Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy

46. Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, June 26, 1977

MEMORANDUM ON SOME POSSIBLE MEASURES FOR STABILIZING US-SOVIET RELATIONS

Given present strains in US-Soviet relations, the uncertainties involved in current Soviet political changes, and the fundamental limitations of the SALT negotiations, what actions by the United States might have a useful stabilizing effect? Following are some measures for consideration:

1. Brezhnev Meeting: It seems evident that the idea has been of persistent interest to Brezhnev, and, if he would be willing to accept a non-negotiating, “get-acquainted” session not tied to SALT, with as little build-up of advance expectations as possible, it might have intangible but considerable benefits in dispelling misconceptions. It is possible, but not likely, that Brezhnev would handle himself as gruffly as he did in Paris, but the gamble seems worth taking.²

2. SALT: It seems desirable to consider what measures could be taken before September to encourage the Russians to consider more actively possible areas of movement on their part, without ourselves appearing over-eager. One such measure might be to use the exploratory channel of non-governmental scientists who have been involved in the joint study group on arms control with the Soviet Academy of Sciences for the past 14 years. They have an invitation from the Soviet Academy, which could be used to arrange a meeting in August, primarily for the purpose of eliciting responses from the Soviet side. The group could include such men as Paul Doty, Herbert York, Wolfgang Panofsky, Franklin Long, Sidney Drell—all responsible men who have served in government, know the issues, and who could have access to such officials as Korniyenko, as well as the Academy scientists.³

3. Technology: This is a subject of preeminent interest to the Soviet leadership, and the possibility of some movement in this field would be a stabilizing incentive. Two illustrative possibilities:

A. Vladimir Kirillin, Deputy Prime Minister and head of the State Committee on Science and Technology, is coming to Washington in July. For him to be received by the President would be of more than symbolic importance. (We could also use the occasion to stress our interest in having Brezhnev receive Ambassador Toon, and it would be more effective to make the point in this way than to make it as a pre-condition.) Kirillin is a good man, a cryogenics scientist of repute, sober, reasonable, and influential.⁴

B. Frank Press has developed some ideas on how the Soviet Union could be given remote access to the Cyber 76 computer for use in its weather observation system. This would by-pass the security objections to having the computer on Soviet territory, and would yield results of considerable benefit to us.

4. Steps to Increase Soviet Involvement in Global and North-South Issues: This is a large subject, which needs more detailed examination than is possible in this memorandum, but it is worth consideration as an expression of our long-term interest in drawing the Soviet Union into more responsible and constructive participation in international efforts to deal with global problems.⁵ Although the Soviet response at the present time is likely to be limited, the effort to involve them, if advanced seriously and not propagandistically, will have present usefulness as a mark of our intentions, and may have substantial effects over time. Once we have completed our preparations, we could consider sending someone like Under Secretary Cooper to Moscow to discuss a number of concrete proposals.⁶ We could also shift the emphasis in some of our bilateral cooperative agreements to areas of primary interest to the Third World—e.g., earthquake prediction, tsunami research, health care delivery in developing areas, etc. (See attached memorandum from Anthony Lake on “Prospects for Expanded Soviet Bloc Role in North-South Problems.”)⁷

5. Invigoration of US-Soviet Working Groups: Among the working groups set up in the course of our Moscow meeting in March,⁸ some are proceeding as well as can be expected (Comprehensive Test Ban, Chemical Weapons, Indian Ocean) but some could be invigorated (Conventional Arms Transfers, Anti-Satellite Weapons, Radiological Weapons) with both symbolic and practical benefits. (This might also be true for the working groups on Civil Defense and Prior Notification of Missile Launching.)⁹ These have not had a high priority, but they could be made to demonstrate our seriousness of purpose and the network of issues of possible overlapping interest. (On the Anti-Satellite Weapons issue, a decision would be required whether to proceed with these discussions now, or to hold them pending resolution of other space issues involved in PRM–23.)¹⁰

