Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E-15, Part 2, Documents on Western Europe, 1973–1976, Second, Revised Edition

98. Memorandum From the Counselor (Sonnenfeldt) to Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Washington, October 18, 1976.

SUBJECT

• NPG Ministerial

Attached (Tab A) find a memo from EUR, PM and S/P outlining a potentially important issue between ourselves and the FRG, as regards the “nuclear balance.” An immediate focus for this problem is Rumsfeld’s statement for the NPG Ministerial pending November 17–18.

At last year’s Ministerial, Rumsfeld used the term “Eurostrategic” to characterize a very imprecise concept which the Germans have been using since in a manner increasingly troublesome. The FRG view, which has lately surfaced in a formal statement by German NPG Perm Rep Pauls, comprises: [1] a view that SALT codifies a balance of intercontinental strategic systems, which [2] signifies that the US strategic deterrent is ineffective insofar as preventing local aggression is concerned; [3] therefore, from the European point of view (“Eurostrategic”), a nuclear sub-balance must exist at any given time; [4] prospective deployments of Backfire and the SS–X–20 IRBM will upset this balance; and [5] deployments of new systems may be necessary to re-establish the balance. In connection with the latter point, the FRG has showed increasing interest in cruise missiles; which may express their specific concern for the possible effect a SALT agreement might have on this particular system.

I don’t think we should let this tendency in FRG thinking mature much further. The Bureaus propose to begin now to head off such a development. Their immediate point of concern is the Rumsfeld statement for the Ministerial next month, which could easily aggravate the problem unless carefully framed. The Bureaus request your approval for a prophylactic effort in which they are now engaged, as regards Rumsfeld’s statement. I recommend you approve their course of action. In addition, this issue, in my view, is suitable for you to raise with Rumsfeld at your breakfast meeting with him on Thursday, October 21.

Attachment

Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Hartman), the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Miliary Affairs (Vest), and the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lord) to Secretary of State Kissinger

Washington, October 18, 1976.

Nuclear Balance Issues at NPG Ministerial

The Problem

An FRG request for review at the NPG of what it suggests could be a potential imbalance in European theater-nuclear systems raises problems for the credibility of the NATO deterrent, current and future US arms control strategies, and Alliance solidarity. The German request appears to reflect some confusion concerning FRG interests. We need to begin considering strategies on the long-term aspects of the problem. In the shorter term, this memorandum describes the course of action we are following in working with DOD to prepare a US response to the German questions for Secretary Rumsfeld to use at the NPG in London, November 17–18.

What are the Germans Seeking?

Beginning at the Hamburg NPG session last January, the FRG has given increasing emphasis to trends in the theater-nuclear balance, with particular stress on longer range strike systems. At the June NPG Ministerial in Brussels, the FRG proposed that the traditional strategic balance briefing given by the US be expanded at the November meeting to include separate discussion of a so-called “Eurostrategic balance.” At the October 5 briefing to NPG PermReps by Donald Cotter on Warsaw Pact theater-nuclear systems, German Ambassador Pauls made a formal statement outlining what the FRG would hope to see covered in such an expanded balance briefing, including:

—A breakdown and East-West numerical comparison of categories of European theater weapons, according to range: battlefield (e.g. Lance, artillery); extended area (e.g. Pershing, Scaleboard, tacair); “Eurostrategic” (e.g. SLBM, MR/IRBM, medium bombers); other forces (e.g. ADMs, air defense).

—Discussion of whether, in the context of strategic parity, Soviet deployment of new theater systems such as Backfire and the SS–X–20 poses a qualitatively and quantitatively “new” threat to Europe which could offer opportunities for “blackmail;”

—Whether “new technologies” (read cruise missiles) offer a “solution” to these perceived problems;

—Whether there are prospects for new arms control negotiations with the USSR on theater systems.

Sources of German Concern

The German concerns arise from the matrix of the SALT negotiations, MBFR, and the continuing US proposals for European theater-nuclear force modernization.

—On SALT II, German and Allied concerns have related to potential provisions for non-circumvention and non-transfer, and to the treatment of weapons systems of particular interest to the European theater, especially cruise missiles and Backfire. The Germans have followed the intense and frequently public US debate on these issues, and appear to have absorbed at least some of the argumentation of US opponents of tight limits on cruise missiles. Their apparent fear that a significant theater imbalance may now exist or may develop as a result of new Soviet deployments of the SS–X–20 and Backfire, directly parallels similar arguments made by some US officials. The Germans, however, have long been concerned with the MR/IRBM question, going back to the early 1960s. The MLF proposals, and ultimately the formation of the NPG, were in part designed to deal with the problems of perceived theater imbalance at that time, by giving the FRG greater participation in the nuclear deterrent. In more recent years, the Germans reluctantly subordinated concerns over MR/IRBM in order to avert limitations on US FBS. The statements by some Administration officials may have helped to reawaken these long-standing concerns over the theater balance.

