Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

244. Briefing Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Spiers) to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, March 29, 1980

Moscow’s Terms for Withdrawal from Afghanistan

The Soviets have not rejected the notion of negotiation about Afghanistan. But, to the extent that Moscow has developed and elaborated its views, the stated Soviet terms for withdrawal from Afghanistan appear to be even stiffer now than they were on December 27.

When the Soviets moved into Afghanistan, they promised simply to withdraw when foreign interference ceased. Moscow is now close to demanding a formally negotiated guarantee by the US and Afghanistan’s neighbors acceptable to Kabul as a pre-condition for withdrawal, and has increasingly identified itself with maintaining the current regime.

Willingness to Talk

Both the British and the French came away from their probes in Moscow in early March impressed that the Soviets stopped short of rejecting the notion of negotiations on Afghanistan outright. Gromyko’s public use on March 14 of much the same language as Zemskov’s March 3 non-paper to the British—which said that the USSR had no objection to political efforts to settle questions about Afghanistan—had the effect of committing Moscow at least to hearing out further Western demarches.²

Moscow seems to have been surprised by the amount of interest which Brezhnev’s February 22 reference to guarantees evoked in the West,³ and the Soviets probably decided not to kill off Western speculation about negotiation in the hope that divergent views might emerge thus allowing Moscow greater room for diplomatic maneuvering between the West Europeans and Washington.

What emerged from the French and British contacts was the impression that the Soviets have not developed an initiative of their own for settlement or negotiation. In general, their current position seems to be a piecemeal series of responses to British and French queries on withdrawal of Soviet troops, guarantees and neutralization.

Soviet Terms for Withdrawal

The original December 27 Soviet position was simply that Soviet troops would be withdrawn when the stated reason for their dispatch in the first place—outside interference—had ceased. Over the past month, the Soviets have added the concept of a guarantee that outside interference, once stopped, will not be resumed.

A. Cessation of Interference

According to the Zemskov non-paper delivered to the British on March 3, “one cannot speak seriously about a political solution . . . without a complete and guaranteed cessation of all forms of outside interference, including armed interference, directed against the government and people of Afghanistan.” Thus, there can be no discussions of any kind until outside interference is stopped.

During the de Leusse visit in early March, the French inquired as to whether the Soviets expected the US to admit that it was guilty of interfering in Afghanistan.⁴ The Soviets replied that they did not require a formal or public admission of guilt; a de facto cessation of interference would be sufficient.

In framing their position this way, the Soviets are basically insisting that the US and Afghanistan’s neighbors accept responsibility for the insurgency and the Soviet reaction. They are thus arguing implicitly that the causes of Kabul’s problems are entirely external and that the yardstick by which Moscow would measure cessation of interference would be abatement of rebel activity.

B. Guarantee

Cessation of foreign interference in itself would not, apparently, be sufficient to lead to a Soviet withdrawal. Moscow has added that there must be “guarantees” that interference would not resume. The Soviets have not spelled out precisely what they mean by guarantees. Indeed, it seems unlikely that Brezhnev had any plan in mind, when he first used the term on February 22. The Soviet position which emerged from their talks with the British and the French is still vague:

—The Soviets see the notion of guarantees as the result of some sort of negotiation in which the US and Afghanistan’s neighbors would “guarantee” its security. The participants in any such negotiation would be the US, Pakistan, China, possibly Iran, and Afghanistan. The USSR would not be required to give guarantees since—by Soviet lights—it is not interfering.

—When asked about international or UN mediation, the Soviets told the French that the Afghan government alone was the judge of what its security needs were, and that “no international mechanism was needed.”

Nyet to Neutralization

Given the Soviet position on negotiations and withdrawal, it is not surprising that Moscow has rejected the notion of the “neutralization” of Afghanistan raised by the British. On the most basic level, the Soviets simply refuse to draw a distinction between neutral and non-aligned or accept the argument that pro-Soviet is not non-aligned.

