211. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, August 30, 1975, 1145.1 2
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
17 SEP 1975
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT: Meeting with Japanese Minister
for Foreign Affairs
Japan Participants
- Minister for Foreign Affairs, Kiichi Miyazawa
- Deputy Foreign Minister, Keisuke Arita
- Director General, Asian Affairs Bureau, Masuo Takashima
- Director General, American Affairs Bureau, Toshio Yamazaki
- Private Secretary to the Foreign Minister, Tatsuo Arima
- Director, Security Division, American Affairs Bureau, Shintaro Yamashita
- Interpreter, Sadaaki Numata
- United States
- Secretary of Defense, James R. Schlesinger
- US Ambassador to Japan, James D. Hodgson
- Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Amos Jordan
- Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Morton I. Abramowitz
- Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Owen Zurhellen
- Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, MG John A. Wickham, Jr., USA
Time: 1145, 30 August 1975
Place: Prime Minister’s Residence, Likura
House
Following an exchange of pleasantries and picture-taking, Foreign Minister Miyazawa asked the Secretary to discuss his visit to Korea.
The Secretary said that after Vietnam there was great trepidation in the ROK. The ROK also saw Vietnam leading to the continued growth of neo-isolationism in the US, which they believed would encourage military aggression by North Korea. SecDef thought that the basic confidence of the ROK had been restored. At the beginning of the Security Consultative Meeting the Koreans seemed a little uneasy, but at the end they became more confident and relatively relaxed.
The ROK is making a major effort to improve their armed forces. Training and morale are fairly good, but equipment is somewhat [Page 2] obsolete. The Koreans are trying to upgrade their forces. Although in the US the ROK is somewhat taken for granted, their self-help efforts should bring forth a good us response. SecDef concluded that he thought his trip had helped calm ROK apprehensions.
Mr. Miyazawa commented that the Secretary’s statement about the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons was helpful in quieting ROK fears. When he visited Seoul in late July the Koreans were visibly relieved. The Secretary’s visit also was a strong shot in the arm to ROK morale. He did not expect North Korea to take any chances.
The Secretary agreed that North Korea is not likely to start a war, the problem is that someday they expect to. Political problems in South Korea generate some loss of confidence. The ROK needs extensive support in the psychological realm. The ROK feels beleaguered and is worried about the Vietnam example. However, South Vietnam was never an effective society, while South Korea has national cohesion and will. Korea is more dynamic than Vietnam and the Koreans a different people. They should not be so obsessed about the South Vietnam example. Korea is a remarkable success story.
Mr. Miyazawa asked if SecDef knew what made Kim Il-sung run to Peking after Vietnam. The Secretary said that it appeared that Kim perceived a collapse of will on the part of the US. This generated in him hopes that it would spread to Korea. If he could receive Chinese support he might foster subversion in South Korea. Kim showed a real post-Vietnam euphoria in Peking.
Mr. Miyazawa replied that Kim should know Asians better than that. SecDef said that was probably doubtful since Kim is so isolated. We are an ogre to North Korea. North Korea is dominated by ideology and they paint the picture they would like to see. Kim is a driven Marxist who believed that after Vietnam his enemies were on the run.
Mr. Miyazawa said that if Kim is that way, this problem could occur again and we need to expose him to the real world. SecDef agreed this might be helpful but added that North Korea would not likely change while Kim runs the country. There is great room for improvement in North Korea perceptions.
Mr. Miyazawa observed that Japan and the ROK are neighbors but not really good friends. There are strains in the relationship. His visit to Seoul had some success in improving relations. Japan had moved to break the impasse between the two countries and is starting anew to try to improve relations. The ministerial meeting will take place in mid-September.
The Secretary said South Korea is a small, beleaguered country which needs external support. Its internal stability is dependent on the continuation of rapid rates OF economic growth. It would be exceedingly helpful if the Japanese Government would continue to help the ROK economically and politically. Conceivably, because of their unique relationship, Japan might give special preferences to the ROK as the Europeans had done in Africa.
[Page 3]The Foreign Minister said that Japan would like to spend more on Korean Infrastructure needs, but the Korean economy had already taken off. Concessional aid is not possible. Rather Korea needs business-type relationships and commercial channels. Japan would probably give Korea some official loans but economic relations will be pursued through normal commercial channels.
Mr. Schlesinger said that a stable relationship between Japan and the ROK is highly desirable in fostering political stability in South Korea. A reduction in Korean exports to Japan, leading to a fall-off in economic performance, could have repercussions on ROK political stability. Stability in the ROK is important to Japan because of obvious security considerations.
Mr. Miyazawa said the Opposition was opposed to the GOJ helping the ROK. They always asked how the GOJ could aid such a dictatorial government. Miyazawa’s invariable reply was that the GOJ was trying to help the Korean people. He added that there is much confusion in Japan on this subject.
SecDef observed that this is perhaps natural and understandable but not necessarily correct. If the ROK Government lacks external support, it would be less inclined to reduce the degree of authoritarianism. If we and Japan deny external support to the Koreans, it would seriously affect the ROK’s internal political situation.