—In MBFR, the Germans were willing to go along with the US Option III nuclear offer, but fought vigorously in NATO consultations to avert the possibility of ceilings on all Allied nuclear systems in the NGA. Although the lengthy internal Alliance negotiations on the subject of Allied equipment limits ultimately proved successful, the intense bargaining and eventual compromise probably did not assuage longer-term German concerns over possible US intentions regarding the European theater-nuclear posture.

—With regard to theater-nuclear force modernization, the Germans have been suspicious of US motives from the outset, believing—correctly—that some senior officials in DOD desired to remove large numbers of nuclear warheads from Europe, while seeking to shift away from theater-based nuclear-capable tacair towards coverage of theater targets with SLBMs. The Germans see grave implications of strategic decoupling and battlefield warfighting in the entire modernization effort. For the moment, the thrust of the original DOD TNF modernization effort has been blunted by German resistance, expressed in a thoroughly staffed FRG counterpaper tabled at the NPG last June, and by State intervention. The positive US decision on F–16 nuclear capability, and your insistence on retaining all existing F–4s in the FRG when the F–15 is introduced next year, have signaled to Bonn that the US is aware of German concerns over “denuclearization.”

Where are the Germans Headed?

The nuclear-capable aircraft question has not been definitively resolved and other TNF issues such as Nike Hercules are still under study in the Alliance. The overall modernization exercise has accentuated German nervousness over US intentions and stimulated German thinking on possible successor systems for existing nuclear-capable tacair in the deep strike role. In this situation, some German MOD officials may view the cruise missile as opening the possibility of new theater-based force posture options which could keep viable deep strike systems in Germany indefinitely, even if future decisions ultimately should downgrade the role of nuclear-capable tacair.

The “Eurostrategic balance” argument which the Germans have advanced as a vehicle for discussing their fears holds that:

—the existence or potential existence of a significant disparity in levels of nuclear delivery systems at the theater level could give the Soviets opportunities for blackmail against Europe;

—because of strategic parity, to be codified in SALT, the ability of the US to offset regional imbalances with its strategic umbrella is less credible, at least in political terms; and

—the mobile capability of the SS–X–20 makes it far harder to target than earlier MR/IRBMs; (we had specifically assured the Europeans in the 1960s that the MR/IRBM threat was balanced because the launcher sites were covered by external US strategic missile forces).

The Germans do not appear to have thoroughly thought out the implications of this line of argument. The logic of the “Eurostrategic” balance runs counter to the long-standing assumptions of US-European solidarity, and many of its potential corollaries could work against basic German interest in the coupling of US strategic forces to deterrence of war in Europe and in general East-West stability. At the staff level, FRG officers deny that they are interested in doing anything that would appear to divide the doctrinal and operational unity of the NATO triad of conventional, theater-nuclear, and strategic forces. Nor do they suggest the future creation of an independent European deterrent—which could be an implication of arguing the need for a European based cruise missile force to offset the SS–X–20. The evident implications of an independent German nuclear capability are daunting, and a relationship with the UK and France, even if possible, could never provide a satisfactory deterrent from the German viewpoint. Even a conventionally-armed long-range cruise missile force in German hands could be an unsettling factor given uncertainties on the part of other European countries both as to German intentions and as to what kinds of warhead was, in fact, mounted on such missiles.

The Germans are also aware of the acute difficulties and potential unattractiveness of negotiating on theater weapons systems. They were quick to inquire when ideas for SALT-type negotiations were floated this summer.

It is not clear that the FRG has decided that it must find a “hardware” solution to the yet ill-defined balance problem or that, if so, the hardware should be the cruise missile. They have been very cautious in evaluating the implications of cruise missile technology in NPG study groups and have avoided leaping on popular theories about “strategic-conventional” options or other slogans related to cruise missile development. State and DOD have received conflicting signals on whether the FRG considers the application of the cruise missile to Europe to be primarily for close range interdiction (up to 600 kms) or for long range strike into the USSR. It is possible that, as in the mid-60s with the NPG, the FRG could ultimately be satisfied with a “consultational” rather than hardware response to its concerns. In any case, with the MLF history in mind, we will want to be careful about flashy “solutions” to a long-standing problem.

