Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–15, Part 2, Documents on Western Europe, 1973–1976

37. Telegram 214396 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Federal Republic of Germany¹

Washington, October 31, 1973, 1707Z.

Subject: President’s reply to Brandt letter.

1. Please pass following reply from the President to Chancellor Brandt at your earliest opportunity:

2. Quote: Dear Mr. Chancellor:

Quote I appreciate your letter and the frankness with which you have set forth your views on the problems that the Middle East crisis has created within the Alliance. There are two aspects that I wish to clarify.

Quote I understand that on the substantive questions relating to the conflict between Israel and the Arab governments, there is no obligation to reach a common Alliance position. Our European allies have economic interests in the area that lead to positions that diverge from our own. In this light, the US did not expect public support for its policy.

Quote I also appreciate that the Europeans, including the Federal Republic, were under a great deal of pressure from Arab governments. I had been led to believe that it was nevertheless agreed between our two governments that the US would draw on part of the military stocks in the Federal Republic for the resupply of Israel. There was never any question of doing this against the wishes of your government. It was thus a shock when our Ambassador was informed that these activities were to stop, even though the crisis was far from over. It was even more surprising that this démarche was released to the press before we could respond.

Quote In any case, it is best if we put this incident behind us and consider it closed.

Quote The second point, however, relates to the more basic problem of the interests of the Alliance as a whole. You note that this crisis was not a case of common responsibility for the Alliance, and that military supplies for Israel were for purposes which are not part of the alliance responsibility.

Quote I do not believe we can draw such a fine line when the USSR was and is so deeply involved, and when the crisis threatened to spread to the whole gamut of East-West relations. It seems to me that the Alliance cannot operate on a double standard in which US relations with the USSR are separated from the policies that our allies conduct toward the Soviet Union. By disassociating themselves from the US in the Middle East, our allies may think they protect their immediate economic interests, but only at great long-term cost. A differentiated détente in which the allies hope to insulate their relations with the USSR can only divide the alliance and ultimately produce disastrous consequences for Europe. If the USSR learns that it can exploit the Middle East to divide the US from its European allies, then it is only a matter of time before the Soviet Union adopts more aggressive policies elsewhere.

Quote I profoundly hope that what has occurred in the past few weeks reflects only lack of adequate and timely communication produced by the rush of events. I agree that we need to give some serious thought to the meaning of recent events for the Alliance. The work we have already started in framing a declaration of principles allows us to examine some of these fundamental problems and sets forth the principles and mechanisms for handling whatever problems may arise. You are quite right that substance is most important, and, as you are aware, we hope to move expeditiously in the meeting with the European Community and with NATO. The concerns I have expressed in this letter are not, however, eased by the refusal of the Nine even to mention the word “partnership” in a common document with the US. Sincerely, Richard Nixon unqte.

3. Chancellor’s letter delivered October 28 by Ambassador Von Staden follows:

Quote Dear Mr. President,

Quote I am concerned over signs of official and public reactions in connection with insufficient information during the most recent Middle East war.

Quote In the interest of our untroubled and trustful relations and for the benefit of cohesion within the Atlantic Alliance I wish to inform you without delay of my ideas on this point in order to obviate any serious misunderstanding between us or within the Alliance.

Quote Without knowing details of the actions or arguments that have led your government to bring things under control in the Middle East, it was and is my opinion that no one but the United States in cooperation with the Soviet Union was capable of doing this. It seems that your efforts have been successful. Who would not appreciate this. My government has sought in its own way to use its comparatively very small possibilities for peace-securing measures. It would be a grave error, therefore, to presume that my government had not had sufficient understanding for the requirements of balance in the Middle East and for the responsibility imposed upon you.

Quote At the same time it is important to realize that, as in previous crises, this was not a case of common responsibility for the Alliance.

Quote We have proved more than once that we have not been indifferent and that we know who our chief ally is. But it is another thing if—without the Federal Government having been completely informed, let alone beforehand asked—United States materials are handled from the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany for purposes which are not a part of Alliance responsibility. On this point the Federal Government could not, in principle, act any differently than my predecessor in office did in 1956. Like then, this need not and should not lead to tension, either bilaterally or within the Alliance, for our common interests can and must not be affected when we discover deficiencies in communication and concertation.

Quote Should it be necessary, I will gladly explain this in detail. Today I am anxious to contradict emphatically any conjecture that the Federal Republic of Germany might be lacking in Alliance solidarity.

Quote I am convinced that the misunderstandings and frictions that have arisen will lead to more thought being given to problems within the Alliance with a view to attaining the goal that we all pursue, namely, the strengthening and deepening of the Alliance in a difficult time.

Quote These occurrences show how necessary the work is that is to be done in preparation for your visit to Europe. In this connection, substance will be still more important than language.

Quote With kind regards, yours sincerely, Sgnd. Willy Brandt, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany Unquote.

Kissinger

1. Summary: Nixon responded to a message from Brandt concerning U.S.-West European relations in the aftermath of the October 1973 Middle East war.

   Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 688, Country Files, Europe, Germany (Bonn) Oct 73–Dec 31, 73 (Feb 73–Dec 31, 73) (1 of 1). Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted in the White House; cleared by Springsteen and Gammon; and approved by Eagleburger. On October 26, Schlesinger, McCloskey, and Nixon publicly criticized the lack of West European support for the United States during the Middle East crisis; both Schlesinger and McCloskey made specific reference to the independent stance adopted by West Germany. (New York Times, October 27, 1973)