Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy

32. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, April 1, 1977

SUBJECT

• Weekly National Security Report #7

1. Opinions

After two months in office, let me give you a highly subjective assessment of where we stand with our foreign policy:

The public clearly understands that the Carter foreign policy is derived from an affirmative commitment to certain basic human values. Moreover, you have defined these values as “human rights,” which is both broader and more flexible than such words as “liberty” or “freedom.” This gives our foreign policy a wider appeal, more in tune with the emerging political consciousness of mankind—which is concerned both with liberty and equity.

Starting from that moral base, your basic priorities for our foreign policy, both in terms of actual substance and specific focus, are coherent and consistent: (1) we will seek to coordinate more closely with our principal allies in order to provide the foundation for a more stable international system; (2) we will engage in a North-South dialogue in order to deal with wider human needs; (3) we will seek accommodation on the East-West front in order to avoid war and to widen trans-ideological cooperation. In addition, we will seek to halt the spread of arms, both conventional and nuclear.

The record is more mixed, in my judgment, when we look at more specific aspects of this broad policy:

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

Here I think we have done very well. Our commitment to human rights has put the Soviet leadership on the defensive in an area where it had a free ride for at least the last eight years, and perhaps even for the last fifteen—if we count from the start of the Vietnamese War. The reason that Brezhnev et al are reacting so strongly to your insistence on human rights is not because they fear that we will make human rights a condition for our relations with them; they fear this insistence because they know that human rights is a compelling idea, and that associating America with this idea not only strengthens us, but it also generates pressures from within their own system. Ideologically they are thus on the defensive.

Moreover, with regards to SALT, by committing ourselves to reductions, we have made the Soviets seem opposed to genuine arms limitations. In the past, they have often made the United States look as if it was opposed to arms limitations. The tables have now been turned, though the chance for a comprehensive agreement this summer are very uncertain.

The next step should be this: we should ask the Soviets to explain what specifically they did not like about the package, thus drawing them into a discussion of it.

The Middle East

Your basic statement has created a flexible framework for dealing with hitherto intractable issues.² By combining the need for a comprehensive peace with minor territorial changes but transitional security arrangements and with a homeland for the Palestinians, and by doing so publicly you have made a real breakthrough. The need is now for the parties concerned to understand that we are committed to these basic principles and that they provide the point of departure for more substantive negotiations among themselves. Again, this is a significant step forward from almost everything that the United States has said on the subject for at least ten to fifteen years, but persistence on our part will be required.

Latin America

We are still shaping our basic approach, but I am hopeful. I use the word “approach” advisedly; it will not be a new policy, something which every new Administration has tended proudly to proclaim—and then forget. Instead of focusing on Latin America as something special, to be protected by the Monroe Doctrine (which most Latin Americans resent) you are moving towards an approach which stresses bilateral relations, of various types, with individual Latin American states, and which deals with their broader problems in a wider global context. I believe this is responsive to their pride and to their needs.

The major cloud is the deterioration in our relationship with Brazil, something which ought to be repaired, given Brazil’s present and potential role in the Western Hemisphere. Brazil is an emerging superpower and it is clearly in the U.S. interest to have it on our side. It can be a source of stability and influence not only in regard to Latin America but even in regard to Africa, in which it is likely to become increasingly engaged.

Trilateral Relations

We have made an excellent start, especially with the Mondale visit³ which put so much emphasis on genuine consultations. This reflected your emphasis on the primacy of these relations; and was further underlined by your meetings with Callaghan and Fukuda, and by your phone calls to Giscard and Schmidt.⁴ However, the nuclear proliferation issue has become a serious bone of contention. Your statement next week⁵ and the subsequent consultations might help to relieve this irritant, while the forthcoming summit should provide us with the opportunity for an affirmative recommitment to basic unity among the trilateral countries.

I should note, however, that our human rights policy has evoked rather mixed feelings in Western Europe. This is not surprising, given West European political traditions and their proximity to the Soviets, but for some Europeans—especially the Germans—it is a source of concern.

China

Our policy towards China is yet to unfold and it needs to be unfolded. Nonetheless, Soviet efforts to promote Sino-Soviet normalization and/or reconciliation have so far failed. This gives us the needed time to develop the required initiatives, though these should be forthcoming in the course of the spring, lest the Chinese begin to think that we ignore them or take them for granted. I will be making some concrete proposals soon.

South Asia

With the political change in India, we have again the opportunity for a significant improvement in U.S.-Indian relations.⁶ Though my own view of India’s future remains pessimistic, such an improvement—at least in the short run—is highly desirable.

