Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–15, Part 2, Documents on Western Europe, 1973–1976

75. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 6, 1975.

SUBJECT

• Concorde

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• General Scowcroft
• Secretary of Transportation Coleman
• Deputy Secretary Barnum, DOT
• Michael H. Styles, Office of Aviation, State
• John Hart Ely, General Counsel, DOT
• Alfred J. White, Office of Aviation, State (notetaker)

Secretary Kissinger: I understand you wish to discuss the Concorde. We will certainly have serious foreign policy problems if the Concorde is not permitted entry.

Secretary Coleman: Before making my own recommendations on Concorde, I did want to discuss the matter with you, mainly in your capacity as Special Assistant to the President. There are some problems with the Concorde; the noise level is higher than what was originally expected. Secondly, the Environmental Impact Statement indicates that there is the possibility of skin cancer and that an estimated 200 light-skinned people per year might contract cancer due to disturbance of the ozone level.

Secretary Kissinger: There are certainly a great many military supersonic flights and if Concorde were to cause 200 cases of cancer the military flights must cause many more cases. I wonder how they arrived at such a figure. It seems questionable to me.

Secretary Coleman: The plane also uses a lot of fuel.

Secretary Coleman: You may recall that the Senate attached a rider to the FAA appropriations bill that would have denied the Concorde entry into the United States. That rider lost by only two votes; mainly because it was considered premature since FAA had not yet come to any decision. If the plane is permitted entry, Congressional action to prohibit it is probable and might well be passed. The President could then veto the bill and the veto probably could be sustained. The President should be aware that he would most likely be confronted with this situation.

Secretary Kissinger: I would be glad to write a letter to you on the foreign policy grounds.

Secretary Coleman: I do want to discuss the problems with you. Another problem is that Concorde service may cost Pan American and TWA about $30 million annually in diverted traffic.

Secretary Kissinger: You mean they will have to charge more?

Deputy Secretary Barnum: They want to charge 115% of the existing fares, but it is questionable whether IATA would approve so small a charge. The CAB will have to approve any new fares and again this aspect will come to the attention of the Board and possibly the President directly.

Secretary Coleman: There is also the possibility of Treasury anti-dumping action against the Concorde on the grounds that the fares may not fully reflect both operational and construction costs.

Secretary Kissinger: You want something from me on the problems relating to foreign policy matters?

Secretary Coleman: Something stronger than that. That is, whether there would be adverse effects on some of our foreign relations if entry is not approved. The present request is for six flights a day; four to Kennedy and two to Dulles.

Secretary Kissinger: That is a lot of flights.

Secretary Coleman: Another problem that arises and which you would have to deal with later is applications from other countries such as Iran. We could limit the number of flights granted to the UK and France to six, but how would this affect relations with Iran or some other country?

Secretary Kissinger: If we don’t let the British and French do it, they will say that, having defaulted in having our own SST, we are trying to close them off from the fruit of their success in a high technology product. The French and British have leaned on us pretty hard.

Have you seen the letter which my staff has presumably negotiated with yours.

Mr. Styles: We did not negotiate this letter.

Secretary Coleman: I would prefer not to negotiate a letter. I would not wish to be subject to Congressional criticism that I negotiated a letter before I received it.

Secretary Kissinger: You want us to send the letter on our own responsibility.

Secretary Coleman: There’s not only the British and French to think about.

Secretary Kissinger: You might establish limits on the number of landings. The problem would be different with Iran because the British and the French have invested so much in the development of the plane.

Secretary Coleman: Another question I want to raise is whether the President should get involved in this.

Secretary Kissinger: I can take it up with the President or we can take it up with him together.

Secretary Coleman: Yes, we could do it together.

Secretary Kissinger: I can mention it to the President today.

Deputy Secretary Barnum: I think there are two separate decisions involved. You (Secretary Kissinger) could raise it with the President to determine whether he wants to be involved. If the President wants to be involved then you can both discuss the issue with him.

Secretary Kissinger: The President would be better off not being involved. If he is going to veto any bill, Secretary Coleman should talk it over with the President. If he is not going to veto, the President can thus stay out of it.

(The Secretary gave Secretary Coleman a letter, previously prepared, dealing with the foreign policy aspects of the Concorde case.)

1. Summary: Kissinger, Coleman, and Barnum discussed Concorde.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P820123–2263. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Alfred White in the Office of Aviation, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State; and approved by Covey in S on October 21. Kissinger’s letter to Coleman was not found. On October 7, Ford told Kissinger that he was disposed to veto a Congressional ban on Concorde landings in the United States. (Memorandum of conversation, October 7; Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 15) On February 4, 1976, Coleman approved a 16-month trial of limited Concorde service to New York and Washington.