More specifically, the Soviets have termed the British concept of neutralization “unacceptable” on the grounds that it is intended to undermine the legitimacy of the current Kabul regime and thus constitutes interference in internal Afghan affairs. As the British were told on March 3, questions on the international status and social system of Afghanistan, as well as the composition of its government, cannot be a matter for political settlement. In the Soviet view, the pro-Soviet international alignment and socialist political orientation of Kabul were fixed by the April 1978 revolution and cannot be the topics of negotiations since this would “constitute inadmissible interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state.”

This latter point perhaps reflects the most dramatic shift in the Soviet position since late 1979. Moscow has now committed itself more than ever before to the preservation of the pro-Soviet Marxist regime and not just the maintenance of a friendly regime in Kabul. This point was underscored by Gromyko during Dost’s visit to Moscow on March 14–15.⁵ Gromyko went out of his way to stress that there was “complete unity” of views between Moscow and Kabul and promised continued aid and support.

Soviet Tactics

The main lines of Moscow’s tactics in response to a further round of Western probing are likely to be:

—not to reject discussion of the Afghanistan crisis;

—to refuse to negotiate over the future regime in Kabul; and

—to emphasize the theme of cessation of outside interference as a precondition to any other moves toward a settlement.

To the extent that the Soviets find they have to elaborate on the theme of guarantees, they may build a position in which a formally negotiated guarantee of noninterference, and Kabul’s acceptance of it, becomes an additional precondition for Soviet withdrawal.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs David Newsom, Lot 81D154, folder 2. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Limberg, Schwartz, and Baraz (INR/RSE), March 28.
2. For Gromyko’s March 14 statement, see footnote 5, below. The March 3 Soviet oral note was delivered to the British in both Moscow (by Deputy Foreign Minister Zemskov) and London; the British Embassy in Washington then provided a copy to the Department. The main points of the note were as follows: “above all, one cannot speak seriously about any political solution of the Afghan problem without a complete and guaranteed cessation of all forms of outside interference, including armed interference, directed against the Government of Afghanistan, that is without removing the causes which are that the bottom of the tension around Afghanistan. Thus it is now up to the countries involved in the subversive anti-Afghan activities and in the aggression unleashed against Afghanistan to cease that aggression and to respond positively to the constructive initiatives of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.” (Telegram 62066 to Moscow, March 8; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880025–0607)
3. See Document 216.
4. During a meeting with the Chargé in Paris, March 6, the Secretary General of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, de Leusse, reported on his recent visit to Moscow. De Leusse recounted his opening statements on French policy toward the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan: 1) France understood the insurgency as “chiefly characterized by the revolt of an entire people against a foreign intervention;” 2) the situation had compelled the Soviets to become further enmeshed in Afghanistan; 3) Afghanistan threatened détente between the Soviet Union and Western Europe, and Soviet leadership “must make a political decision to resolve the situation;” 4) tensions continued to rise as time passed; and 5) France believed only a “political solution” could resolve the crisis. That solution would include three elements: “withdrawal of foreign military forces from Afghanistan,” self-determination for the Afghan people, and “Afghanistan should not constitute a threat to its neighbors, and guaranteeing in particular that the country cannot be the stake or the instrument of rivalry of the superpowers.” De Leusse relayed the Soviets’ point-by-point refutation of his presentation, from which the French concluded that the dialogue with the Soviets over Afghanistan left them “very puzzled” and had reached an endpoint for the time being. (Telegram 7809 from Paris, March 7; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800118–0489)
5. The visit of the Afghan Foreign Minister was reported in telegram 4200 from Moscow, March 15. “Particularly noteworthy,” the Embassy reported, was Gromyko’s statement during a toast at a luncheon on March 14, during which he offered a “limited endorsement of a political settlement” for Afghanistan. The Embassy further noted that Dost, in contrast, took a “much harder line” on the topic of neutralization and quoted him as saying: “Now, when it has become necessary for imperialists to recognize that their calculations have been smashed, they have begun to think up ‘plans’ for Afghanistan’s ‘neutralization’, etc. In showing our rejection of this interference, we have made it clear to all, and particularly to those circles, that we will not let anyone interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800132–0871)