320. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Eagleburger) to Secretary of Defense Richardson, Washington, April 7, 1973.1 2
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON D.C. 20301
7 Apr 1973
In reply to: I-22058/73
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SUBJECT: U.S. Attitude Toward Philippine Claim to Sabah (U) - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM
(S) This memorandum is in response to your question, “What is our attitude toward Philippine claim to Sabah? Should we try to get Philippines to drop it?” Your question related to the recent Special National Intelligence Estimate issued on “The Muslim Insurrection in the Southern Philippines: Implications for the United States.” A brief background of the Sabah claim issue is attached herewith as a matter of related information.
(S) The United States, in line with its traditional policy of taking no position on territorial disputes between friendly states, has remained officially impartial. We have consistently tried to avoid becoming involved in this particular dispute, or in the attempts of the two parties and other friendly governments to settle it. Assistance in settling the dispute can probably most appropriately be offered by neighboring countries such as Indonesia and Thailand, or through the ASEAN forum. Intervention by the United States or other outside powers would probably not be effective, and would weaken the responsibility of Southeast Asian nations for handling their own problems in a regional context. Philippine renunciation of the claim, though perhaps helpful in easing tensions, would not guarantee that Malaysia could stifle Sabah’s involvement with the Philippine Muslim insurgency. Sabah has traditionally gone its own way, and has the right to secede from the Federation of Malaysia if it so desires.
(S) While I view the Philippine claim as weak, I don’t see it as a viable course of action for us to lean on President Marcos regarding the Sabah claim, which is an emotional issue with the Filipinos. Moreover, we should even be careful about stating a neutral position, which would demonstrate a lack of our support for a traditional ally. The real issue is how to deal with the Muslim frictions in the southern Philippines, a problem which has resisted solution to any degree for over 400 years. The eventual [Page 2] answer may be something akin to a semi-autonomous state worked out through arrangements made by the countries in that region. However, the U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines, in a lengthy cable of 4 April 1973, stated that, “We do not see role for USG in promoting such an arrangement (regional assistance, arms control, resolution of Sabah claim) with Phils...U.S. can make appropriate contribution in meeting emergency relief needs...and possibly participating in regional development effort, if such were to materialize.”
(U) I agree with that assessment.
[signed]
Lawrence S.
Eagleburger
Acting Assistant Secretary
- Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–78–0001, Philippines, 370.64, 7 April 1973. Confidential. Sent for information. Captain Robert Shaid, USN, prepared the memorandum. At the top of the first page of the memorandum, Richardson wrote, “Noted. Sounds right. ELR 4/12.” Attached but not published is an undated background sheet on the “Sabah Claim Issue.” Eagleburger sent the memorandum in response to a comment, attached but not published, that Richardson wrote on SNIE 56–73; see Document 319.↩
- Eagleburger sent Richardson a memorandum on the U.S. attitude toward the Philippine claim to Sabah.↩