251. Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1
[Omitted here are a title page, a security information page, and a cover page.]
East Asia-USSR: The Impact of the Afghanistan Invasion ([classification marking not declassified])
Key Judgments
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan gave added impetus to growing concerns among non-Communist East Asian states that the Soviets, together with Vietnam, represent a serious long-term threat to regional security. It brought new awareness to the USSR’s ability and willingness to project its power beyond Soviet borders and pointed up deficiencies in existing East Asian defense arrangements. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])
All East Asian countries are now reassessing their defense and foreign policies. They see the need for a strong US military presence in the region but question the commitment and capability of the United States to project its power overseas; thus they will avoid getting “out front” in opposing the Soviets. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])
East Asian countries do not agree on how to meet the more visible Soviet threat. Many have important economic dealings with the USSR that they do not wish to jeopardize. Some still believe China presents the main long-term danger. Relations with nonaligned countries and commitments to Third World causes also influence their decisions. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])
Japanese leaders now believe Japan must play a more active defense role and that it must use its economic strength to further its international political and security goals. Public attitudes will change more slowly, but the evolution has begun. ([classification marking not declassified])
South Korea’s preoccupation with the possibility of a North Korean invasion influences its view of international affairs. Seoul may believe that the Afghanistan invasion and consequent exposure of Soviet [Page 679] duplicity will intensify the US security commitment to South Korea. ([classification marking not declassified])
Southeast Asian states see the need to strengthen their defenses but differ about what course to take. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations is unlikely to become an explicit defense grouping in the near future, but bilateral defense cooperation will increase among member states. More cooperation with the United States on a bilateral and limited basis is also likely. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])
Australia and New Zealand recognize that their geographic location no longer isolates them from the effects of Soviet- or Vietnamese-instigated instability in East Asia. Budgetary restrictions and domestic political inhibitions, however, constrain either country from major increases in defense spending. ([classification marking not declassified])
US and Soviet actions in the coming months will largely determine whether the changing perceptions of East Asian states evolve into lasting action. The speed and effectiveness of US responses to East Asian security concerns will condition attitudes about the United States as a durable and consistent deterrent to Soviet expansionism. If Moscow refrains from further provocative acts and embarks on a peace offensive, the fears of some countries may recede. ([classification marking not declassified])
The Afghanistan invasion has opened the way for greater cooperation with US security and other international policy objectives. Future US actions will be the major determinant of whether this happens. Military assistance is an important yardstick, but East Asian states will also measure the US response by Washington’s willingness to provide political support and understanding as well as economic aid and cooperation in matters they consider important. ([classification marking not declassified])
[Omitted here is the body of the assessment.]
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 6, folder 20. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. A statement on the cover page reads: “The author of this paper is [name not declassified] East Asia-Pacific Division, Office of Political Analysis. This paper was coordinated with the Office of Economic Research and with the National Intelligence Officer for China and East Asia-Pacific.”↩