250. [text not declassified] Research Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1
[Omitted here are a title page, a security information page, and a cover page.]
PREFACE
The opposition to the Soviet-backed government of Babrak Karmal in Afghanistan currently comprises three political elements. The most active is the disorganized collection of independent Afghan tribes currently waging vigorous guerrilla warfare against occupying Soviet troops and their Afghan clients. A second element is the royal family, headed by former King (1933–73) Zahir Shah, who lives in exile in Rome. The third force, and probably the most potentially significant, is a group of six religious leaders, each heading an opposition party based in Peshawar, Pakistan. Collectively they enjoy a wide following among their countrymen, including many of the Afghan refugees in [Page 676] Pakistan and a significant number of the fighting tribesmen. ([classification marking not declassified])
In the past these six exile leaders have never been able to set aside their deep personal and ideological differences in order to unite into a more forceful opposition against the pro-Communist government in Kabul. Attempts at unification in April 1978 and August 1979 foundered after only a few weeks. A third attempt was initiated in January 1980, when the six leaders united under the banner of the Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan (IALA). This attempt at unity has an important distinction from previous tries; it incorporates a direct agreement between two significant exile figures—Sayed Ahmad Gailani and Sebqatullah Mojadedi—who had hitherto been unable to set aside for very long the historical rivalry of their respective families. This try at unity has also been the first since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. As a consequence of that act, the IALA has come under increased pressure from the Governments of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states to keep itself united as a precondition for military and financial aid. In March 1980, in response to this pressure, the IALA selected a figurehead leader, Abdul Rasul Saif. Imprisoned for the past five years, Saif, unlike the six other exile leaders in Peshawar, is not known to have any political or religious following. ([classification marking not declassified])
Despite these efforts, the potential for disintegration remains. The IALA was formed in haste to achieve a semblance of unity before the 26 January Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference in Islamabad, so the six leaders had to postpone negotiating any organizational details. The charter was drawn up by Mojadedi and Gailani; under it Mojadedi will be prime minister (head of government) in a government-in-exile or any future post-Communist government, while Gailani will act as chief of a revolutionary council (chief of state). Another council, composed primarily of tribal leaders, is to elect other government officials. The leaders have not yet all agreed to the specifics of the charter. In fact, Gulbuddin Hikmatyar has withdrawn his Islamic Party from the IALA—at least temporarily—because he believes that it will have too small a representation on the revolutionary council. He was demanded a system of proportional representation that will reflect the number of guerrillas that each alliance group has fielded. ([classification marking not declassified])
The IALA, the Tribesmen, and the King
The view the embattled tribal leaders have of the IALA probably varies from individual to individual. Some no doubt look to it for political coordination of their opposition to the pro-Soviet government and as the channel for external military assistance. Others are most [Page 677] likely indifferent to its existence and are content to struggle independently. In any case, most tribesmen are discontent with the internal squabbling that depletes so much of the exile leaders’ energies and that reduces their effectiveness as a conduit of external aid. The tribesmen also perceive that the exile parties are playing a minor role in the actual insurgency. As a consequence the tribesmen want a greater role for themselves in Peshawar politics so as to obtain a greater share of the arms they think are coming into the area from the outside and to influence the nature of a successor government. Many of the tribal leaders have said that if the IALA members do not make immediate progress in resolving their differences, they will form an alliance of their own as the principal political focus of resistance against the Communists. Participation of the Peshawar-based leaders in such a tribal council would depend on the number of seats each could win in an election among district representatives picked by the tribesmen. Under such circumstances, Gailani, who has the most religious influence among the tribesmen, would have a good chance of being elected president of any post-Communist government. ([classification marking not declassified])
Some tribesmen support the return of the royal family, regarding it as the last legitimate government of Afghanistan and possibly considering it as having sufficient national stature to rally around in case the Peshawar leaders and the tribesmen fail to develop their own unified opposition to the Communist government. Neither King Zahir Shah nor another important member of the royal family, the King’s cousin and son-in-law Prince Abdul Wali, seem likely to gain enough support to reestablish the monarchy, but they may still figure prominently in any post-Communist government because of the respect they continue to enjoy among some tribesmen in Afghanistan. ([classification marking not declassified])
The return of the monarchy, however, is one of many issues on which the Peshawar leaders differ. The role that Islam will play in a successor government is another key sticking point, with the spectrum of views running from those who favor a Western-style democratic form of government to those who feel that the only constitution their country needs is the Koran. ([classification marking not declassified])
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- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 6, Afghan Crisis—Pubs Insurgents. Secret. A statement on the cover page reads: “The author of this paper is [name not declassified] Near East/Africa Division, Office of Central Reference. This paper was coordinated with the Office of Political Analysis, the NFAC Afghanistan Task Force, and the Directorate of Operations.”↩