170. Article in the National Intelligence Daily1
SITUATION REPORTS
USSR-AFGHANISTAN
Three weeks after the Soviet intervention, insurgent activity remains on about the same level as before the invasion. ([classification marking and codeword not declassified])
The rebels continue to cut vital lines of communication by felling trees, seizing bridges, and opening floodgates on mountain streams. They also are setting up ambush positions to prevent the movement of troops and supplies. Army units cannot move along the main highways without armored or air escort. In addition to harassing troop convoys, the insurgents are disrupting the flow of food and fuel from the countryside to the cities, activity that could bring serious winter shortages unless the Soviets undertake a major resupply effort. ([classification marking and codeword not declassified])
The Soviets evidently have no active plans to pursue rebel forces, but appear satisfied with reacting to flash points of insurgent activity and maintaining control of the key cities—Kabul, Jalalabad, Qandahar, Herat, and Mazar-e-Sharif. Opening of the major roads may require a substantial commitment of additional ground and air support forces to push the insurgents back into remote mountainous regions. ([classification marking not declassified])
Military Movements
A Soviet airborne artillery regiment, which had been at Kokayty airfield for the past two weeks, is no longer there and may have moved into Afghanistan. [2 lines, classification marking, and codeword not declassified]
Soviet forces are being airlifted into Ghowr Province to break a rebel siege at Shahrak. The situation in the province is critical, and Afghan units have been unable to move without air support. ([classification marking and codeword not declassified])
[Page 487]Military Morale
The installation of President Babrak’s regime and its complete dependence on Soviet support has led to increased despondency in the Afghan military, [1 line not declassified]. Many officers resent the role of Soviet forces in the coup and their disarming of Afghan units whose loyalty to the new regime was suspect. [less than 1 line not declassified] all ranks of the military generally believe that the Afghans will be unable to regain control of their country without foreign assistance. ([classification and handling restriction not declassified])
Babrak’s Poor Showing
[less than 1 line not declassified] Babrak’s inept performance at a press conference for foreign newsmen last week has been ridiculed in Kabul and has further degraded his popular standing. The press conference, aired on local radio and television, reinforced the widely held view that Babrak is a Soviet puppet. The session reportedly was terminated before half its scheduled time had elapsed.2 There is speculation in Kabul that the Soviets probably are belatedly aware of Babrak’s shortcomings and may soon replace him. [less than 1 line, classification marking, and handling restriction not declassified]
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—January 1980, NIDs. Top Secret; [codeword and handling restriction not declassified]. Attached but not printed is a map of Afghanistan. The full version of this National Intelligence Daily was not filed with this collection. The article printed here was found in this form.↩
- According to a news report, the January 10 press conference was completely controlled by Soviet officials. Karmal pledged that Soviet forces would leave Afghanistan when the United States, in conjunction with Egypt, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and China, halted “aggressive policies” against Afghanistan. (James P. Sterba, “Soviet Lets Press See Afghan Ruler, Then Impedes Reports on Meeting,” New York Times, January 12, 1980, p. 5)↩