392. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, Washington, November 14, 1974.1 2
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 14, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SUBJECT: Long-Term US
Military Force Levels in Thailand (FY 1976 and Beyond)
Your October 11, 1974, response to NSDM 249 concerning alternative U.S. military force levels in Thailand has been reviewed. As you have indicated, Options 1 and 4 do not represent viable alternatives for our long-term presence in Thailand. The remaining two options both call for a residual level of 7,000 spaces but differ by three months in arriving at that figure.
In order to consider a broader range of alternatives the President requests you forward an additional option, including manpower requirements, that would fall between the end CY-1974 force level in Thailand of 27,000 personnel and the 7,000 man level proposed in Options 2 and 3. As an illustrative force this level might include 4 tactical fighter squadrons, an AC-130 squadron, a tactical reconnaissance element, a B-52 force of about nine aircraft, and an appropriate number of supporting aircraft.
[signed]
Henry A. Kissinger
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–245, NSDM 249, Folder 4. Secret. Kissinger received this memorandum to sign under a covering memorandum, November 1, from Kennedy, which stated, “It is apparent that a basic difference of opinion exists between Defense and State, on one hand, and the CIA and ourselves on the other, concerning the ability of US combat air units in Thailand to exert any meaningful influence vis-à-vis the Hanoi leadership.” Schlesinger’s October 11 memorandum to Kissinger on “Long-Term US Military force Levels in Thailand (FY 1976 and Beyond),” is attached but not published. ↩
- Kissinger directed the DOD to produce an alternative scenario for U.S. military force levels in Thailand.↩