Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy

31. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, March 28, 1977, 11 a.m.–1:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

• US-Soviet Relations

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.
• Secretary Cyrus R. Vance
• Ambassador Malcolm Toon
• Mr. Paul Warnke
• Mr. Phillip Habib
• Mr. William Hyland
• Mr. William D. Krimer, Interpreter
• USSR
• General Secretary L.I. Brezhnev
• Minister A.A. Gromyko
• Ambassador A.F. Dobrynin
• Mr. A.M. Aleksandrov-Agentov
• Mr. G.M. Korniyenko
• Mr. O.M. Sokolov
• Mr. V.M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

[Omitted here are Brezhnev’s expressions of condolence for the 300 Americans killed in an airliner collision in the Canary Islands and his introductory remarks on the status of U.S.-Soviet relations.]

Secretary Vance first wanted to thank the General Secretary for the frankness and openness with which he had addressed the various important questions before us. He, too, would try to speak frankly and openly, because he believed this to be the best way of achieving results. First, before beginning to set forth the views of the United States regarding the relations between our two countries, the Secretary wanted to transmit to Mr. Brezhnev a letter from President Carter.²

(Brezhnev took a few minutes to read the translation of the President’s letter and passed it on to Minister Gromyko).

The Secretary said that all of us were heartened by Brezhnev’s foreign policy remarks in his recent speeches. Last winter, as Governor Carter prepared to assume the presidency, he had been impressed and gratified by Brezhnev’s public statement on the importance of good relations between our two countries. In particular, he was encouraged by Brezhnev’s statement at Tula that detente meant a willingness to resolve differences and disputes by peaceful means, at conference tables.³ The President’s deep conviction, which the Secretary shared and, in his judgment, was shared by a majority of the American people, was that our two countries must do everything they could to reduce the danger of war. The President, like Brezhnev, was a practical man and realized that the overall state of our relations would be determined largely by the specifics of the issues on our agenda. These were the “objective realities” of detente which determined where we were going.

The President, like Brezhnev, had been an officer in the armed forces of his country, and had a deep determination to do all he could to work toward a reasonable and fair regulation of military competition.

The Secretary well knew that Brezhnev had lived through the devastation of war, and knew the sorrow and suffering it would bring to all of our people, the young and the old. The Secretary, too, had experienced the horrors of war, had seen his friends and comrades die, and had lived with the responsibility for nuclear weapons for many years. It was his fervent hope that our children and Brezhnev’s children would be spared the incalculable horror of a nuclear holocaust. At this point Brezhnev interrupted to tell a story in connection with alleged Soviet intentions to attack or threaten the United States. An Oriental tale related that at a bazaar a man had purposely started the rumor that at the far end of that bazaar someone was giving away pillows free of charge. As people heard him, they began running toward that part of the bazaar, until the man was left all alone. At that moment he began to wonder whether there might not be something to the rumor that he himself had started, and he thought that, just in case, he, too, should start running; who knows, maybe they were indeed giving out free pillows. Brezhnev said he knew that Americans liked anecdotes, and that is why he told this story by way of an analogy to those who started rumors about Soviet-war-like intentions.

The Secretary continued by saying that recently, Brezhnev had noted that there were objective possibilities for developing equal and mutually advantageous cooperation in various spheres for the good of both countries and universal peace. He heartily agreed with such a view of the situation.

Brezhnev had further said that the question was how soon such a development would begin. He was firmly convinced that we could begin that process now. We had an unparalleled opportunity to set our relations on a fresh course.

At Tula Brezhnev had also said that detente meant an ability to take into consideration each other’s legitimate interests. The two sides were realistic enough to know that we would have differences. But we shared a fundamental interest in improving our mutual understanding. Our differences must not distract us from working for peace. They also must not divide us.

The Secretary wanted to give Brezhnev a sense of developments in our country which had affected our national outlook. We have come through a hotly contested national election which was a process of renewal and of developing a new policy consensus in the country. Now a new government had taken office in Washington, but we were dealing with the same currents of opinion that had shaped our election debates. There was support for detente among the American people, but there were also concerns and apprehensions which had to be overcome.

At this point Brezhnev interrupted again and recalled how at the very beginning of the “Great Patriotic War”, at the time Hitler had attacked Czechoslovakia and had allied himself with Mussolini, he had come home from work one day to the place where he lived in rather humble conditions together with his father. His father was a simple man, a steel worker, and this story, which Brezhnev was sure his colleagues on the Politburo had heard more than once, was well-suited to illustrate a simple working man’s approach to the psychological questions of war. His father had asked him “Lyonya, which is the highest mountain in the world”? He had responded that it was Mt. Everest. His father then asked how tall was the Eiffel Tower in Paris? He had replied that it was some 300 meters tall. His father then said that if he and his friends had been authorized to do so, they would have built a tower twice as tall as the Eiffel Tower, would have hauled it up to Mt. Everest and topped it off with a gallows. There they would hang Hitler, and would instruct everybody to view this scene through a telescope. His father was obviously unaware of the fact that the curvature of the earth would make such viewing impossible. His father went on to say they would then declare that this would be the fate of not only the first instigator of war, but of any other war-monger. After hanging five, six, or seven such criminals the world would be rid of war. Much later, during the Nuremberg Trial, when the prosecutor there pronounced the words “instigator of War”, Brezhnev recalled this heart-to-heart conversation between a father and a son. It was a true story and, while Brezhnev apologized for having interrupted, he felt it was a useful story, because it emphasized the need to defend peace.

