Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976

319. Special National Intelligence Estimate 56–73, Washington, March 28, 1973.¹ ²

Washington, March 28, 1973

[Omitted here is the title page, the list of concurrences, and a map of the Philippines.]

THE MUSLIM INSURRECTION IN THE SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

PRECIS

The basic problem behind the Muslim insurrection in the southern Philippines is the Christian encroachment on traditional Muslim lands. A low level of armed dissidence has been endemic to the area, but the recent major fighting was sparked by efforts to pick up Muslim weapons under President Marcos’ martial law decree. The insurgents are increasingly well-armed and despite a lack of any central political organization, they appear to have developed some military coordination. Malaysia, principally the State of Sabah, and Libya have given support to the insurgents.

Continuation of the Muslim insurrection would jeopardize US interests in the Philippines and the Southeast Asian region. It would weaken Marcos’ political position and the ability of the Philippine armed forces to contain the communist New People’s Army. Philippine relations with Malaysia and Indonesia would become increasingly contentious, thus damaging the promising development of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations).

Providing the large quantities of military equipment which Marcos has requested from the US would not give him the capability to suppress the Muslim insurgents. It would alleviate temporarily the pressure for a political compromise and would undoubtedly lead to further requests. Heavy US military support would also strain US relations with Malaysia and, perhaps, Indonesia—particularly if Philippine military units stepped up shelling and bombing which affected the civilian population.

A US response limited only to a speed-up of deliveries of current MAP assistance might not be accepted gracefully by Marcos. He could try to pressure the US for more military aid by attempting to exploit Washington’s desire to retain the basing arrangements at Clark and Subic.

The best hope to avoid a consolidation of the insurrection would be a political compromise that would stop the major fighting and allow the Christians and the Muslims to coexist. The government would probably have to permit the Muslims to retain their personal weapons, and to take some steps to protect the Muslims against wholesale loss of their traditional lands. Some form of local self-rule and greater government attention to their economic needs would also help.

A persuasive US posture to encourage Marcos toward such a compromise would involve economic development assistance and refugee aid for the south, along with the speed-up of MAP support currently planned. Expressions to Manila and the ASEAN nations of the US preference for a political approach to the Muslim problem would probably have some influence.

[Omitted here is the body of the paper.]

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 557, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. IV, January 1972–December 31, 1973. Secret; Controlled Dissem. The CIA and the intelligence organizations of DOS, DOD, and the NSA participated in the preparation of the SNIE. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in the estimate except the representative of the FBI who abstained because the subject was outside of his jurisdiction. In a memorandum, March 20, Holdridge recommended that Scowcroft ask the CIA to produce a SNIE on the Muslim uprising in the southern Philippines. (Ibid.)
2. The estimate examined the implications for the United States of the Muslim insurrection in the southern Philippines.