57. Telegram From the Consulate in Lahore to the Embassies in Pakistan and Afghanistan1
1098. Subject: Call by Afghan Rebel Leader. Ref State 173258 (Notal).2
1. (C—Entire text.)
2. Summary: Gailani of (moderate religious) National Front for Islamic Revolution of Afghanistan claims that major advances being made against Taraki regime, that it will fall in two months, but that thereafter there may be confrontation among victors, between his “liberal” and ultra-conservative religious rebel groups. Latter group receiving most outside financial support now; their ascendancy would insure USSR entry en masse into Afghanistan to forestall development of “Khomeini-like” force with possible influence on Soviet-Muslim border areas. “Liberal” ascendancy on other hand would be something USSR could live with, and would not stimulate massive Soviet intervention. [Page 169] Gailani asked that U.S. urge Saudi Arabia to provide major material assistance to Front as rebel force favored by U.S. He was informed we play no favorites in current civil war. End summary.
3. August 15, Louis Dupree, American universities field staff/Lahore, requested appointment with ConGen and without indicating he was bringing guest, appeared with Syed Ahmad Gailani, leader National Front for Islamic Revolution of Afghanistan (reftel). To avoid offense to an important rebel religious leader, ConGen had no alternative but to receive him. As expected, he asked for U.S. support but only indirectly, to encourage Saudi Arabia to provide material assistance. Request was duly declined.
4. Gailani reported that his forces, operating from Pakistan and in Afghanistan, now number 70,000 and could be swelled to 200,000 (cf. Afghan army strength of reportedly up to 100,000). Gailani claimed his men now total 90 percent of all rebel fighting contingents. At present, they have adequate equipment but need ammunition and want financial support.
5. In contrast, various ultra-conservative religious rebel elements are getting funds. An unidentified Arab recently appeared in Peshawar with $3 million, to be distributed through Jamaat-I-Islami. Money to ultra-conservatives attracts peripheral groups to their side, while “liberal” Gailani forces are getting only minor contributions from abroad. Yet former doing hardly any of fighting.
6. Gailani said he had recently met with Prince Fahd, “main power” in Saudi Arabia, and had been assured Saudis support NFIRA over ultra-conservative groups. However, Saudis hesitant to initiate major flow of aid to Front unless U.S. indicates latter is its favorite among dissident forces. Gailani also has met with ex-King Zahir Shah, who similarly favors NFIRA. (Zahir wants to return to Kabul but “not as King”; relatives are more ambitious, Gailani said.)
7. Both Gailani and Dupree emphasized that now was critical period for support for NFIRA, as liberal vs. ultra-conservative confrontation growing. It was important that former win out because if latter does, USSR will move into Afghanistan in force. Moscow not willing to stand idly by as a “Khomeini-like” movement takes over Afghanistan and spreads anti-Communist, ultra-conservative Islamic influence into Soviet-Muslim border areas. On other hand, USSR might be willing to countenance a “liberal” takeover, returning Afghanistan to status quo ante—nonaligned, with necessary tilt toward traditional friend to north. Gailani urged that U.S. should move now, indicate preference for NFIRA and encourage Saudis to make substantial contribution to cause. In this way, Front would be strengthened against ultra-conservatives, and after overthrow of Taraki regime, Afghanistan would be spared a further war (between liberals and conservatives).
[Page 170]8. Gailani said Taraki regime would be toppled in two months. Most of Afghanistan area along border, from Torkham (near Peshawar) to Chaman (near Quetta), now under NFIRA dominance. Afghan Army brigade (two battalions), which according to press has surrendered to dissidents, actually defected to Front near Abu Kala (70.8 miles east of Kandahar). Urgun and Gardez virtually surrounded by Front (respectively 60 miles southeast and 50 miles east from Ghazni, main town on highway between Kandahar and Kabul). Pincer movement now planned against Ghazni itself, by Front from east, in coordination with Hazara Shias from mountainous area west of town. Combined forces may then move northward toward Kabul.
9. Government troops in area mostly new raw recruits. Officer corps dominated by Khalqi political commissars. Gailani estimates that at present there may not be more than 15 Soviet advisors to government military force in area. Latter however fight to bitter end; NFIRA has no Soviet prisoners—those captured alive are killed. Gailani said professional Afghan Army troops largely concentrated in Kabul area. He described Nooristan as “practically independent” and Paktia almost so.
10. ConGen informed Gailani that U.S. not disposed to provide any support, direct or indirect, to any parties in Afghan civil war. Gailani said he had spoken to American Ambassador in Jidda and might want to make contact with Embassy in Islamabad.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790378–1327. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated for information to Jidda, Moscow, and the Department of State. A copy of the telegram was also found in the Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 7, USSR in Afghanistan (August 79).↩
- Telegram 173258 to Islamabad is dated July 4. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790304–0500)↩