Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976

415. Memorandum From Thomas J. Barnes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft), Washington, March 4, 1976.¹ ²

Washington, March 4, 1976

MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

URGENT INFORMATION

March 4, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM: THOMAS J. BARNES [initialed]

SUBJECT: U.S. Residual Forces in Thailand

The Problem

Ambassador Whitehouse has significantly altered his assessment of the likely outcome of our negotiations with the RTG over our residual force presence in Thailand after March 20. Whitehouse now concludes that no segment of the RTG is prepared to publicly or privately support the type of presence we wish to have. He therefore recommends that we authorize him to inform the Thai that we will withdraw from Ko Kha and Chiang Mai, accelerate the reduction of personnel at Utapao, and hold on to Ramasun only if the RTG accords its personnel MAAG-like privileges and immunities. We think Whitehouse has underestimated the degree of support among the Thai hierarchy for our residual presence.

Background

Whitehouse met March 3 with Thai Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Anan Panyarachun. Anan repeated his earlier insistence that all of our residual military forces, except JUSMAG, be subject to Thai legal jurisdiction. Anan threatened that if we do not accept this principle by March 20, all U.S. forces would have to leave Thailand. Whitehouse previously discussed this problem with Prime Minister Khukrit, who expressed agreement with our position that such changes in status need to be carefully negotiated over time.

Whitehouse now believes Khukrit and others in the RTG have done a complete reversal on their position toward our residual presence. In analyzing this confrontation with Anan in a March 4 telegram (Tab A), Whitehouse concludes that:

• -- (Based in part on the CIA report at Tab B), neither the Prime Minister nor any significant segment of the Thai leadership is prepared to support publicly or within the Thai Government the kind of residual presence we have in mind and to which they have previously agreed.
• --It would not be wise to charge back to Khukrit to try to get him to reaffirm the positions he has previously taken.
• -- Significant elements of the Thai hierarchy will now view favorably the retention only of MAAG and possibly Ramasun.
• -- The Thai simply do not believe that they have a vital stake [text not declassified]
• -- The Thai seem to have lost faith in the value of our presence as a counter-weight (to Vietnam).

Residual Force Possibilities

Whitehouse then says that the following possibilities represent about the maximum we could hope to retain:

• -- Refueling and transit rights for U.S. military aircraft, possibly involving the presence in Thailand of a small number of American personnel (presumably at Utapao).
• -- Participation in combined operations at Ramasun.
• -- JUSMAG itself, the Defense Attache Office, Marine Security Guards, and possibly a few other specialized operations.
• -- Training personnel, if we decide on the turnover of the Integrated Communications Systems to the Thai.

Embassy Recommendations

Whitehouse makes the following recommendations:

• -- That he present to Anan as soon as possible the Washington revision of Anan’s Seven Principles governing the U.S. residual presence (State hopes to be able to send these instructions March 5).
• -- That he be authorized to tell Anan that we will be ordering at once a U.S. withdrawal from Ko Kha and Chiang Mai, and the accelerated reduction of U.S. personnel at Utapao.
• -- That we maintain Ramasun provided that Americans stationed there will enjoy MAAG-like privileges and immunities. Otherwise, that he be authorized to tell Anan that Ramasun will be closed.
• -- That JUSMAG will stay on if the Thai so desire.

Expecting that Anan will stick to his position that the Thai must have legal jurisdiction over all residual forces except Ramasun, and that we cannot accept this condition, Whitehouse proposes to follow up his next meeting with Anan by another with the Prime Minister. He says that if there is support for a residual presence, the shock treatment that we will be leaving will bring it out. If there is no support, he claims that nothing will have been lost.

My View

I think Whitehouse has insufficient basis for concluding that Thai negativism is this extreme. Even acknowledging that Ko Kha and some of our Utapao activities (like ammunition storage) are dispensable, we should not go out under a blaze of Thai pressure. Defense and CIA share my view that Whitehouse should go back to Khukrit rather than first see Anan separately. It would be particularly helpful to have Anan present at the Whitehouse-Khukrit meeting so that Anan can make no false claims about speaking for Khukrit. CIA believes that we have sufficient support in the Thai hierarchy to work up Thai resistance to Anan’s hard line. We have recommended that Phil Habib chair a meeting March 5 to discuss our reply to the Whitehouse stance.

1. Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 17, Thailand (18). Secret. Sent for urgent information. At the end of the memorandum, Scowcroft wrote, “Whitehouse’s position doesn’t surprise me at all. What is present status?” Attached but not published is Tab A, telegram 5023 from Bangkok, March 4, in which Whitehouse analyzed opinion within the Thai government toward U.S. residual forces. Also attached but not published is Tab B, Intelligence Information Cable DB-315/02282–76 from March 4.
2. Barnes reported Whitehouse’s claim that the Thai government has withdrawn its support for a significant U.S. military presence in Thailand.