Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–15, Part 2, Documents on Western Europe, 1973–1976

165. Memorandum From Denis Clift of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Washington, October 11, 1975.

SUBJECT

• The Situation in Portugal—WSAG Meeting Monday, October 13, 1975 at 10:15 a.m.

The Situation

The latest situation report on Portugal is at the immediate Tab so marked. Director Colby is prepared to brief.

The main elements of the situation are:

—The Azevedo government is caught in a crisis of authority which threatens its viability. It would be premature to count out Azevedo and the Moderates, but they face some critical challenges, even in the short run.

—Growing political instability stems from several sources:

1. Increasing politicization of the military with polarization between moderates and leftists, resulting in a serious breakdown in order and discipline. This is critical since stability in the military is necessary for stability in the government.

2. Subversive activities and demonstrations of the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) and far left groups. Ex-Premier Goncalves and his supporters are suspected to be behind much of this activity.

3. Worsening economic and social problems which are exacerbated by the influx of Angolan refugees (now approximately 175,000), many of whom blame their troubles on the radical governments which have dominated affairs over the past year.

—The present volatile situation could lead in any of several directions:

1. Survivability of the present government, albeit in a very shakey condition.

2. Return of a more radical government, either pro-communist or far-left.

3. Large-scale civil disorder, with possible civil war, or at least a leftist government in Lisbon and widespread disorder in the rest of the nation.

4. Attempted rightest takeover.

The Agency believes that the first alternative listed above is the most likely to pertain for at least the near term.

—In sum, the Agency notes:

The Portuguese talent for last-minute accommodation to avoid final showdowns may once again reassert itself, and head off any decisive resolution of these uncertainties at least for a time. The Azevedo government, and the moderate elements in the Armed Forces and political parties still have assets—including a majority of popular support. But the tendencies toward disintegration of institutions—especially the Armed Forces and the government’s control over them—make the outlook more uncertain than ever.

You and the President met with Foreign Minister Antunes on October 10. In order to ease some of the pressures on Lisbon, the President is sending to the Congress an assistance program for Portugal which includes some $35 million for relief and resettlement of Angolan refugees and some $20 million for long-term economic assistance. We have also agreed to increase our airlift of Angolan refugees from 500 to 1000 evacuees per day. Since the first American aircrafts were provided on September 7, we have evacuated approximately 13,000 refugees from Angola to Portugal.

Angola. Angola is scheduled to become independent November 11. However, the three independence movements, the Soviet-supported Popular Movement on the one hand and the National Movement and Movement of National Union on the other, are engaged in an armed conflict that may become an all out effort to gain military predominance by November 11 and thus a claim to sole representation in Angola. A major U.S. concern is that in its haste Portugal will withdraw its troops from Angola leaving behind significant quantities of military equipment and material, most of which, situated in Angola, could fall into the hands of the Popular Movement. We have made clear to the Portuguese Government that our agreement to double our airlift is predicated on its assurances the Popular Movement will not gain possession of Portuguese military stocks currently in Angola.

Following Director Colby’s brief, you may wish to comment on your recent meetings with Portuguese Foreign Minister Antunes, and his assessment that there are serious obstacles in the road ahead for Portugal, but that the Moderates, with whom he is associated represent the democratic force in Portugal and they are determined to persevere and hold on to their position of leadership.

We need to ask some key questions:

—The rebellion and indiscipline in certain military units is leading to strife and disorder in the country. How has this affected the durability of the Azevedo government? Even if the Azevedo government survives, will it be so weakened that it will be unable to rule effectively?

—What are the Communists and the extreme left up to; what are the current activities of Goncalves, Carvalho, Coutinho?

—Do we still see the same basic political divisions along geographic lines with principal support for the moderates in the North?

—Has this moderate support been fragmented by leftist military dissidence within the northern troop commands?

—What is the likelihood of the current situation deteriorating into widespread civil strife or even civil war?

—What are the moderates doing to counter the current trend?

—Are the rightests seeking to take advantage of the current situation? Are they a viable force?

—What role can the United States and individual Western European nations play in strengthening the hand of the moderates? NATO? EC–9?

—How has the current situation in Lisbon influenced developments in Angola? The Azores/Madeira? Has the independence movement in the Azores been revived?

Immediate Issues

—It is mandatory that we keep track of Portuguese developments and actions we might take to advance our interest as carefully and systematically as possible.

—What steps are required to follow through on the current assistance program for the Azevedo government?

—U.S. Installations. We want to be sure that our military installations (particularly in the Azores) are protected if the situation so requires. We also want to be sure that alternate arrangements have been made if this becomes necessary.

—E and E Plans. Are our E and E plans up to date? (Ask State.) And are we fully prepared to implement them if this becomes necessary? Where do we stand on planning for RFE transmitter shifts?

—What is the current status of our Azores contingency planning?

1. Summary: Clift briefed Kissinger on an upcoming WSAG meeting on the situation in Portugal.

   Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 20, Washington Special Actions Group Meeting, 10/13/75—Lebanon, Portugal, and Italy (1). Secret. The tab was not attached; entitled, “Portugal: A New Crisis of Authority,” it is attached to another copy. (Ibid., National Security Adviser, NSC Europe, Canada, and Ocean Affairs Staff Files, Box 18, Portugal 1975 (15) WH) No minutes of the WSAG meeting were found.