74. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State1
7392. Subj: The Position of Amin and Afghanistan’s Independence: Part Two of Two. Ref: Kabul 7326.2
1. (C—Entire text)
2. Summary. Though the dominant position of the Soviets in Afghanistan is probably due more to Hafizullah Amin than to any other Khalqi leader, Amin is a nationalist. His vision for Afghanistan may be a Marxist one—but it is for an independent state. Amin is probably sincere in professing a desire for friendly relations with the rest of the world, but he has made clear too that he sees Afghanistan as belonging naturally to the pro-Moscow camp of “Socialist” countries. Though claiming that his country will not meddle in the internal affairs of other countries, he speaks of supporting progressive and liberation forces everywhere, and the Pakistanis are worried about Amin’s frequent abstruse references to the Afghan peoples between the Oxus and [Page 203] the Indus. As for U.S. relations, I think they will remain difficult, if for no other reason than VOA’s Persian-language broadcasts which the DRA finds irritating. If the insurgency starts to ebb—and it has shown few signs of intensifying—we may have to come to terms with Amin. Of fundamental interest to us will be whether the U.S. can woo, to any degree, Afghanistan away from Moscow’s orbit and can discourage any inclination by Amin to be irredentist. I am not sure we can. End summary.
3. Though Hafizullah Amin has welcomed the massive support of the Soviets, I believe him nonetheless to be a nationalist—and the only strong Khalqi leader around. Amin has shown himself to be intelligent, decisive, and extraordinarily energetic. He is also ruthless; otherwise he would not be where he is.
4. While in part one of this message, I expressed concern that the Soviets may now have a commanding influence in this country, I believe also it would be a mistake to characterize Amin as a Soviet toady. We have lots of evidence that he wants to run his own show, and that Moscow is less than ecstatic over the successive purges which have caused division in and depleted the ranks of the “progressive forces.” In this respect, Foreign Minister Shah Wali made a remarkable series of disclosures this week. On Oct 6, he invited all the “Socialist country” Ambassadors (excepting the Chinese) for a briefing. According to the Yugoslav Ambassador who was there, Shah Wali spent most of the time telling about the Sept 14 Palace shootout when Taraki was removed, and made the following startling disclosures:
—Soviet Ambassador Puzanov was with Taraki on Sept 14 when Amin was called over to the latter’s office to be arrested. The inference is that the Soviets knew about the anti-Amin plot.3
—After the shootout, Amin’s departing car was fired on in the Palace complex by a rooftop sniper, apparently pre-positioned, but Amin had left Taraki’s building by another way.
—Interior Minister Watanjar, together with the two other military-officer Cabinet ministers plus the secret police chief, fled to the Soviet Embassy but later allegedly left there.
—At the Soviet Embassy, Watanjar placed a phone call to the Kabul Central Military Command ordering immediate action against Amin. But the commander refused to act unless so ordered by the Politbureau. Thus ended the anti-Amin plot.
5. Though the above Sept 14 account shows that Amin may not be Moscow’s first preference as the DRA leader, Moscow has now [Page 204] seemingly accepted Amin and reached a modus vivendi with him. Last week, when I asked the Hungarian Ambassador about Moscow’s alleged unhappiness over the purges of Taraki and Watanjar, and the reported coolness between Amin and Moscow, he cautioned against reading too much into this. He said, “As long as Afghanistan does not change its basic policies (read Communism and a pro-Moscow foreign policy), Moscow doesn’t care who is in charge.” From Moscow’s and Amin’s behavior since September 14, I think the Ambassador may be right.
6. This is not to say that the Amin-Soviet relationship has been or will be an easy one. Before Sept 14, there was tugging and pulling on both sides—and now there may be distrust. A few days ago, an Asian Ambassador here aptly described the situation when he said: “They are like a husband and wife who don’t much care for each other but nightly keep climbing into the same bed, because each has compelling needs and no options.”
7. If Amin survives, a relevant concern for the U.S. will be whether, in shaping foreign policy, he will keep a low profile such as did Hungary’s Kadar or be bent on playing an active international role like Fidel Castro. The departing Pakistani Ambassador (to be Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary) fears the latter. He sees Amin as irredentist, and told me that during his farewell call on Amin, the latter’s evasive answers on Pushtunistan and Baluchistan heightened rather than assuaged his fears. This is notwithstanding assertions, like Foreign Minister Shah Wali made to me last week, that Afghanistan has “no territorial ambitions.”
8. As for U.S.-Afghanistan relations, if Amin and his Khalqi Party survive (and I fear time is working in their favor), we will have to give thought as to what kind of presence and role we can have here. Can we exert a moderating influence? I am not sure we can, though the Sept 14 incident involving the Soviets gives some grounds for cautious hope. Certainly Amin would welcome resumption of U.S. economic aid—on their terms—but I am doubtful this would necessarily give us leverage. When we had a $17 million aid program here, we enjoyed almost no influence.
9. I doubt, too, that Amin would ever sincerely turn to us (or to the Chinese or Yugoslavs) as a political alternative to the Soviets. For one, our political ideology is so different from his. I also don’t think the Soviets would allow it, and Amin must realize this. Yet, I cannot ignore that in years past, nationalism has been a powerful force in Afghanistan, rejecting foreign influence. It is conceivable that over the next year or so it could assert itself in ways which would diminish the Soviet presence. The insurgency is one manifestation of this. Though so far the rebellion has disappointed many well wishers, and does not immediately threaten this regime, it may gain momentum.
[Page 205]10. What should our posture be during this period of uncertainty? I think our best strategy is to continue what we have essentially been doing: maintaining a low profile, trying to avoid disputatious bilateral issues, and waiting to see what happens.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790462–0311. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Islamabad, Moscow, and New Delhi.↩
- See Document 72.↩
- For discussion of alleged Soviet foreknowledge of Taraki’s ouster, see Document 65.↩