By advancing the “Eurostrategic balance” argument, the Germans may be signaling less a fear of specific theater imbalance—although that should not be ignored—than a general malaise with the course of US and Western nuclear defense deployments and thinking in a period of strategic parity. Throughout the postwar period, the Germans have feared that the systems analysis approach to military problems advanced by some in the Pentagon, without due attention to political aspects, could ultimately come to drive US policy and thereby damage FRG interests. This concern continues to be fed by an intense campaign by some in DOD, in official and unofficial channels, to convince the Germans that they face a new and greater nuclear threat from Soviet theater forces.

In sum, there is considerable confusion in FRG statements to date on the European nuclear balance, suggesting that the Germans are still thinking the issue through. This may afford us an opportunity to get across the US viewpoint at the NPG Ministerial before the FRG concerns harden.

US Interests and Options for November Ministerial

US interests in the European balance question are both immediate and long range, and include:

—maintaining Allied confidence while avoiding potential difficulties for SALT II over cruise missiles and theater systems;

—ensuring that the Germans and other Allies continue to perceive effective coupling of the US strategic deterrent to Europe;

—avoiding unnecessary disagreements with the Allies over nuclear employment policy, and the gradual and pragmatic modernization of theater nuclear forces.

We believe that these interests can best be pursued by a US approach to the November NPG Ministerial which talks candidly about the current state of NATO and Warsaw Pact systems, including the controversial SS–X–20. However, it should place all nuclear systems within the context of a global balance of forces and explicitly reject the logic of single numerical sub-balances for particular elements of the Triad. We would reaffirm our commitment to deter Soviet attack on NATO, including nuclear attack, and reiterate the continuing logic of common deterrence and shared risks within the Alliance. We would need to counter the assumption that strategic parity has led to a weakening of this commitment and point to the enhanced flexibility of US strategic targeting doctrine and improvements in all aspects of the NATO Triad as an indication of our seriousness in maintaining it. We would also have to describe specifically the capabilities of the SS–X–20 and Backfire, placing them in the context of evolutionary development of Soviet capabilities against the theater. While acknowledging that the SS–X–20’s mobility could make it far more difficult to target, we would point out that the real counter to such missiles, as to SLBMs, is not counterforce targeting, but assured retaliatory capacity which the US and NATO continue to possess. There is no way that the USSR could employ or threaten to employ the SS–X–20 against NATO Europe without risking totally unacceptable levels of retaliation by NATO, including US strategic forces.

With regard to the cruise missile, we believe that the Secretary of Defense should focus his remarks on a description of the state of technical development of the weapons system, and avoid discussion of hypothetical operational roles it might fill, or of the state of play of the SALT negotiations regarding cruise missiles. This may not meet the expectations of the Germans, and the issue will remain alive for future discussions, but it would be the surest approach given the present state of play. It would also avoid exacerbating internal US arguments over the merits of the system. Finally, we would deny that we contemplated any new negotiations on European theater systems.

In addition to preparing for the November Ministerial, we need to begin thinking about longer term approaches to the problem. This could, for example, entail bilateral consultations with the FRG (and perhaps the UK and others). Considerable interagency work would be required here, however, to iron out present sharp differences of perception of the nature of the European regional threat and our preferred options for dealing with it. Much of this latter question is now being debated in the context of work on the NSSM 246 response. We may be in a better position to make recommendations for further work and consultations as we see how NSSM 246 develops and we work with DOD in preparing for Secretary Rumsfeld’s participation in the Ministerial.

Recommendation:

In working with DOD on the development of Secretary Rumsfeld’s presentation for the November NPG Ministerial, we intend to follow the course outlined above which would (a) describe European theater systems but integrate them into the overall strategic balance; (b) reaffirm the US commitment to the integrity of the NATO Triad; (c) focus discussion of cruise missiles on technical description of system development; and (d) deny interest in European theater-nuclear arms control talks. We request your approval of this course.

1. Summary: Sonnenfeldt forwarded and commented upon a memorandum from Hartman, Vest, and Lord on nuclear balance issues at the NPG Ministerial.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, 1955–1977, Entry 5339, Box 3, HS Chron, Oct–Dec 1976. Secret. All brackets are in the original. The attached memorandum was drafted by John Hawes in EUR/RPM on October 15; concurred in by Bartholomew and James Goodby in PM; and sent through Sonnenfeldt. Kissinger initialed his approval of the recommendation in the attached memorandum, writing at the bottom, “Wish also to discuss.”