Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976

414. Memorandum From Thomas J. Barnes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft), Washington, February 20, 1976.¹ ²

Washington, February 20, 1976

MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION

February 20, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT [initialed]

FROM: THOMAS J. BARNES

SUBJECT: Thai Elections and Its Implications for the U.S.

The Intelligence Community has prepared an inter-agency memorandum (Tab A) assessing the current Thai election campaign and its implications for the United States. We have already briefed the key points of this assessment to you and the President. Because the memorandum indicates that there is a strong possibility that the Thai military may assume control of the government at some point before the elections or sometime soon thereafter, we are sending it to you again to insure that you are familiar with it.

In his covering memo transmitting the study to you (Tab B), George Bush states that the Intelligence Community gave serious consideration to issuing the study as an alert memorandum. It states further that the decision not to do so should not be construed as a sign of complacency about affairs in Thailand. He added that the situation in Thailand is fluid, and subject to quick and dramatic changes.

Coup plotting has continued since the Intelligence Community issued the memo. Two Americans have approached our Embassy on behalf of groups allegedly ready to attempt a military takeover of the government. [text not declassified] several military officers have been actively discussing this possibility. Ambassador Whitehouse’s most recent judgment on this subject is that, while several groups are actively considering a coup, there is nothing to indicate an imminent attempt.

The key points of the intelligence study are:

• -- Thailand is experiencing a growing sense of malaise concerning the country’s experiment with parliamentary democracy.
• -- In this circumstance, there is a strong possibility that the military might decide to assume control.
• -- A sharp deterioration of security, a breakdown in public order, or the prospect of a left-of-center coalition government coming to power after the election would increase the likelihood of a coup.
• -- The election campaign will probably complicate Thai-U.S. relations. The U.S. presence is likely to become an issue in the campaign, and some pressures may force candidates to insist on a total U.S. military withdrawal.
• -- The U.S. will probably be able to complete the negotiations now in train with the Khukrit government regarding the residual U.S. military presence.
• -- But there is no assurance that a new government will honor what Khukrit agrees to.
• -- If the election goes ahead as scheduled, another centrist-conservative government would likely come into power.
• -- Such a government would probably keep Thai policy toward the U.S. more or less along present lines.
• -- A less likely possibility is either a coalition based exclusively on rightist elements, or one which included the Socialists.
• -- A government in which the Socialists had a strong voice would make it difficult, if not impossible, for the U.S. to maintain any military presence in Thailand. Such a government could prompt the military either to force the government to resign or to overthrow it.
• -- In the event of a military takeover, the resultant government would be sympathetic to U.S. interests.

1. Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 17, Thailand (17). Secret. Sent for information. Scowcroft initialed the memorandum. Attached but not published are Tab A, an Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, February 1976, on “The Thai Election and Its Implications for the US,” and Tab B, a covering memorandum, February 4, from Bush to Scowcroft.
2. Barnes described political events in Thailand.