Mr. Miyazawa said that depended on whether one was thinking short or long range.
The Secretary said that despite the absence of civil liberties as we knew them, South Korea still had many elements of a free society. His press conference in Seoul was pretty open, not like ones in Yugoslavia, Spain or East Germany. Korea had achieved much in a very brief time and under difficult conditions. The situation in the South is not too bad, although obviously not what we desire. Certainly conditions are not bad if we compare them with the North.
Mr. Miyazawa agreed that there is no question about greater North Korean repression.
SecDef observed that at present Japan is now the only real democracy in Asia. We need to better convey to the press realistic yardsticks in measuring Asian countries. One of America’s problems in Vietnam was that the US press was looking at the situation not in the light of realistic alternatives but in abstract concepts. There was a high degree of personal freedom in South Vietnam. The press needed to be more politically realistic on this point.
Mr. Miyazawa stated that we need to avoid the collapse of the Pak government. There was no such danger (oil collapse) in the North where the concept or freedom does not exist.
The Secretary said there were dilemmas in the democratic process. We need to maintain our goals but we have to be judicious in attaining them.
[Page 4]Mr. Miyazawa thought that President Pak could be endangered either by a recession or prosperity. Kim Il-sung’s policies, however, have certainly been a help to Pak.
The Secretary replied that it is necessary to maintain a high rate of economic growth in South Korea. He was impressed with the Korean standard of living, adding they are indeed in the takeoff period.
Mr. Miyazawa agreed that the ROK had taken off. Despite the oil crisis he was sure that economic growth would again pick up.
The Secretary observed that the threat from the North is politically helpful to Pak. The strength and imminence of the threat is exaggerated by the ROK Government. However, the ROK has day-to-day pressures we do not feel such as infiltration and tunneling, which are symptomatic and indicative of a continuing threat. Given all these things, as well as the personal tragedies he had suffered because of the North, it is no wonder that President Pak is concerned about security.
Mr. Miyazawa asked for the Secretary’s thoughts on the reasons for the tunnels.
The Secretary replied that they would allow regimental size forces to get behind the ROK lines in an outright conflict. He said Korea probably exaggerates the number of men that can go through the tunnels, but units the size of regiments would certainly be disruptive to ROK defenses.
Mr. Miyazawa thought that Pak had changed from early days. He had become a victim of his own power and had grown isolated. Few dared to tell him the truth. Noting that Pak saw some US Congressmen who spoke their minds, he asked if people could get through to Pak to give him a better sense of reality.
The Secretary asked Mr. Miyazawa if he had any suggestions on this point. He noted that in this case truth would probably come largely from abroad. But Pak must have confidence in any nation telling him unpalatable things.
Mr. Miyazawa asked how the ROK compared to the North in air power.
The Secretary replied that the ROK is inferior. South Korean equipment is somewhat obsolete. The ROK also has a small defense industry, while North Korea has a substantial one which could build tanks and submarines. He cautioned, however, not to exaggerate ROK vulnerabilities although the ROK is somewhat inferior in air and naval forces. He added that if the ROK were not able to rely on the US, perhaps some of these deficiencies might be significant. At the SCM the Secretary had stressed the complementarity of US-ROK forces.
Mr. Miyazawa then turned the talk to UN resolutions, adding that the resolutions of both sides seem to have some common points: they both need Security Council approval and call for talks between the US, North Korea and other parties. Perhaps some way could be found of bringing them together, although the North Korean resolution is unrealistic.
[Page 5]The Secretary noted that the Japanese Government would like to promote a better dialogue between North and South. South Korea has made serious efforts to that end but with no response. North Korea claims it is the only legitimate government on the Peninsula. As long as the North maintains that attitude, there is not much chance for a genuine dialogue between the two. The Secretary suggested that direct talks between the US and North Korea would only be interpreted as undermining South Korea. Clearly we do not want this. North Korea must be willing to accept the legitimacy of South Korea or there is no basis for detente. North Korea apparently has a different notion of what detente means.
Mr. Miyazawa said that in the Military Armistice Commission there is no place for the ROK per se, the ROK not being a signatory to the Armistice. While North Korea did recognize the ROK in the 1972 talks, North Korea is the only Korean party to the Armistice. That appears to be a basis for their logic.
The Secretary continued that the logic of their position is to carefully select those points that buttress them as the only legal government in Korea. We should obviously not support them in such an effort.
Mr. Miyazawa said that he had instructed the Japanese Ambassador at the UN to find out the real intent of the North Korean resolution, adding that perhaps there is an opportunity for a genuine dialogue.
The Secretary said the Japanese could sound them out, but he would not be too surprised if they find that the North really intends what it professes. What the North apparently is now aiming for is to withdraw our legitimacy. While that will not affect our deployments in Korea, the North hopes it will weaken our underpinnings. That seems to be their simple and straight forward objective.
The group then went to lunch.