265. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, March 27, 1975, 5 p.m.1 2
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
- Mr. Richard L. Sneider, U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea
- Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Mr. W.R. Smyser, National Security Council Staff Member
DATE, TIME & PLACE: March 27, 1975
5 p.m.
White House
Sneider: The President’s trip to Korea was very useful. The crucial question in Korea is our credibility, and that trip did much to boost it.
Things are going well in Korea. The country is becoming a middle size power, though we do not realize it. It is too large an economy to be a client state. In ten years it will be a significant military power. It will also have a per capita income of $2,000 or more. It has energy, intelligence and leadership.
Right now Korea is in a real box of rising oil prices and declining export markets.
President Park has been developing his second option, the “what if” option. He says it in terms of a 2 to 3 year period. He wants to accelerate independence. He knows we do not like it, so he does it in a clandestine way.
Park knows that the Administration wants to keep a U.S. presence in Korea but he does not know if we can deliver the goods. Vietnam made it worse. We can no longer tell him what to do.
Scowcroft: Will he go in this direction no matter what we do?
[Page 2]Sneider: We have to go to Park with an honest package that will tell him how we will help him and what we do not want him to do — such as move toward nuclear weapons. Once it gets out that South Korea is developing nuclear weapons, I do not know what the Russians or the Chinese or the North Korean reaction would be.
I do not just want to go in and beat him over the head. I want to give him a package, perhaps a broad energy agreement with ERDA. We are making a lot of ad hoc decisions but none are coordinated.
Scowcroft: That makes good sense. Maybe the debacle in Southeast Asia will help us with other aid bills in time.
Sneider: It may go the other way.
Scowcroft: We fight a constant eroding action from DOD. Schlesinger wants to pull out.
Sneider: I have him interested. He may come out to Korea.
Scowcroft: In response to Congressional pressures, he wants to pull out from other places than Korea as well.
What do you think about I Corps?
Sneider: I think we should hold off until the end of the year and then do it as part of the UNC rearrangement.
I am concerned about coordination. I did not learn of the Yellow Sea incident until several hours after the event.
Scowcroft: We were worried about the scramble.
Sneider: We should have put aircraft over our assets, but not to deter the North Koreans.
On Lockheed, I do not want the French to get this contract. We should draw a line on where we will not give them stuff. We should be in bed with them so as to have access. We should talk to Park about this in the next six months or so.
[Page 3]I have the Department looking at the thing and I have talked to Schlesinger. I have asked for a science attaché. But I do not want to talk to Park without the President’s or the Secretary’s instructions.
Park knows that we are holding back. We have to talk to him promptly. Every time he is worried, he tends to be erratic and he plays silly games.
The President’s visit was a boost to Park. He now wants to come here. I don’t know what a good time is.
Scowcroft: Not now. It may change after Southeast Asian events.
What about the UNC?
Sneider: We have talked to the Koreans on the basis of Kissinger’s decision. We will go to the Security Council and then to the General Assembly. The Non-Aligned Bloc has decided to make North Korea a full member. That means a few more votes for them.
I have told the Koreans they have to fight their own battles with the Non-Aligned. I have told Park to visit some of those countries that will show the initiative and they will take him seriously. All this UNC stuff will force us to sort out Opcon. I think we should keep this. We can exercise caution in a situation. Our commanders have to be able to say “no” to Park. On the air side, we have good control. I also think that, with 40,000 men, Congress won’t be comfortable unless we cannot be dragged into things. If we do not have Opcon, we may need to reduce.
Smyser: Habib says we do not really have Opcon.
Sneider: In the Yellow Sea incident, we gave the orders.
Scowcroft: It turned out okay. We were lucky.
Sneider: They will get a lick in somewhere. They have lost three ships.
Scowcroft: I think it is better not to clobber them in international water. That was our concern.
Sneider: Would we be prepared to do anything with the Chinese and the Russians on Korea? We cannot wait forever. We can live with the present situation, but it is not a good one. I think North Korea will need more Russian economic aid.
[Page 4]Scowcroft: The Sino-Soviet split is a factor.
Sneider: Maybe there would be a payoff for Moscow or Peking. Can you think about it?
In Korea, we should prove that we have a negotiating process. I hope that Schlesinger comes for this security consultants meeting in August.
It was good to see you.
Scowcroft: It was good to see you. Please stop by any time.
- Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 10. Secret. The conversation took place in the White House. The March 26 talking points that Smyser gave Scowcroft, are ibid., Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 9, Korea [5].↩
- Sneider informed Scowcroft about developments in U.S.-South Korean relations.↩