The Secretary acknowledged that it was indeed a very useful story. He continued by saying that President Carter enjoyed the support of the vast majority of the American people—more so than any President for many years—and therefore he could get support for arms control agreements. The point he wanted to make was of critical importance, because it meant that any agreements we could reach here the President could get ratified by Congress.

The Secretary said that what we wanted to set in motion during our talks was a process of improvement in key arms control issues, in our bilateral relations, and in international relations. The President had spoken of his belief that we were all here in good faith to pursue a more stable peace through new arms limitation negotiations. He felt that we must be bold and vigorous in achieving control over nuclear weapons. We were prepared to go far in this joint endeavor and explore new ideas. The positions the President advocated were an advance over the past—not only in the strategic arms area, but in stopping all nuclear testing, and moving ahead on a broad range of other arms control issues.

Our present talks were a crucial step in demonstrating that detente was a dynamic, long-term process. It was not static. We, like the Soviet Union, must give it new meaning, if it were truly to reflect greater mutual understanding. The Secretary would suggest that we begin regeneration of detente.

Without going into details now, the Secretary wanted to sketch out those areas which we would want to explore with the Soviet side. We will explore ways to address the Backfire and Cruise missile issues, we will make a comprehensive proposal which would enhance strategic stability and mutual confidence, we will discuss advance notification of missile test firings, averting military competition in space, and concerns that certain forms of civil defense can be destabilizing. We also hoped that our discussions will make a turning point in the long effort to achieve a total cessation of nuclear testing, a subject in which, the Secretary knew, the Soviet Union had deep concerns. Conditions may be right for the United States and the Soviet Union to exercise unique leadership in getting this process moving. We were moving promptly to secure Congressional ratification of the Treaty on the Threshold Test Ban and the Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions.⁴ What we accomplish during our meetings here would help us in the ratification of those treaties. Another area where we could work together to move forward was the Indian Ocean. We wanted to explore Soviet interest in mutual restraint in that area.

The Secretary pointed out that conventional arms exports were dangerous and wasted vast and increasingly scarce resources. Our two countries have accounted for a large proportion of such trade. In fact, the United States occupied first place in the export trade of conventional arms, and the Soviet Union second place. Competition between us in the export of arms placed stress on our bilateral relations. It should in any event be a matter of principle for advanced countries to make a serious effort to restrain and reduce this trade. We would welcome an expression of interest on the part of the Soviet side in an exchange of views on this subject. In this connection, we believed that the best way to begin was with suppliers. The United States was ready to exercise restraint in its own activities. We would be talking to our allies. The President was interested in Soviet views on prospects for cooperation. In the area of non-proliferation we were gratified by progress in the London Suppliers’ Group,⁵ and in particular with very solid Soviet participation. These were important problems, and we hoped to continue in close cooperation.

The Secretary wanted to inform Brezhnev today that in the very near future we would announce certain policy decisions concerning nuclear non-proliferation. They will include the indefinite deferral of commercial reprocessing and recycling of plutonium in the United States, and the restructuring of the U.S. breeder reactor program to emphasize designs other than the plutonium breeder. The Secretary had instructed our Embassy to inform Minister Gromyko in detail of these policy decisions. We shared Soviet concern about the dangers of proliferation of nuclear weapons, and we believed that the actions which we are about to take would constitute a major step forward toward this end.

We had reviewed the Vienna MBFR negotiations and our MBFR policy. The Carter Administration strongly supported these negotiations. A satisfactory agreement could enhance the security of both sides equally. The West had shown its will to move toward agreement. The December 1975 Western proposal to reduce U.S. nuclear weapons was a substantial step.⁶ We hoped that the East would agree to the two basic objectives involved in these negotiations, which were parity in the form of equal military manpower in the area, and collectivity of limitations. If the East showed serious willingness to reach an agreement based on parity and collectivity, the way for movement on both sides would be open.

[Omitted here is discussion of strategic arms limitations, human rights, and economic policy.]

1. Source: Department of State, Shulman Files: Lot 81D109, Vance to Moscow, March 28–30, 1977. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Kremlin. Drafted by Krimer; reviewed in draft by Hyland; approved by Twaddell on April 12. Printed in full in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 17. For subsequent memoranda of conversation, see ibid., Documents 18–23. Vance departed Washington on March 25 and attended an NAC meeting in Brussels before arriving in Moscow. Following his meetings with Brezhnev, Vance met with West German, British, and French officials in Bonn, London, and Paris before arriving in Washington on April 2. For the text of Vance’s news conferences while in Moscow, en route to London and Paris, and upon arrival in Washington; the joint U.S.–Soviet communiqué issued on March 30; Carter’s March 30 press conference; and Brzezinski’s April 1 news conference, see Department of State Bulletin, April 25, 1977, pp. 389–421.
2. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 15.
3. See footnote 3, Document 17.
4. On July 3, 1974, Nixon and Brezhnev signed the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests, also known as the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT),which prohibited underground nuclear tests above a 150 KT limit. On May 28, 1976, Ford and Brezhnev signed the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (PNE), which extended the limitations of the TTBT to underground tests for peaceful purposes.
5. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), also known as the London Suppliers’ Group, was established following the 1974 Indian nuclear test. Members included the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, and Japan. A series of meetings in London between 1974 and 1977 resulted in agreements that set guidelines for the export of nuclear materials, equipment, and technology.
6. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXIX, European Security, Document 367.