58. Intelligence Appraisal Prepared in the Department of Defense1
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[Page 171]AFGHANISTAN: TRIBAL REBELLION (U)
Summary
(C) Afghan tribal and religious leaders have historically resisted government encroachments. Central authority has always been weak in the provinces except when tied to local leaders. With the encouragement and support of dissaffected elements of the ruling elite, serious opposition by traditional forces has invariably resulted in political change in Kabul. Only in 1929, however, did tribal rebels manage to take the capital and then were unable to hold it.
([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]) The present rebellion began within a month of the April 1978 coup by the leftist Khalqi group. Almost immediate implementation of far-reaching reforms, degradation of Islam, alliance with the USSR, and extension of close government control into the lowest levels of society produced strong and steadily escalating opposition in the countryside. The government managed to contain dissent through much of 1978 but not suppress it, largely because of the depth of discontent and its own preoccupation with consolidating the revolution.
([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]) No distinct pattern of tribal opposition is evident, nor are the numbers of rebels known. Violence has occurred throughout Afghanistan and has involved elements of all five major ethnic groups and many minor ones. The fighting is generally confined to tribal valley homelands. Islam and hatred of the Soviets and godless leftists serve as unifying motives for rebellion, but they are not strong enough to produce a coordinated rebellion. Despite much publicity, calls for a holy war, and inflated claims, most exile groups play a very small role in the fighting or its support.
([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]) In the past several months rebel forces, aided by army defectors and captured equipment, have demonstrated improved capabilities in some areas and continued to expand the rebellion. Rebels are now able to operate freely in 20 of 28 provinces, and the recent outbreak of serious fighting in three major areas is severely taxing government forces. Nevertheless, without some additional catalyst, such as a military collapse, the rebels lack the capability to remove the regime.
([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]) The threat to the government stems less from rebel strength than Army weakness. The Army has never been tested in battle nor trained in counterinsurgency. Despite extensive Soviet support and the presence of about 2,000 military advisers, Army capabilities continue to decline. The Army holds only the major towns and provincial capitals, but increasingly it has been unable to secure the roads between them. [Page 172] Frustrated at fighting a no-win struggle, poorly trained, dependent on tenuous air resupply, and badly overextended, some units have refused to fight. More important, at the recent rate of losses and desertions major units may be unable to maintain organizational integrity and combat effectiveness through the winter.
([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]) As the government’s power base has narrowed, the Army’s role as the primary national-level stabilizing institution has become critical. Neither non-Khalqi officers nor the Soviet advisers are likely to allow the Army to collapse or be sacrificed. Before such a development, key military units in Kabul are likely to turn on the government. Such a struggle could result in anarchy, and the outcome is far from clear. In the event of a power vacuum in Kabul, a tribe or combination of rebel tribes might seize the capital, but this would only aggravate the bloodshed. In any case, serious violence in Kabul and political change seem almost inevitable and could occur at any time.
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- Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I–047, Afghanistan: 15 Feb 1979–22 Aug 1979. Top Secret; [codeword and handling restriction not declassified]. The appraisal was attached at Tab E to an August 22 memorandum from Henze to Denend, not printed, that responded to Mondale’s request for information on Afghanistan. Henze did not specify when Mondale made the request.↩