Africa

It is a morass. Current African events can be seen in terms of two broad interpretations, both of them probably right but each yielding a contradictory conclusion. The first is that Africa is in the midst of a social-political upheaval, with post-colonial structures simply collapsing. In that case, it is clearly inadvisable for the U.S. to become involved. On the other hand, events in Africa can also be seen as part of a broad East-West struggle, with pro-Western regimes being challenged by the pro-Soviet regimes. This dictates resistance to Soviet efforts. Both interpretations are probably right, and they point to the conclusion (in my mind) that we should press the Soviets to desist but do so outside of Africa, through diplomatic leverage, trade denial, etc., but not through direct involvement in Africa per se. In the meantime, the situation remains grave and it is possible that pro-Soviet developments in Ethiopia may soon be matched by a collapse of the pro-Western government in Zaire. This, together with the likelihood of very little progress in Southern Africa, portends a rather dark future.

Defense

Our basic position is strong, and a comprehensive reassessment of our force posture and fundamental strategic concepts is now under way. Under Brown’s direction, I feel quite confident that by late summer we will be well under way towards a renovated and relevant strategic doctrine. However, in the conventional field and in long-range rapid strike capabilities much remains to be done, and NATO standardization is not moving forward as much as it should.

North-South Relations

We are yet to define our basic position. You made a good start in your UN speech,⁷ but the basic North-South strategy is yet to be shaped. I think it is quite clear that on this issue there will be major divisions within the Cabinet, and probably a tough fight in Congress. However, if one looks ten or twenty years ahead, it is clear that the United States needs desperately to fashion a comprehensive and long-term North-South strategy. Such a strategy is an essential component of your wider architectural effort.

International Economics

The Summit will be vital in this respect, especially with protectionism becoming increasingly appealing.⁸ The United States has to provide definite and clear-headed leadership, and our weaker allies (and all of them are much weaker than we) will be looking to you for personal leadership.

[Omitted here is information unrelated to foreign policy opinions.]

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 125, Weekly National Security Report: 2–4/77. Top Secret; Sensitive; Codeword. The President wrote “Good report. J” in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.
2. Presumable reference to a statement the President made regarding a possible Middle East settlement during the question-and-answer segment of the Clinton, Massachusetts town hall meeting on March 16 (see footnote 2, Document 29). When asked what he felt “must be done to establish a meaningful and a lasting peace” in the Middle East, Carter responded that the “first prerequisite” of a lasting peace was the recognition of Israel by its neighbors; second, the establishment of permanent borders for Israel; and third, the establishment of a homeland for Palestinian refugees “who have suffered for many, many years.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book I, p. 386–387) See also Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, Document 23.
3. See Document 16.
4. The President met with Callaghan on March 10 and Fukuda on March 21. The memoranda of conversation of these meetings are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXVII, Western Europe, and Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XIV, Korea; Japan. The memoranda of the President’s March 3 telephone conversation with Giscard and his conversation with Schmidt are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXVII, Western Europe.
5. On April 7, during a question-and-answer session held in the Briefing Room at the White House, the President announced that the administration had engaged in a review of issues related to the use of nuclear power; as a result of that review, the administration would pursue a major change in U.S. domestic nuclear energy policies, designed to limit the production of plutonium, encourage research into alternative nuclear fuel cycles, increase production capacity for enriched uranium, and continue discussions with a number of governments over the establishment of an international nuclear fuel cycle evaluation program. (Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book I, pp. 581–583) The White House also released a statement on nuclear power policy, containing these and other objectives, on April 7. For the text of the statement, see ibid., pp. 587–588. See also Edward Walsh and J.P. Smith, “U.S. Acts to Curb Plutonium, Asks Allies to Assist,” The Washington Post, April 8, 1977, pp. A–1, A–19.
6. Reference is to the lifting of the Indian state of emergency imposed by Gandhi in June 1975; see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–8, Documents on South Asia, 1973–1976, Documents 204, 207, 208, and 213. Gandhi called for elections in March 1977, only to be defeated by Janata Party leader Morarji Desai. Additional information about the election is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XIX, South Asia.
7. See Document 29.
8. See Document 38. In his April 9 weekly report, Brzezinski indicated that he would focus the President’s attention “on what needs to be done to give greater meaning to the ‘architectural’ notion with which your foreign policy has been associated.” He continued: “The forthcoming summit will be an important test. Without some broader initiatives, the Summit may not live up to expectations no matter how much we seek to deepen them. The main reason our allies wanted the Summit is because they are concerned that the public—particularly in Europe—has lost faith in the liberal democratic political and economic system that has provided both prosperity and social stability. The purpose of the Summit is both to reaffirm our collective faith in that system and to take concrete steps to demonstrate its viability. As of next week we will be concentrating on this issue.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 125, Weekly National Security Report: 2–4/77)