64. Memorandum From Thomas Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1
SUBJECT
- What Are the Soviets Doing In Afghanistan? (S)
Simply, we don’t know. Speculation is, however, intriguing. (S)
There appear to be three possibilities:
1. The entire sequence over the weekend (dismissal of the military in the cabinet; retirement of Taraki; Amin’s announcement of the end of one-man leadership) was stage-managed by the Soviets as a way of getting a more acceptable government installed in Kabul. This doesn’t seem likely. The Soviets made quite a fuss over Taraki last week in Moscow; Taraki would have been a much better figurehead for a national front government in Afghanistan; and the Soviets would not seem to have any reason to do in the military faction. This would seem to be the least likely explanation.2 (S)
2. Amin is doing the whole thing in defiance of the Soviets, facing them with a fait accompli. This would be a high-stakes game for him, but he is capable of it. It is not clear, however, why Amin would now be calling for broadened leadership unless that is solely window-dressing or nothing more than a gratuitous slap at Taraki. (S)
3. Amin started out on his own, but after the dropping of Taraki, the Soviets stepped in, called his bluff, and are now forcing him to accept a collective leadership—something the Soviets have probably been looking for for quite a while. (S)
We have no evidence that proves or disproves any of these. High levels of Soviet [less than 1 line not declassified] before the ouster of the military men may denote foreknowledge, but not necessarily complic [Page 183] ity.3 As between the second and third explanations, I like the second one since I think that Amin would have held out longer in his bluff against the Soviets, and will doubt his vague professions of future collegiality until he starts implementing them. That, however, is only a guess. (TS/Codeword)
It is hard to see how the Soviets can come out winners no matter which is the case. They tried before to put a national front together and failed, probably because nobody else would play. Why would anybody be more willing to sign on now—unless the Soviets could give credible guarantees that there would be a genuine sharing of power? That doesn’t seem too likely. And, given the growing weakness of the regime, why would anybody want to share power now when they might get the whole thing shortly? (There may be in fact reasons that would impel people to do so, arising perhaps from inter-tribal considerations. But I don’t understand these and know nobody who does.) (S)
Most likely, the Soviets have just been pushed a big step nearer to their moment of truth in Afghanistan. In this game of “Ten Little Afghans,” there is now only one left. (S)
Whatever the Soviet role in this, they should be made to look as if they had a hand in the operation. Taraki was something of a Lenin figure and had a degree of foreign respect. Amin is the Stalin of the drama and the Soviets should have him hung prominently around their necks. (S)
Brement concurs.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton, Country File, Box 91, Afghanistan: 5/78–12/79. Top Secret; Codeword. Sent for information.↩
- In telegram 21969 from Moscow, September 13, the Embassy reported that Taraki was in Moscow September 9–11, during which he secured an “authoritative reaffirmation” of the Soviet Union’s commitment to the Afghan “people,” which the telegram noted was vague, as opposed to a more specific commitment to the Afghan Government. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790418–0686)↩
- This uncertainty was reflected in a September 17 intelligence note for the Secretary of Defense, which stated that on the one hand [text not declassified] “possibly reflected” Soviet foreknowledge; on the other, Soviet facilities and residential areas in Kabul only received extra protection in reaction to the fighting that broke out at the palace, thus suggesting Amin’s move took the Soviets by surprise. (Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 4, USSR in Afghanistan (September 79)) In telegram 7063 from Kabul, September 22, the Embassy reported that Vasily Safronchuk, Minister-Counselor of the Soviet Embassy, denied that the Soviets had any advance knowledge of the takeover. (Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 5, Soviets in Afghanistan—General Part #1) A situation report prepared in the CIA, September 18, found “no evidence” of Soviet complicity in Taraki’s ouster, and cited the unlikelihood that Brezhnev would have met with Taraki during his visit to Moscow had Brezhnev known Taraki’s fate. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 6, Afghan Crisis—Pubs Pre-Invasion Reporting) A CIA intelligence information cable, September 19, quoted Aleksandr Puzanov, Soviet Ambassador to Afghanistan, who allegedly told the Yugoslav Ambassador to Afghanistan that Brezhnev and Taraki had discussed replacing Amin as Prime Minister. According to this report, Amin learned of the discussion and was consequently prepared for the “power play” of September 14. (Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 4, USSR in Afghanistan (September 79))↩