Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

265. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Belgrade, May 8, 1980

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S. Side

  • Vice President Mondale
  • Assistant Secretary of State George Vest
  • Deputy Assistant to the President David Aaron
  • Assistant to the Vice President Denis Clift

• French Side

  • French Prime Minister Raymond Barre
  • French Foreign Minister Jean Francois-Poncet
  • Notetaker

The Vice President greeted his French guests and opened the conversation by noting that the Foreign Minister had just met with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko.

Francois-Poncet: Yes, it was one of our regularly scheduled meetings, and we felt it would have been more complicated to try to cancel it. Let me report briefly on the conclusions of the meeting. Gromyko had a general hardness of line, and a harsh tone about US-USSR relations, using vocabulary I have not heard before. We had three long discussions with Afghanistan taking up about two thirds of our time. The Soviet objective in Afghanistan is a diplomatic initiative involving Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan legalizing the Afghan regime and legalizing the Soviet presence. It is clear they want a regional legitimization. When this is done, they then may want to invite outsiders. We told them that we do not see any outside interference, nothing justifying the Soviet invasion, and with this the case, we asked why they did not accept the proposal of having an international body come in. Gromyko said no, how could they, there was fighting going on. It would be too dangerous (laughter).

Secondly, we got into a discussion of Giscard d’Estaing’s proposal for a withdrawal of troops and self-determination.² Gromyko did not say this is of no interest. He said he accepted the proposal, but only in as much as it helped to promote the USSR objective. But the Soviets say first outside interference must stop. Gromyko balks at a date for Soviet withdrawal. They want a regional approach to “crack the Pakistani nut.” They are embarrassed.

Vice President: Did he express some heat about the Pakistanis?

Francois-Poncet: Yes, he was aggressive and insulting about the Pakistanis. He said who does this Zia think he is; he should remember how he came to power.

Vice President: We have just picked up [less than 1 line not declassified] evidence of construction of a new 9,000-foot air field in southwest Afghanistan. It has a rationale entirely unrelated to the Islamic problem they say is at the basis of their invasion. It looks to us as it is a base for projection of Soviet air power.

Francois-Poncet: Generally, our reading of the Soviet move into Afghanistan has not been that there was a master plan with the objective of the Persian Gulf. It is not proven at this stage that they have become prone to military adventurism, but this does not mean that once they are there there will not be other military developments.

I have a question. They must get out. We cannot be starry-eyed about this. It may take a long time, but they have to get out. We feel local and regional factors will determine whether or not they do so. Why aren’t the Afghan rebels more effective? Why aren’t they shooting down Soviet helicopters?

Aaron: They have shot down about a dozen. They are obtaining SA–7s from defecting Afghan troops. The problem of supply is the narrow Pakistani funnel. The Pakistanis are cautious. A much more promising route would be Iran, but of course we know the problems there.

Francois-Poncet: Our feeling is that the weapons they have are very limited.

Vice President: Our objective is to get the Soviets out.

Prime Minister Barre: It is important that Russians die in Afghanistan. A friend of mine, a businessman, recently visited Kiev, and public opinion there is afraid of the consequences in Afghanistan. They are aware of casualties. They are reading newspapers.

Francois-Poncet: We are making a mistake about how we treat the rebels. They should be treated as a nationalist movement.

Prime Minister Barre: We had an excellent newsreel film on the rebels on fighting in Afghanistan shown just two or three weeks ago. It is worth seeing.

Francois-Poncet: On Islamabad II, our feeling is that it would be rougher than Islamabad I.³

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Afghanistan.]

Vice President: We view the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as a very dangerous development. We are afraid that if the leaders of the industrialized world meet and no mention of Afghanistan is made, it will be taken as a signal that the heat is off.⁴

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Afghanistan.]

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 34, Memcons: Mondale: 7/79–5/80. Top Secret; Codeword. The meeting took place in the U.S. Ambassador’s residence. Mondale was in Belgrade to attend the funeral of Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito.
2. Not further identified. Gromyko visited Paris April 24–25 and met with Giscard and Francois-Ponçet. Presumably the proposal was made at that time.
3. A likely reference to the Islamic Foreign Ministers Conferences. In a weekly report to Carter, May 9, Aaron noted: “We have found that we have a surprising amount in common with the French in their analysis of the Afghanistan situation and in their position that the Soviet approach is totally unacceptable.” (Carter Library, Donated Historical Material, Brzezinski Collection, Brzezinski’s Subject Files, Box 41, Weekly Reports (to the President), 136–150 (4/80–8/80))
4. Reference is to the upcoming G–7 Economic Summit in Venice June 22–23. See footnote 2, Document 281.