Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976

212. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford, Washington, September 19, 1975.¹ ²

Washington, September 19, 1975

MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 19, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER [HK initialed]
SUBJECT: U.S.-Japan Space Cooperation

NASA has expressed concern that the continuing implementation of the 1969 Space Agreement with Japan will lead to the transfer of sufficient U.S. technology to assist Japan in becoming a viable competitor with the U.S. in the space hardware and launch service market. The Under Secretaries Committee (USC) has assessed this problem and considered our objectives and obligations under the 1969 Agreement (Tab B).

The 1969 Agreement permitted U.S. industry to provide to Japan, on a commercial basis, technology for domestic production of space launching vehicles and communications and other satellites for peaceful applications. The level of launch vehicle technology to be made available was specified in the agreement as that of NASA’s Thor Delta. No specific level of satellite technology was identified in the agreement.

The agreement has facilitated significant sales of hardware, technology, and related services by U.S. industry to Japan and has served cur political interests. However, as implementation of the agreement has proceeded, the Japanese have pressed for increasingly advanced levels of technology beyond what we consider required by the agreement. To accede fully to Japanese requests could speed up Japan’s emergence as a very able competitor in the space market.

A moderate tapering off of the availability of U.S. hardware and technology might well be viewed by the Japanese as inevitable as the U.S. obligations under the treaty are fulfilled. The tapering off would be made more acceptable by continuing assurances that existing U.S. launch policies would provide launch support for their space programs.

The USC has made the following recommendations, which I support.

A. We should allow the 1969 agreement to run its course on the following basis:

1. As required by the agreement, we would allow export of launcher manufacturing technology up to the level of the Thor Delta which was operational at the time the 1969 agreement was concluded (the so-called Delta 58). Guidance and re-entry technology would be excluded.

2. We would seek to limit exports of satellite technology to the level of that in orbit in 1969. NASA will develop appropriate technical criteria to provide a basis for a case-by-case review of export requests.

B. Any export requests going beyond the level of technology in orbit in 1969 as defined above would be evaluated on the basis of our general policy on providing space launching and technology assistance to other countries or would become the subject of a new agreement. Minor requests would be processed through normal export licensing procedures. Restrictions would continue to be imposed on the transfer of hardware and technology by Japan to third parties, and we would require that Japan not provide launch services to third parties without our approval. Any requirement for recoupment (for example, of any U.S. investment in the research and development involved) would be determined by the U.S. policy in force at the time a contract was signed.

The requirement for prior approval of launchings for third parties would assist in safeguarding NASA’s interest in providing launch services to other countries. The Japanese would probably regard this as an acceptable quid pro quo. The fact that we have not provided such extensive assistance to the space launcher program of other countries should preclude possible misinterpretation of the requirement as being discriminatory. It would, however, be important to put the matter to the Japanese in a manner which would not arouse their sensitivities. State and NASA would develop a suitable approach.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the above recommendations as embodied in the NSDM at Tab A.

APPROVE [GRF initialed]
DISAPPROVE

1. Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–61, NSDM 306, U.S.-Japan Space Cooperation. Confidential. Sent for action. The President initialed the “Approve” option, and the recommendations became NSDM 306 on September 24. (ibid., Box H–69, NSDM Originals (2 of 2), NSDM 301-NSDM 315). The report of the Under Secretaries Committee is attached but not published. It arrived under a covering memorandum, May 5, by Ingersoll.
2. Kissinger recommended that Ford sign a NSDM governing U.S.-Japanese space cooperation.