2) We would be engaging in a blockade of China to the benefit of the
Soviet Union, and this would destroy the chances of any collaborative
US-Chinese relationship.
4) The Soviet Union also rejected any linkage between its conduct in
Africa and SALT, but it is hinting at
linkage between our relations with China and SALT.
5) In the light of the above, I recommend that you ask Cy, Harold, and me
to draft an ambiguous response, suggesting that this matter, as well as
others, is something that can be discussed at the Summit, in the context
of reciprocal efforts to improve US-Soviet
relations, and without prejudice to the right of every state to acquire
purely defensive weaponry.
Attachment
Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President
Carter
3
Dear Mr. President,
Availing myself of our established practice of confidential exchange
of views on urgent problems of international life and bilateral
relations, I would like to touch upon one important question related
to China. We have already had an opportunity to express our
viewpoint concerning the forthcoming establishment of diplomatic
relations between the US and the PRC. This time I shall speak of a different thing,
namely, of the plans of some Western states to supply China with
weapons, military equipment and technology which is intended for
military purposes or can be used for those purposes.
This question is not a new one. Recently it has been a subject of
discussion in various NATO bodies,
at other forums of Western countries
[Page 505]
and it may be dwelt upon at your forthcoming
meetings with the leaders of some Western states. On our part, we
have already drawn the attention of a number of states allied to the
US to the acuteness of the question of arming China. So far they are
slow about giving official replies which is evidently not
coincidental. Meanwhile the time runs and the things move in the
direction of concluding concrete deals for deliveries of weapons to
China, including the transfer of sensitive technology.
It should be obviously clear to you that intentions of the US allies
to sell weapons and military equipment to China cannot but make us
consider possibilities of appropriate reaction on our part. Indeed,
the question here is of arming a country with the biggest ground
forces, a country whose leaders proclaim for all to hear the
inevitability of a new world war and are driving in practice at
unleashing such a war.
It would seem that the US, which along with the USSR share special responsibility for
the maintenance on international peace and security, should neither
bypass facts and trends of such kind. It is the more true that
international relations are now, so to say, at a crossing of roads
leading to peace, stability and cooperation and roads leading to
confrontation and increased threat of a war pernicious in its
consequences. So, the promoting of the armament of China in whatever
form and under whatever pretext as a cover, predetermines
objectively the development of international situation in a
direction dangerous for the cause of universal peace.
To all appearances, some people yield to the temptation “to play up”
to such orientation of Peking’s foreign policy course which is
hostile to neighboring countries and increases the threat to
international security. I will say straight, this is a game
dangerous for all. It is built on a very shaky ground—on momentary
political considerations. Not too distant lessons of history, both
in Europe and in the Pacific, do not allow to forget that such plans
bring results which in no way conform to the calculations of those
who embark on the road of arming a big country which in the end
decides for itself in what direction to turn its military might.
Sometimes one hears that the sales of weapons and transfer of
technology to China promise some commercial, although rather
problematic so far, advantages. I must say with all conviction that
the considerations of a responsible policy, concern for broad
interests of the world not only of today but also of tomorrow
outweigh many times references to such commercial
considerations.
Of course, we take note of the statement by the US side that the
United States will not sell weapons to China and does not intend to
encourage other countries to do so.
[Page 506]
But even in the light of these statements, which we would like to
take seriously, we have a number of questions. Indeed, a number of
US allies are preparing—and this is an open secret—deals for
deliveries of arms and transfer of technology to Peking. For us it
is not so important who exactly signs this or that contract. Much
more important is another thing: a state pursuing a policy hostile
to the interests of peace gets modern weapons, made under US
licenses for that matter, which include many components and systems
of American manufacture, and such modern technology that can be used
for the up-building of military strategic potential. Therefore, to
call things by their own names, one has to conclude that the US is
by no means standing away from promoting the cause of arming
China.
One also can hardly avoid the impression that in this question there
exists a certain coordination of efforts of the NATO countries. And it is well known
that the US has not the least role to play in the NATO and its voice is closely heeded
by the other partners.
In view of the aforesaid you, Mr. President, may well understand that
a question arises before the Soviet Union, how should we react to
the policy of arming China with the help of the US and other Western
countries.
The armament of the neighboring country pursuing openly hostile
course against us places us in a position where the necessity arises
to undertake what we shall consider required so that plans and
actions directed against us do not take even more dangerous turn,
and to take due care of our defense with ensuing consequences. Our
duty before our people demands it.
You evidently realize that all this could not but affect further
steps in the area of limiting the arms race and of disarmament with
regard to which both the Soviet Union and the United States as well
as a number of other countries are exerting efforts, known to you,
with the obvious advance to agreement. And indeed, a certain level
of trust is needed for the solution of these problems which would
make it possible to relieve the burden of armaments weighing on the
peoples. There can hardly remain any doubts that contributing to the
armament of China does not strengthen but, on the contrary, erodes
trust in our relations which is being built with such
difficulty.
In view of the all said you may well understand that in the
conditions where concrete steps are being taken for levelling off
the Soviet-US relations, for giving them a new positive impetus the
present position of the United States with respect to deliveries of
weapons and transfer of technology to China causes quite definite
alertness on our part and desire to see this position more
circumspect and weighed.
I hope that you, Mr. President, will appreciate my frankness and will
take most seriously the questions raised by me both in determining
[Page 507]
further course of your
country and in your contacts with the leaders of countries allied to
you.
Sincerely,
