Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–15, Part 2, Documents on Western Europe, 1973–1976

76. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

• Release to NATO of the United States Reply to the 1975 NATO Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ–75)

Defense has forwarded the proposed U.S. reply to the 1975 NATO Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ) (Tab B) and has asked that you approve release of the document to NATO. The Questionnaire is sent annually to each member of the Alliance (less France and Greece) as part of the NATO defense planning cycle. Responses to the Questionnaire are the primary source of information on individual country force plans. In this year’s response, each country will describe its tentative plans for 1976 through 1980, and will designate the forces it has actually committed to NATO for calendar year 1976.

The U.S. DPQ response as originally transmitted to you by Secretary Schlesinger proposed a drawdown in the number of U.S. nuclear capable aircraft deployed to Europe and a reduction to only one aircraft carrier continuously on station in the Mediterranean (rather than two). After substantial high level review of the proposed reply, the Defense Department was able to modify the DPQ and its force program to avoid the proposed drawdowns.

—Nuclear Capable Aircraft. The original version of the DPQ reply would have shown a drastic reduction in the number of U.S. nuclear capable aircraft in Europe as U.S. nuclear capable F–4 aircraft were replaced by more modern aircraft (the F–15 and A–10). While highly capable in the conventional role, these aircraft are not configured to deliver nuclear weapons. Between 1976 and 1980, the number of U.S. nuclear capable aircraft in Europe would have declined from 474 to 258, with an even more severe drawdown in the MBFR reductions area (from 192 in 1976 to 48 in 1980).

A drawdown of this magnitude would have risked undermining the MBFR talks (particularly the value of our Option III proposal which includes withdrawal of 54 U.S. F–4s), and might have reawakened Allied doubts about our commitment to use nuclear weapons if necessary in the defense of Europe. For these reasons, the Air Force has modified its aircraft modernization plans and will replace only 90 F–4s between now and 1980. Since virtually all of these aircraft are assigned an air defense role, there will be almost no reduction in the number of U.S. aircraft tasked with the nuclear strike mission. The Air Force is also examining ways to insure an adequate level of nuclear capable aircraft in Europe over the long term, by nuclearizing the F–15 and the F–16, which is scheduled to begin entering the force in the early 1980’s.

—Carrier Deployments. As originally proposed, the U.S.–DPQ response would have reduced the number of U.S. aircraft carriers continuously on station in the Mediterranean from two to one. A second carrier would have been deployed to the Mediterranean for a total of only six months out of the year. In view of the importance of our continued presence in this strategic area, the Navy has agreed to modify its carrier deployment schedule and to plan to maintain two carriers on station full time in the Mediterranean. Drawdowns to one deployed carrier may occur, but only under exceptional circumstances, involving essential ship maintenance and repair or crucial training exercises. To assist in supporting two carries continuously forward deployed in the Mediterranean, the Navy will retain in the Atlantic fleet a seventh active carrier (one originally scheduled for retirement this year).

The proposed DPQ reply at Tab B has been updated to reflect the agreed changes in our aircraft replacement program and in our aircraft carrier deployments. The remaining sections of the DPQ, particularly those dealing with our ground forces, describe our efforts to upgrade the warfighting capability of our forces by modernizing their equipment and replacing excess support personnel with combat troops. In sum, the DPQ should not provide good evidence to our Allies of our continuing commitment to the defense of Europe.

Recommendation:

That you authorize me to sign the memo at Tab A releasing the U.S. DPQ–75 response to NATO.

1. Summary: Scowcroft requested Ford’s approval of the release to NATO of the U.S. reply to the 1975 NATO Defense Planning Questionnaire.

   Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Agency Files, Box 14, NATO—1975 NATO Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ–75) (1). Secret. Sent for action. Ford initialed his approval of Scowcroft’s recommendation. Tab A was not attached. Attached but not published is Tab B. Minutes of an October 17 SRG discussion of the DPQ are ibid., NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 24, Meeting Minutes—SRG—Originals, June–October 1975.