6. Examination and Development of Bilateral Scientific Agreements: Although our experience with these agreements has been mixed, some among them have been clearly successful and mutually advantageous; perhaps some should be dropped; and others could be made much more useful than they have been, with proper high-level support.¹¹ Even taking into account the uneven results, they serve to dramatize the network of overlapping interests which connect the United States and the Soviet Union, despite transient vicissitudes. The Bilateral Agreements include the following: Environmental Protection, Medical Science and Public Health, Artificial Heart Research and Development, Science and Technical Cooperation, Space Cooperation, Agriculture, Transportation, Studies of the World Ocean, Atomic Energy, Energy, and Housing and Other Construction. (Frank Press is engaged in a review of the Agreement on Science and Technical Cooperation and the Agreement on Space Cooperation. On the basis of his review, a program could be developed for increased support to those agreements which have been, or could be made, mutually beneficial.)

7. Some Miscellaneous Possibilities:¹²

A. The Soviet Union has been interested in opening a banking office in New York to perform deposit and loan functions. US banks are interested in expanding their services in Moscow. There are no legal barriers to this, and we could endorse and facilitate the project.¹³

B. We could begin to plan with the Soviet Union for a distinguished representation at the 60th Anniversary ceremonies in Moscow next November. This is an event of great personal interest to Brezhnev.

C. An expansion of scientific, academic and cultural exchanges would be well received by the Soviet Union, and could have substantial benefits, providing equitable treatment is assured for our exchangees.

D. A clarification of visa policy would eliminate some irritants in our relations and would be consistent with our CSCE obligations and general policies on contacts.

E. It is possible that the negotiations with the Soviet Union on Civil Aviation arrangements could be moved off dead center if we decided, on further examination, that the pooling proposal could be made to meet present CAB objections.

F. It is possible that the Yakutsk Liquified Natural Gas Project could be redesigned in a way that would merit support. This could be examined with the participating US firms and in consultations with Japan.¹⁴

G. In any forthcoming announcements concerning weapons procurement or deployment, consideration should be given to the effect we desire these announcements to have upon the Soviet Union.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Outside the System File, Box 48, Chron: 6/77. Secret. Carter wrote “Cy. J” in the top right-hand corner of the first page of the memorandum. No drafting information appears on the memorandum; however, Brzezinski sent it to the President under a June 29 cover memorandum, noting: “Secretary Vance has submitted a memorandum identifying a number of measures which you may want to consider as part of an effort to ‘stabilize’ U.S./Soviet relations.” Brzezinski commented on several of the specific proposals outlined in the memorandum and concluded: “U.S.-Soviet relations are the product of deep and long-term historical forces and we should not become too preoccupied with transitory aspects, some of them deliberately generated by the Soviets in order to exercise psychological and political pressure on us.”
2. In the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, the President wrote: “I agree. If B. is incompetent to negotiate, a mtg w Gromyko may be advisable.” Brezhnev embarked on a 3-day state visit to France on June 20; see Jim Hogland, “Brezhnev in Paris, Focuses on Détente,” The Washington Post, June 21, 1977, p. A–14.
3. In the left-hand margin near this paragraph, the President wrote: “They could be briefed, but not speak for me.”
4. In the left-hand margin next to this point, the President wrote: “I’m rather adamant re B. seeing Toon. He’s acting like an ass.”
5. In the right-hand margin next to this sentence, the President wrote: “Hans Detrich [Dietrich].” Reference is to Genscher.
6. In the left-hand margin next to this sentence, the President wrote: “ok.”
7. Not found attached. Printed in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs as Document 215.
8. See Document 31.
9. In the left-hand margin next to this sentence, the President wrote: “ok.”
10. Reference is to PRM/NSC–23, issued on March 28, which called for a review of existing space policy and prior efforts and formulation of a statement of overall national goals in space. PRM/NSC–23 is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXV, United Nations; Law of the Sea.
11. In the left-hand margin next to this sentence, the President wrote: “ok.”
12. Next to this heading, the President wrote: “Put a good person to work on these. J.”
13. In the left-hand margin next to points A–E, the President wrote: “ok.”
14. In the left-hand margin next to points F and G, the President wrote a question mark.