166. Telegram 6965 From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State1
Subject: The Current Crisis; and Assessment. Refs (A) Lisbon 6953 DTG 211619Z Nov 75, (B) Lisbon 6211 DTG 211625Z Oct 75. Summary: The government’s objectives in the current confrontation are to bring about major military command changes in the vital Lisbon area. The government is supported by the two democratic parties in the Cabinet, the Group of Nine, and Azevedo. It can count on the armed support of the commandos, Santarem Cavalry School, and some attack aircraft. Opposing the government are the Communists, the Far Left, Otelo, and perhaps the President. The opposition can count on Ralis, the military police, and elements of other commands in the Lisbon area. Various left wing militias are untested militarily but an important psychological factor. Although there is increasing talk of a showdown by force, both sides are anxious to avoid shedding blood and a negotiated solution is likely. While the Left seems to have achieved important concessions in today’s Revolutionary Council decisions, we should not underestimate the significance of the Lourenco appointment as head of Lisbon Military Region. It is a major victory for the Nine. From the point of view of USG, a survival stance of limited gains that gets Azevedo through to elections that convey full legitimacy on the anti-Communist parties may be the best we can expect. End summary.
1. The problem: The problem facing the Azevedo government was generated by the progressive breakdown of cohesion in the armed [Page 562] forces movement coupled with increased Communist inspired labor unrest. The tactics were deliberately designed to back Azevedo into a corner. The situation reached the point where the Prime Minister found himself twice locked in by hostile crowds, and on the second occasion could not count on enough military support to effect his own release. Such events undermine totally the government’s efforts to impose economic austerity, restore balance to the press and purge the PCP from the bureaucracy. Azevedo could no longer govern. Since resignation could lead to chaos and/or civil war, he tried another approach.
2. The government’s objective in the confrontation: In suspending its operations, the government forced an indecisive President to focus on its demands:
(A) Removal of Army Chief Fabiao, COPCON and Lisbon Region Head Otelo Carvalho, Military Police Chief Campos Andrade, Ralis Operational Commander Dinis de Almeida, and the Head of the Infantry School.
(B) Transfer of crowd control function back to police from military.
3. Contending forces:
(A) Supporting the government on this issue are the PS and PPD, the Group of Nine, and Azevedo.
(B) Opposing the government are the Communists, the far left FUR Group, Otelo, Rosa Coutinho, and perhaps the President, although the latter has not shown his hand.
4. Balance of power: In a showdown, the government counts on solid support from the Popular Democrats and Socialists, neither of which has an effective armed organization. The GOP can also count on most of the army units north of the Mondego River, and general support from the population in the north. Militarily, the Group of Nine will have with them the Commandos, the Santarem Cavalry School, and some Air Force attack aircraft. The Marines may or may not stay loyal to their former commander, Azevedo.
5. The opposing forces can count on Ralis, the military police, and elements of various commands in the Lisbon area. It is likely that Army Chief Fabiao will follow the lead of the President. The President will attempt to avoid an armed confrontation—but probably at the expense of the government forces. Otelo may join the anti-government forces. The various armed militia of Left wing forces in the Lisbon area are a psychological factor of importance but their fighting ability is completely untested. Both the military and the democratic parties fear that the Left and their militias have the capability of taking control of Lisbon.
6. Likely outcomes: Although there is increasing talk of a showdown by force, both sides are anxious to avoid shedding blood. Thus, a negotiated solution is likely. Today’s decisions by the Revolutionary [Page 563] Council are the first steps in the process of reaching an accommodation (ref A). While the Left seems to have achieved important concessions, we should not underestimate the significance of the Lourenco appointment. It is a major victory for the Nine. Possible outcomes can be described as follows:
(A) Government resigns. Antunes becomes Prime Minister with Left-technocrat cabinet with heavy ex-mes influence. Some changes in military commands.
(B) Government restructured. Azevedo remains with a cabinet that includes increased PCP representation and dropping of Labor and Information Ministers. Military commanders, except the Lisbon region, remains largely unchanged.
(C) Azevedo reshuffles cabinet, eliminating some controversial Secretaries of State but holding to basic structure. Some military commanders are replaced with government supporters.
(D) Azevedo replaces President and most of the military changes demanded by the government are made. New Prime Minister is selected from military—perhaps Antunes. Cabinet party balance remains the same.
(E) Government stays same. President remains. Today’s communiqué and passage of time resolve problem.
7. Likely evolution: President Costa Gomes, himself a public issue for the first time, will fight hard to survive and will seek a compromise favoring a continued important role for the PCP. He has on his side the authority of the presidency, the desire of all sides to avoid violence, and the exaggerated fear of the armed power of the PCP and its far left allies. He would probably favor solution (B), but Moderates may be able to hold on to Rosa or at least receive additional military concessions in exchange.
8. Socialist Leader Soares is not prepared for a full scale confrontation. The PS goal is for the government to survive until elections, but it still will not accept a coalition with the PCP alone (probably the President’s preference). PPD is more militant but unprepared for all out fight and anxious as well to see elections held.
9. Group of Nine, hoping to avoid bloodshed and an inter-army firefight, may be satisfied with modest gains in its influence in Lisbon military commands.
10. Although PCP behavior in the past has often been self-damaging, it is unlikely that PCP would wish a suicidal showdown at this time. Without the PCP, the Far Left does not have the numbers or organization to undertake a showdown by force. The PCP and the Far Left could settle for a small reduction in their influence if the alternative [Page 564] is confrontation and if it saves face. However they will fight hard to get PPD and Labor Minister out.
11. Antunes will be a key man in deciding the outcome. As the most political of the Nine, he is in a position of leadership. He clearly would like to be Prime Minister. If he could push Azevedo aside, it is conceivable that he would be able to convince his less sophisticated colleagues in the Nine that a Left technocratic solution is the best way to keep the Communists in line, but out of an excessively influential role.
12. From the point of view of USG interests, a “survival stance” of limited gains (the most likely outcome) on the part of the Azevedo government may be the best we can expect. The Azevedo government is nearing the two month mark. Our first-month assessment (ref B) noted that it had survived under stress and this was, perhaps, its principal achievement. The same is still true. I believe our interests are likely to be served if the Azevedo government merely survives until the elections for legislative assembly convey full legitimacy on the democratic political parties. Even this minimal requirement will be a tall order and will require help from Portugal’s Western friends. It will also require that we keep our own expectations fairly modest, while continuing to assist the Azevedo government economically and in other ways.
- Summary: The Embassy assessed the latest political crisis in
Portugal.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1975, [no film number]. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Bonn, London, Madrid, Moscow, the Consulate in Oporto, Paris, the Consulate in Ponta Delgada, Rome, Stockholm, the Mission to NATO, DIA, and USCINCEUR. Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt, Lowenstein, and Barbour discussed the U.S. position on the developing situation in Portugal on November 25. (Memorandum of conversation, November 25; ibid., Records of the Office of the Counselor, Helmut C. Sonnenfeldt, 1955–1977, Entry 5339, Box 7, Southern Europe 1975)
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