169. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State1
271. Subject: Afghanistan Sitrep No. 23.
1. (C—Entire text)
2. Summary. Kabul remains quiet but tense as the Soviet profile, while lowered, remains visible. The ruling Parcham faction is trying to broaden its bases of support through a Fatherland Front. There are indications that even the Parchamists are splitting among pro- and anti-Soviet presence elements. The government-controlled media continue to attack the U.S. and President Babrak Karmal has made a strong pitch for Afghan-Iranian solidarity against American “imperialism.” He pledged that the DRA would not permit Afghanistan to be used as a base of operations against Iran (ignoring the presence of over 25,000 Soviet troops near the Afghan side of the two nations’ border) and expected Iran to assume a “reciprocal” stance. The Afghan economy appears to have come to a standstill, at least in regard to development activity and commerce. Although foreign exchange reserves are [Page 484] high, wheat, the staff of life, is in short supply and is becoming dearer in Kabul markets. End summary.
3. As of mid-afternoon Wednesday, January 16, Kabul remains quiet but somewhat tense. The quietness reflects the absence of noted incidents; the tension reflects widespread unease and anger at the continued Soviet occupation of the country. Although the Soviet presence is not visible on every street corner, the passing of a truckload of armed Soviet soldiers, the presence of a Soviet soldier (military policeman?) at the entrance to an Air Force installation near the Kabul Airport, the increased number of Soviet civilians seen living in Kabul’s Karteh Seh and Karteh Chahar areas (near the Soviet Embassy) all serve to remind Afghans and other observers that the Soviets are very much on the scene. (This is to say nothing of the curfew hours when Soviet troopers reportedly take over much of the guard responsibilities at many DRA installations.)
4. The ruling Parchamist faction of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan has made an attempt to broaden its bases of support through the cooption of some non-partisan, prominent Afghans, of some former Khalqi officials, and of officials from the Daoud and King Zahir eras, in an effort to form a “Fatherland Front,” presumably at Soviet urging. (The Soviets had reportedly urged unsuccessfully the Taraki-Amin regime to broaden, rather than narrow, its bases of support last year.)
5. Despite the recent Parchamist effort to form its Fatherland Front, there are indications that splits are occurring within Parcham, as well as within Khalqi, circles over the issue of Soviet domination. If such indications prove true, it would appear that Afghan nationalism is a force to be reckoned with, even within President Babrak Karmal’s Parcham faction. There are also rumors repeat rumors that Babrak himself is growing unhappy with the degree of Soviet control of his government.
6. Meanwhile, the DRA-controlled Kabul New Times maintains its incessant anti-U.S. and anti-Western drumbeats.
7. Babrak has, however, made an overture to Iran’s Khomeini in a publicized note to the latter, carried in the Times’ January 14 edition. Babrak charged that “certain Iranian men and circles . . . have been doing vile propaganda and are engaged in unfriendly and unbrotherly activities at the instigation of American world imperialism . . . against the revolutionary change brought about by the Moslem, freedom-loving and brave people of Afghanistan . . .” Babrak assured Khomeini that the present DRA leadership wishes to have “most cordial relations based on Islamic brotherhood with the Islamic Republic of Iran.” Babrak pledged that the DRA “will never allow anybody to use our soil as a base against (the) Islamic revolution of Iran and against the [Page 485] interests of the fraternal Iranian people. And we expect our Iranian brethren to assume a reciprocal stance.” (Comment: We are unaware of any Iranian forces lined up on their side of the Afghan-Iranian frontier, whereas upwards of 25,000 Soviet troops are near that border.)
8. We have been deluged by American (and other) journalists for whom we have given background, unattributed press briefings. One of the issues upon which those representatives have focussed is the Soviet rationale for beefing up their military presence on the Iranian-Afghan border. It is clear that many of them suspect that the Soviets may have designs on Iran.
9. Economically, Afghanistan seems to be more or less at a standstill. There is little or no development activity going on in the country at present. In Kabul, commerce is dead, according to our Afghan contacts. Commercial imports declined sharply in the late summer, owing partially to Pakistani measures blocking re-exports (smuggling) of tires, textiles and other imported commodities to that country, and have reportedly remained down. Foreign exchange reserves stood at about dols 420 million as of mid-December, according to a source with excellent contacts in the Finance Ministry, reflecting both the decline in commercial imports and a relatively high rate of exports during most of 1979. We lack data whether there has been a decline in reserves since the December 27 Soviet invasion; we suspect there has not been yet.
10. Wheat, the Afghan staff of life, is becoming both scarcer and very much dearer in the Kabul bazaars. Bazaar merchants attribute this development both to the problem of bringing wheat in from the producing provinces as a result of the Soviet intervention, and to hoarding on the part of Kabulites. There is also a strong rumor that the anti-Soviet protest strikes, which have reportedly occurred in Kandahar and Herat, may spread to Kabul within the next fortnight.
11. Reports continue to reach Kabul sporadically about clashes between insurgents and Soviets in various provincial areas. An Afghan source, who is believed to report accurately what he hears, spoke recently to a merchant who had come to Kabul last week from Doshi (about mid-way between Kabul and Baglan on the road to the north). The merchant swore on the Koran that he had seen a band of rebels near Doshi chanting death to the Russians and carrying the heads of seven decapitated Soviets. Source felt confident that his informant was telling the truth.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800027–0678. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Ankara, Beijing, Bonn, Islamabad, London, Karachi, Moscow, New Delhi, Paris, USNATO, USUN, USICA (for NEA), CINCPAC (also for POLAD), and CINCEUR (also for POLAD).↩