Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–15, Part 2, Documents on Western Europe, 1973–1976

38. Summary of a Paper Prepared in the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs and the Policy Planning Staff¹

Washington, undated.

US RELATIONS WITH WESTERN EUROPE

Summary

The Present Situation

The structure of our relations with Western Europe has been called into question by a series of developments that seem to undercut one part or another of the Atlantic system. These include: strategic parity; uncertainty about NATO’s strategy and force dispositions in Europe, and the US role in them; the effect of détente on Alliance relationships in general, including European concern about US-Soviet bilateral dealings, and on the Allies’ willingness to continue to shoulder the burdens of defense; divisive economic problems; and the growing unity of the EC Nine and their uneven but increasing coordination of political issues.

US Interests

In light of these challenges to established policy, a reexamination of US interests with respect to Europe suggests they continue to include: 1) prevention of the extension of Soviet control or influence westward; 2) support for development of Western European prosperity and stability in order to strengthen the Allied ability to resist Soviet encroachment; 3) prevention of a revival of sharp internecine European quarrels and, to this end, support for European unity; and 4) maximizing US influence on the policies of the West European countries.

In today’s increasingly fluid international system we also now have a fifth interest in Europe: we have been so closely committed to Western Europe for so long that any serious diminution of our standing and influence there would have a negative impact on our diplomatic as well as our strategic position in the global balance.

Options

Six alternative frameworks for US relations with Western Europe can be envisaged:

1) Atlantic Alliance, Ltd. Pragmatic adaptation of the existing Atlantic system to mitigate, if not resolve, its political-military and political-economic problems, and acceptance of the limitations of working within the system to influence Western European policies outside of the traditional scope of the Alliance.

2) Closer Atlantic Ties. Extension of Alliance coordination functionally and/or geographically.

3) US Hegemony. Hard bargaining of the US security commitment to Europe against Western European concessions to the US on economic and other issues, and undermining the unity of the Nine by playing them off against each other.

4) Devolution. Phased transfer of part of the US security burden to the Allies.

5) Diminution. Unilateral cutback of US force levels, while retaining basic US commitments to Western European security.

6) Disengagement. US withdrawal of its military presence in Europe, perhaps even of its treaty commitment, and dealing with Western European states on an ad hoc basis without fixed, prior commitments.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Analyzing these alternatives in terms of their feasibility and their impact on US security, influence and costs, we conclude:

1) The costs in terms of security and influence of the two alternatives of diminution of the US role or of disengagement are too great, and the feasibility of the third, hegemony, is too slight to pursue them as realistic courses.

2) The policy most likely to meet our needs would include these elements of the other three options:

a) Adapt the existing Atlantic system by working to solve its specific political-security and political-economic problems. These difficult is-sues, and the challenges related to them, can be resolved or managed. This, in general, also is the preferred approach of our European Allies.

b) Add to the existing system more intensified consultations with the Allies—particularly with the three most important of them. There are limits on how much can be accomplished by consultations, and they imply some limitation on our freedom of action. Nevertheless, closer contact among the US, the UK, the FRG and France on matters affecting their interests will produce somewhat greater coordination of policy, or at least greater understanding, than has been the case. Given France’s importance, we should undertake a study of US-French relations in light of present circumstances.

c) The possibilities of devolution should be urgently studied with the aim of arriving at a definite decision whether the US wishes i) to promote devolution, ii) to be receptive to European proposals to that end if any are ever made, or iii) to resist such a development.

In sum, the Alliance system, in our judgment, continues to provide the best vehicle available for pursuing our interests in common with the Allies. It is far from perfect, but can be improved by adaptation. The President’s visit to Europe can promote the goal of adaptation, consistent with our interests and new circumstances.

1. Summary: The paper is on U.S. relations with Western Europe requested by Kissinger.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Policy Planning Council, Policy Planning Staff, Director’s Files (Winston Lord), 1969–1977, Entry 5027, Box 346, Nov. 1973. Confidential. Attached but not published is the remainder of the 33-page paper. Sent to Kissinger under cover of a November 19 memorandum from Stoessel and Lord, in which they note that the paper was prepared in response to his request for an analysis of U.S.-West European relations. Kissinger requested this paper at an October 25 staff meeting. (Ibid., Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, Entry 5177, Box 1, Secretary’s Staff Meeting, October 25, 1973)