Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

245. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

GC 80–10035

Washington, April 1980

[Omitted here are a title page, a security information page, and a cover page.]

The Afghan Refugees: An Irritant to Soviet-Pakistani Relations ([classification marking not declassified])

Summary

Afghan resistance efforts are receiving support from families encamped as refugees in Pakistan and from related tribes who live in the Pakistani borderlands. Soviet and Afghan military forces may attempt to curb cross-border activity when weather conditions improve in April and May. ([classification marking not declassified])

If retaliatory action is taken against refugee groups in Pakistan, likely danger zones are in the upper Konar Valley in Chitral District, in Mohmand tribal territory north of the Khyber Pass, and in the area of Parachinar in the Kurram Valley.² The Pakistani Government may choose to reduce the strain in Soviet-Pakistani relations by removing refugees from the border area. ([classification marking not declassified])

More than 700,000 Afghan refugees are located in the border areas of Pakistan; most eventually register with government agencies in order to establish eligibility for relief supplies, and about 650,000 are already registered in camps ranging in size from 500 to 11,000. Almost all the refugees are Pushtun tribesmen. ([classification marking not declassified])

Cross-border tribal ties, combined with the tendency to travel in extended family units, have enabled the refugees to survive until now without much government support. The need, however, for food, shelter, and sanitation systems is growing. ([classification marking not declassified])

[Omitted here is the body of the memorandum.]

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 82T00154R, Box 1, The Afghan Refugees: An Irritant to Soviet-Pakistani Relations. Secret. A typed note at the bottom of the page reads: “The author of this memorandum is [name not declassified] Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research. This paper was coordinated with the Offices of Economic Research and Political Analysis, the Afghan Task Force, and the National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South Asia. Information available as of 1 April 1980 was used in the preparation of the text. Comments and queries are welcome and may be addressed to the Chief, East Asia Branch, [less than 1 line and classification marking not declassified]”
2. An intelligence memorandum prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, March 27, assessed the prospects for cross-border operations into Pakistan conducted by Soviet forces. The key judgments of that assessment were: “a) The probability that the Soviets will conduct cross border operations is low until they determine that present military and political efforts to control the flow of men and material into Afghanistan will not succeed; b) Soviet efforts to seal the border will not succeed. Therefore, when the Soviets reach this conclusion and if they are not able to neutralize the resistance in Afghanistan, the probability that cross-border operations will be conducted will be very high; c) Soviets have the capability militarily to launch cross-border operations at any time; d) Political activities, such as increasingly strong, public, diplomatic demarches protesting Pakistan support to insurgents, are likely to provide the principal indication of impending cross-border operations.” (Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 1, Cross-Border Operations—Pakistan)