66. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Murray) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McGiffert)1
SUBJECT
- Afghanistan
NSC staff member, Tom Thornton, used a meeting in his office yesterday afternoon to produce a list of options on Afghanistan for the President to consider on Friday morning at the “Breakfast of Champions”—with Zbig and Cy. Thornton said the list would not be presented as a cleared agenda of action but as a guide to discussion.
Thornton said that [less than 1 line not declassified] it was predicted the Soviets were on the verge of a large scale military intervention which had produced in the White House staff a feeling that intervention would doom SALT, and strong U.S. diplomatic action would be required to prevent such intervention or try to counter it. Thornton proposed to work out options on the basis of what we might do if [Page 186] such an intervention does not occur and, alternatively, if it does. (See Tab A.)2
DIA is skeptical [less than 1 line not declassified] that there is a battalion of Soviet airborne already in Kabul, with a full division getting ready to follow. [1 line not declassified] made the point that in the first instance our concern should be with SALT. Thus, while we might want to deplore Soviet presence in Afghanistan, we do not want to create expectations of actions on our part or concessions on the Soviet part if neither was likely to materialize. This could contribute to the defeat of SALT in the Senate. The other argument [less than 1 line not declassified] was that, notwithstanding the importance and difficulty of our discussions with the Soviets on removal of the Soviet brigade from Cuba, we should not pass up the opportunity to tell them that intervention in Afghanistan could doom the treaty just as surely as continued problems on the brigade in Cuba.
Thornton and others did not accept that we should add the Afghanistan item to our talks with the Soviets tomorrow (I knew nothing about them) but said the item would be taken up by Vance with Gromyko in New York on the 27th.3
On the other point, however, a consensus emerged on demarches to regional and other capitals which would avoid overstating our interest, our need to react, and our demands on the Soviets in a way that would box us in with SALT critics here. The demarches are to focus on the—
—Soviet-South Asia relationship, not the Soviet-U.S. relationship.
—Possibilities of further expansion of the Soviet role in a civil war in Afghanistan.
—In this way we could get the publicity we sought for Soviet action—perhaps inspiring a wide and adverse public and diplomatic [Page 187] reaction in the Arab world, Iran and the subcontinent—without taking on Amin directly or aligning ourselves with the rebels. This is essentially a non-interventionist view, and most held it to be compatible with our military capabilities, both direct and indirect in the region, and with our limited interests. It means that we will reject the strong suggestion which the Chinese have apparently made to us to provide weapons for the rebels through the Pakistanis. In fact, most parties were cool to the idea that such aid might be useful even if the Soviets do intervene in great force. The State, NSC, and CIA view was that we want to “wring our hands like mad” and “make them pay a price” but not be drawn into the melee inside Afghanistan.
Constable of State, however, advanced the view that if there was a large scale intervention we would want to:
—Deploy forces (tactical air) to Pakistan and accelerate the deployment of a carrier task force to the Arabian Sea.
—Condemn Soviet action in UN as a threat to peace.
—Consult with the Indians about defense of the Subcontinent.
The meeting did not really come to grips with the problem that an enlarged U.S. role in defense of the Subcontinent probably means arms for Pakistan and a reduction, if not end, of our pressures on the Pakistanis in nuclear matters.
Also, given our wholly diplomatic posture on the current increased Soviet presence in Afghanistan—5000–6000 people, propping up another hateful radical regime—we can expect another chorus of discontent from the Saudis, Israelis, Jordanians, Pakistanis, Chinese, Egyptians and others about an America which is unable or unwilling to act. While we may be constrained in acting in the public arena at the moment—by the precarious position of the SALT treaty and our limited interests in Afghanistan and limited resources which can be brought to bear, we should consider a more active clandestine effort in both propaganda and support for rebel groups. Iran would probably be sympathetic. The Paks would cooperate. The Iraqis would not object. The Saudis would be mollified. The stakes would be raised for the Soviets near our most crucial and vulnerable overseas resource region—the Gulf.
- Source: Library of Congress, Donated Material of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, Box 82, Afghanistan. Secret; Sensitive.↩
- Tab A, a paper dated September 20, is attached but not printed. The paper, organized in two parts, outlined actions the United States could take before and after a Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and called such an action a “watermark event of global import.” The paper emphasized that the United States could not be perceived to be responsible for Afghanistan’s security and that Afghanistan must not be understood as a Soviet-U.S. bilateral problem. Prior to a Soviet intervention, the paper argued that the United States should remain in strong consultation with its regional and strategic allies and must raise public consciousness to foster global condemnation of any Soviet moves into Afghanistan. The paper also argued against military assistance to rebel forces in Afghanistan or military moves in the region. Following Soviet intervention, the United States should consider closing down the Embassy in Kabul, complaining to the Soviet leadership that the intervention posed a danger to the U.S.-Soviet relationship, and giving “open assistance to the rebels.”↩
- Vance and Gromyko met during the UN General Assembly meeting on September 24 and 27. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Documents 226 and 227. They did not discuss Afghanistan.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