the influence of exile insurgent organizations based in Pakistan is unclear. They undoubtedly have played a supportive role in the provinces bordering on Pakistan, while western and centrally located insurgents may be receiving assistance from groups in Iran. The Pakistan-based groups have been plagued by rivalries and have been unable to unite in a common effort. One important role these groups can play is acquiring funds and armaments from outside sources. A major Soviet intervention might bring in more funds, thus increasing the importance of the exiles.

Reaction to the Soviet Role

The Soviet presence and role in keeping the present government afloat have become one of the major provocations of the insurgency and a unifying factor for all rebel groups. While insurgents may be fighting, in large part, for local goals, they are united by a desire to get rid of both the “godless” communist regime and the Russians.

As the Soviet role has increased throughout the civilian and military establishment, it has provoked a nationalist reaction, even from supporters of Taraki and Amin. Recently, an Afghan pilot, probably flying a mission against Badakhshan insurgents, “accidentally” dropped his bombs on the Soviet side of the border, causing several casualties. [less than 1 line not declassified] this incident was a great tonic to the otherwise abysmal morale in the DRA’s Ministry of Defense.²

Amin has recently stated publicly that his government is dependent on Soviet support.³ However, there has been no indication of an attempt by Amin to prepare the public for a large-scale introduction of troops.

If the Soviets were to intervene to replace Amin or to fight directly against the rebels, they would be opening a new level of anti-Soviet feelings and actions. That would greatly complicate achieving Soviet goals. Achieving these goals under such circumstances would require a major Soviet effort.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR and East/West, Brement, Subject File, Box 46, Afghanistan: 10/79–1/80. Secret; Noforn; Nocontract; Orcon. Drafted by Van Hollen (INR). A copy was sent to Packman (INR).
2. The report was not found.
3. Amin’s statement was reported in telegram 8117 from Kabul, November 21. The telegram quoted two portions of an interview Amin gave to the Soviet news agency TASS: “We are convinced that if there were no vast economic and military aid from the Soviet Union, we could not resist the aggression and conspiracies of imperialism, its leftist looking allies and international reaction, and could not move our country towards the construction of a socialist society.” Amin further asserted “there is no limit” to Soviet support of the DRA, and the Soviet assistance level “completely depends on our capacity to absorb and utilize it.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790546–0399 and D790536–0665)